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This dissertation explores techniques for automating program analysis, with a
focus on validating and securely executing differentially private programs. Differential privacy allows analysts to study general patterns among individuals, while
providing strong protections against identity leakage.
To automatically check differential privacy for programs, we develop Fuzzi: a
three-level logic for differential privacy. Fuzzi’s lowest level is a general-purpose
logic; its middle level is apRHL, a program logic for mechanical construction of
differential privacy proofs; and its top level is a novel sensitivity logic for tracking
sensitivity bounds, a fundamental building block of differential privacy.
Some differentially private algorithms have sophisticated proofs that cannot be
derived by a compositional typechecking process. To detect incorrect implementations for these algorithms, we develop DPCheck for testing differential privacy
automatically. Adapting a well-known “pointwise” proof technique for differential privacy, DPCheck observes runtime program behaviors, and derives formulas
that constrain potential privacy proofs.
Once we are convinced that a program is differentially private, we often still
have to trust that the machine executing the program does not misbehave and
leak sensitive results. For analytics at scale, computation is often delegated to networked computers that may become compromised. To securely run differentially
private analytics at scale, we develop Orchard, a system that can answer many differentially private queries over data distributed among millions of user devices.
Orchard leverages cryptographic primitives to employ untrusted computers, while
preventing untrusted computers from observing sensitive results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Dwork et al. [2006] introduced the idea of using randomized noise to perturb computation involving sensitive data gathered from individuals, and proved that such
noised computation provides strong guarantees for individual privacy protection.
Dwork et al. define privacy protection as an upper bound on how likely an adversary can differentiate whether an individual’s data participated in the computation
or not. Randomized computation with such an upper bound is called differentially
private.
The inception of differential privacy ignited research across the theory, systems,
and programming language fields. Theory researchers invented algorithms for differentially private statistical learning, and system researchers built scalable software that deployed differential privacy in the real world. Programming language
researchers recognized the connection between the compositional property of differential privacy and the compositional property of type and proof systems, and
developed a rich body of type and proof systems for mechanically verifiable proofs
of differential privacy. Since proving differential privacy property is an intricate
task with many subtle openings for mistakes [Lyu et al., 2016], formal systems of
differential privacy are not only just conceptually interesting to programming language theorists, but are also empirically important for ensuring correctness for the
development of differential private programs.
This dissertation applies programming language theory towards building automated tools for machine-assisted development of differentially private programs.
In particular,
1. We realize proof automation for differential privacy through elaboration of
a lightweight type system over an expressive program logic for differential
privacy.
2. We automatically test differential privacy by solving constraints gathered
from concrete and symbolic program executions.
1

3. We compile differentially private programs into low-level instructions designed for cryptographically secure execution of differentially private algorithms over distributed data.

1.1

Challenges

Proving differential privacy involves the intrinsic challenge of analyzing randomized programs. Deterministic programs produce a single possible execution trace
under an input, while randomized programs produce a set of possible execution
traces, each with different probability, under a single input. For example, a randomized program may branch on a randomized value, steering program execution towards different paths with different probability. A correct analysis of the
program’s behavior with such a probabilistic branch must account for both states
and their associated probability. As program execution proceeds, the set of possible program behaviors and their associated probability may quickly explode in
complexity. A prover must find an appropriate abstraction that hides the messy
calculations of probability, and is general enough for reasoning about differential
privacy.
Previous work ([Albarghouthi and Hsu, 2017, Barthe et al., 2013, 2016, Hsu,
2017]) discovers that probabilistic couplings strike a balance between abstraction
and expressiveness for proving relational properties on randomized programs. Differential privacy is an instance of relational property, and previous work demonstrates that probabilistic couplings vastly simplifies differential privacy proofs.
In particular, Barthe et al. [2013, 2016] propose a formal program logic called
apRHL for differential privacy. The benefit of mechanically constructing proofs
for differential privacy is that mistakes in proofs are now much easier to detect
than mistakes hidden in an informal proof—any mismatch between expectations
and applications of proof rules is a mistake. Such a formal proof system based on
probabilistic coupling is a solid theoretical foundation for machine-assisted development of differentially private programs. However, the expressiveness of apRHL
interferes with automation: there is no algorithm for deciding whether a judgment
in apRHL has a proof. To automate differential privacy proofs based on apRHL, we
must trade off support for some sophisticated proofs. Nevertheless, we observe
that in differential privacy proofs of whole programs, applications of non-trivial
proof rules are often concentrated in small subroutines. This pattern allows us to
layer a type system with automatic typechecking over a subset of apRHL, together
with an interface between the type system and apRHL, so that experts may manually derive apRHL proofs for complex subroutines. This interface connects the
2

results of manual apRHL proofs with the rest of the type system, and allows programmers to automatically apply expert knowledge in a typechecking process of
programs that rely on subroutines with non-trivial privacy proofs.
Type systems ([Gaboardi et al., 2013a, Near et al., 2019, Reed and Pierce, 2010a,
Winograd-Cort et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2019]) prove differential privacy by analyzing subterms of a program independently, and combining the independent results with the composition principles of differential privacy. However, certain differentially private programs provide stronger privacy protection than that derived
through composition. These programs are often referred to as differentially private
algorithms. Theorists devote pages of manual proofs to establish the strong privacy
protection provided by these algorithms, and implementations of these algorithms
are typically trusted to demonstrate the same privacy protection as originally designed. We wish to increase our confidence in these algorithm implementations.
For deterministic programs, software testing is a reliable method for detecting defects.
However, the level of differential privacy protection is not a directly observable
property from running the implementation. Researchers have developed statistical
testing methods [Ding et al., 2018a] to detect violations of differential privacy, by
running a program many times, comparing the empirical distribution of outputs of
the tested program, and looking for large difference in the empirical distributions.
However, these methods rely on heuristics for binning outputs, so that the empirical distributions can be represented and compared as histograms. For non-numeric
outputs, finding effective heuristics is difficult.
We approach the challenge of testing differential privacy by extracting a testing strategy out of a commonly used proof technique called “proof by pointwise
equality” for differential privacy. This proof technique is used in both informal
and formal proofs of differential privacy, in which two independent runs of a program are related through probabilistic couplings so that both runs always arrive at
the same output value. A pointwise equality proof universally quantifies over one
of the two related runs. In the testing strategy adapted from the pointwise proof
technique, we instantiate universally quantified runs by many observed program
executions, and build a symbolic model that constrains evidence of differential
privacy over these concretely observed runs.
Typechecking and testing can protect us from running non-differentially private programs on secret data. However, these methods cannot protect against compromised actors trusted to run differentially private computations. Both commercial and government organizations (Apple Differential Privacy Team [2017], Erlingsson et al. [2014a], N. Dajani et al. [2017], Petti and Flaxman [2019]) are already
using differential privacy, and in these existing use cases, individuals either noise
3

their data before contributing the data, or trust that the actor performing the analysis is never compromised. Masking individual data before collection introduces a
huge amount of noise when such data is aggregated, sacrificing accuracy.
To eliminate the component of trust and to reduce the total amount of noise,
Roth et al. [2019] propose using secure multiparty computation and additively homomorphic encryption to (1) prevent a data analyst from observing raw data in
the clear, (2) randomly elect a distributed committee of individuals to act as a distributed verifier, and (3) ask this committee to verify that the analyst has faithfully
carried out the intended computation over sensitive data, and to decrypt noised
data. Roth et al. demonstrate that their system is both scalable, and secure.
We wish to enforce the same kind of boundary between encrypted sensitive
data and clear released data for many differentially private programs. However,
Roth et al. [2019]’s system is designed to run a single type of differentially private algorithm. The main challenge here is to extract a general secure computation
primitive from Roth et al.’s system, and express other kinds of differentially private programs in terms of this primitive. We approach this issue by distilling a
primitive called bmcs (broadcast, map, clip, and sum) that can be implemented in
a distributed system with an untrusted aggregator, and many participating user
devices that contribute data. We then design a compiler to automatically transform Fuzz [Reed and Pierce, 2010b] (a lambda calculus for differential privacy)
programs into distributed computation orchestrated by bmcs. A critical requirement on such a compiler is that the generated code must be frugal in invocations
of the bmcs primitive, as each invocation kicks off a distributed protocol with many
participants. We solve this problem by designing an optimization step to fuse independent bmcs invocations.

1.2

Contributions

Chapter 2 reviews discrete probability distribution and differential privacy. Specifically, we provide an overview of probabilistic coupling and the program logic
apRHL in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3. While probability theorists are familiar with
couplings, programming language researchers may find couplings a novel concept. Section 2.2 aims to provide readers who have not seen couplings before an
intuition through examples, counterexamples, and visualization of probability distributions.
Additionally, this dissertation uses a probabilistic variant of PCF as the object
language for testing differential privacy. Our work on testing evaluates terms in
this language with both a probabilistic concrete operational semantics, and a non4

deterministic symbolic operational semantics. Consistency between these two different kinds of interpretation is critical for ensuring our differential privacy tests
produce meaningful results. Section 2.4 presents the object language Pλ, and establishes agreement between these two semantics through logical relations.
Chapter 3 presents our design of an automated, three-level type system for differential privacy, with apRHL as a foundation for elaboration of types. We elaborate typing judgments into apRHL judgments, and elaborate a set of core typing
rules into theorems over apRHL judgments. We establish soundness for the core
typing rules by justifying elaborated theorems, and present a framework that allows an expert to extend the type system with additional typing rules manually
justified in apRHL. Furthermore, we evaluate this type system by implementing
four private machine learning tasks, and comparing the automatically derived sensitivity and privacy parameters to those derived through a manual analysis.
Chapter 4 proposes a testing method of differential privacy, adapted from the
commonly used pointwise proof technique for differential privacy. We present the
connection between the testing method and the pointwise proof technique in the
framework of probabilistic coupling. We prove that the testing method always accepts a class of well-behaved programs, and also rejects ill-behaved programs with
high probability. We evaluate the testing method on 10 benchmark algorithms,
and demonstrate that this testing method correctly distinguishes private and nonprivate implementations for each algorithm. In particular, the testing method is the
first to distinguish private and non-private variants of a sophisticated algorithm
called PrivTree. To evaluate whether the testing framework can help programmers
develop real-world differentially private systems, we test an implementation of
the core mechanism for the Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS) deployed for the
2020 US Census [N. Dajani et al., 2017], use the code extraction feature of the testing
framework to replace the original implementation with the tested implementation,
and run statistical tests to ensure both versions of DAS behave identically.
Chapter 5 introduces a compiler designed to transform high-level differentially
private queries into computations orchestrated by a secure multiparty computation (MPC) primitive. We extract this MPC primitive from Roth et al. [2019]’s work,
and present transformations from high-level code into this low-level secure computation primitive. Each invocation of this primitive is expensive, and our transformation process involves an optimization step based on fusion, for reducing the
number of invocations of this primitive. We evaluate this compiler on 17 differentially private queries, and found the compiler capable of generating code for 14 of
the 17. Before this work, no system can handle more than one of the 17 queries at
scale without trusting the aggregator.
While this dissertation builds upon probabilistic coupling and apRHL, a sepa5

rate line of related work has built type systems that can semi-automatically typecheck sophisticated differential privacy algorithms through a different technique
called randomness alignment. Albarghouthi and Hsu [2017] compare an advanced
variant of probabilistic coupling with randomness alignment. In Chapter 7, we extend this comparison to approximate coupling and randomness alignment, and
highlight the key difference between proofs based on approximate couplings in
apRHL, and proofs of differential privacy constructed through randomness alignment.
Chapter 8 discusses related work for typechecking differential privacy, testing differential privacy, and secure computations designed for differential privacy.
Chapter 9 discusses concrete next steps, and the broader research directions that
may follow from this dissertation.
Acknowledgements The technical contributions of this dissertation draw from
collaborations with Benjamin Pierce, Aaron Roth, Andreas Haeberlen, and Edo
Roth. Chapter 3 is based on [Zhang et al., 2019]. Chapter 4 builds upon [Zhang
et al., 2020]. Chapter 5 first appears in [Roth et al., 2020]. The author contributed
to the main technical material towards Zhang et al. [2019], Zhang et al. [2020], and
the compiler design in Roth et al. [2020].
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Differential Privacy

Differential privacy is a property of randomized programs—programs that operate
on probability distributions. First, we give a definition of probability distribution
that will be used throughout this work.
A discrete distribution over elements of τ is a function from an enumerable set τ
to [0, 1]. Such a function maps each value in τ to an associated probability. We write
τ for the set of discrete distributions over values in τ . Subsets E ⊆ τ are called
events under τ . The support of a discrete distribution µ is the subset of τ whose
elements have non-zero probability: supp(µ) = {x ∈ τ | µ(x) > 0}.
Definition 1 (Sub-distribution and Proper distribution). Let µ :
τ be a discrete
distribution. We call µ a sub-distribution if the sum of probabilities over its support
P
may be less than 1:
a proper distribution if the sum of
v∈supp(µ) ≤ 1. We call µ
P
probability values over its support is exactly 1: v∈supp(µ) = 1.
Sub-distributions are useful for describing the semantics of randomized programs because they naturally model non-termination through the “missing probability” [Kozen, 1979]. In this work, we always spell out whether a subject distribution is a proper distribution or a sub-distribution.
Differential privacy is a relational property. Informally, a program is differentially private if it produces similar distributions when the program runs on similar inputs. The exact similarity relation on inputs depends on what private information we care about protecting. For example, a program f may be counting the
number of patients diagnosed with some disease in a medical database; by regulations, the program f must not leak the diagnosis of any particular patient. More
precisely, the distribution of outputs should be nearly the same, if the diagnosis
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of any single patient changes in the input database. For this example, an appropriate similarity relation on inputs is “at most one patient’s data may be different
between two input databases”, or, more generally:
Definition 2. Two multisets have database distance k if k items must be added or
removed to make the two contain exactly the same items.
For the example above, the similarity relation bounds the database distance on
two similar medical databases by 1.
Another common similarity relation is the L1 -distance between two vectors of
numbers.
Definition 3. The L1 -distance between vectors x1 , x2 ∈ τ n is the sum of the distance
values at each coordinate between the two vectors.
Some programs also use a similarity relation based on the L∞ -distance between
two vectors.
Definition 4. The L∞ -distance between vectors x1 , x2 ∈ τ n is the maximum distance
value among distance values at each coordinate between the two vectors.
Programs that use these distance-based similarity relations consider two inputs
as similar, if the distance between them is bounded by a constant (usually the constant is 1).
Definition 5 ((ε, δ)-Differential Privacy [Dwork and Roth, 2014]). A randomized
program f : τ →
σ is (ε, δ)-differentially private if, for all similar inputs (x1 , x2 ) ∈
τ × τ , the probability of any output event E ⊆ σ satisfies the inequality:
Pf (x1 ) [E] ≤ eε Pf (x2 ) [E] + δ
The ε and δ parameters in the definition are “privacy parameters”. We can interpret them as a quantitative measure of how difficult it is for an adversary to
differentiate two runs by observing a single output value from f . As ε increases,
the multiplicative bound on the difference in probabilities becomes looser, and the
bound on an adversary’s ability in distinguishing two executions of f also becomes
looser. Experts recommend picking small ε values (e.g. 1.0) for meaningful privacy
protection [Hsu et al., 2014]. On the other hand, the parameter δ bounds the probability of “catastrophic failure”—failure to provide any privacy protection at all.
The value of δ should generally be very small.
An important tool for writing differentially private programs is the Laplace
distribution. The Laplace distribution is commonly defined as a continuous distribution, but rigorous proofs of differential privacy using continuous distributions
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require sophisticated measure theory [Sato et al., 2019]. To simplify foundations,
we follow previous work on program semantics and differential privacy [Albarghouthi and Hsu, 2017, Hsu, 2017, Reed and Pierce, 2010a, Wang et al., 2019, Zhang
and Kifer, 2017], and assume a discretized, countable subset of the reals for representable numbers. We write ω for the constant gap between consecutive values. In
this work, we assume all numeric values are drawn from this discretized domain
with granularity ω unless otherwise specified.
The discrete Laplace distribution is formally a two-sided geometric distribution. It is
parameterized by a center c, and a parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. Ghosh et al. [2009] show the
two-sided geometric distribution can provide the same differential privacy guarantees as the continuous Laplace distribution. The continuous Laplace distribution is parameterized by a center c and a width parameter w that controls how
centered the distribution is around c. Ghosh et al. [2009] also show a straightforward translation between the two-sided geometric distribution parameter α and
the corresponding parameter w for an equivalent discrete Laplace distribution. We
will exclusively use the width parameter w to parameterize discrete Laplace distributions in this work.
The probability assigned to each value by the discrete
Laplace distribution can be visualized by this graph to
the right. The vertical bars have width ω, are centered on
each representable numeric value, and their height sum
up to 1.

2.2

Proofs with Approximate Coupling

Proving a program is differentially private amounts to establishing the inequality
relation in Definition 5. A possible approach is to first calculate a closed formula
for the output distribution, and demonstrate the inequality holds for all similar
inputs using the closed formula.
Many interesting differentially private programs involve loops and branches.
These control flow features induce complex structures on the output distributions,
making closed formulas of output distributions difficult or impossible to compute.
Barthe et al. [2016] demonstrate an abstraction called approximate coupling that
significantly simplifies differential privacy proofs for programs. Barthe et al. use
approximate couplings as the foundation of a program logic—apRHL—designed
to express formal differential privacy proofs. This dissertation builds upon results
of approximate couplings and apRHL. We introduce approximate couplings and
apRHL to set up the necessary background for later chapters.
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Informally, the definition of differential privacy (Definition 5) says identical
events have similar probability under related output distributions. An approximate coupling is a precise way of describing what “similar probability” means
for an arbitrary relation R between samples. In particular, we can instantiate R
with the “identical events” relation to recover differential privacy. We will give the
formal definition of approximate couplings, followed by visualized examples and
counterexamples of approximate couplings to give intuition behind the technical
definition.
To define approximate couplings, we first need to understand joint distributions, and an operation called marginalization on joint distributions.
A joint distribution µ :
(τ1 × τ2 ) is a distribution over pairs. We define two
operations πL :
(τ1 × τ2 ) →
τ1 and πR :
(τ1 × τ2 ) →
τ2 to convert a joint
distribution to a distribution over the left and right projection from the pair. We
call πL and πR the left and right marginalization operations.
Definition 6 (Left and Right Marginalization). Given µ :
X
πL (µ) , λ (v : τ1 ).
µ ((v, v2 )) .

(τ1 × τ2 ), let

v2 ∈τ2

Similarly, let
πR (µ) , λ (v : τ2 ).

X

µ ((v1 , v)) .

v1 ∈τ1

The marginalization operations effectively “project” the joint distribution over
one dimension of the pair, by summing up probability from the collapsed dimension into values on the remaining dimension.
The next piece we need is a pseudo-distance function on distributions, called
-divergence.
Definition 7 (-divergence). Let  ≥ 0 be a parameter. The -divergence between two
distributions µ1 :
τ and µ2 :
τ is defined as a supremum over events under τ
∆ (µ1 , µ2 ) = supS⊆τ (Pµ1 [S] − e Pµ2 [S]) .
A differentiating event is one that has a large difference in probability under µ1
and µ2 . Intuitively, the value of ∆ (µ1 , µ2 ) is the difference in probability for the
most differentiating event. In particular, the probability of events is scaled by e
under µ2 , closely following the inequality relation from Definition 5. The similarity between Definition 7 and Definition 5 establish a direct connection between
bounding -divergence, and proving differential privacy. This connection can be
demonstrated by the following lemma:
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Lemma 8. A program f is (, δ)-differentially private iff, the following inequality
holds for all similar inputs x1 ∼ x2 :
∆ (f (x1 ), f (x2 )) ≤ δ.
Proof. By unpacking definition of -divergence.
We now give the definition of approximate couplings. An approximate coupling lifts a relation R ⊆ τ1 × τ2 that is oblivious in probability distributions, into a
relation over two distributions—a relation over
τ1 ×
τ2 .
Definition 9 (Approximate Coupling [Barthe and Olmedo, 2013]). Given µ1 :
τ1
and µ2 :
τ2 , and a relation R ⊆ τ1 × τ2 , an (, δ)-approximate lifting of R is a pair
of witness distributions µL and µR that satisfy these three properties:
1. Marginal: πL (µL ) = µ1 and πR (µR ) = µ2 ,
2. Support: supp(µL ) ⊆ R and supp(µR ) ⊆ R, and
3. Distance: ∆ (µL , µR ) ≤ δ.
The marginal property requires that the left witness µL can be used to simulate
drawing samples from µ1 . If we repeatedly draw samples from the left witness,
and only keep the first projection from these samples, then this process cannot be
distinguished from drawing directly from µ1 . The marginal property places the
same requirement on the right witness µR . Informally, the witness distributions µL
and µR are faithful models of the related distributions µ1 and µ2 .
The support property says that the witness distributions only produce samples
of interest—pairs of values in R. Combining the marginal property and the support property, we know that the witness distributions not only faithfully model
the related distributions, but also “synchronize the randomness” in a way that
we only draw related samples from the two distributions. This is the reason that
we call such a construction an approximate “coupling” between distributions. The
marginal and support property together allow us to study the two related distributions, using the witness distributions as proxies.
Finally, the distance property requires that the -divergence between the two
witness distributions is bounded. By bounding the probability difference for the
most differentiating pairs of related samples under the two witness distributions,
this property ensures that related samples also have similar probability under the
two related distributions.
We will give some intuition to the definition of approximate couplings through
examples and counterexamples. We introduce two important approximate couplings over Laplace distributions as examples of approximate couplings [Hsu,
2017]. These two kinds of couplings are frequently used in differential privacy
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Figure 2.1: Null coupling between two Laplace distributions
proofs. We mutate these two approximate couplings to produce counterexamples,
and explain the consequences of breaking the validity requirements on these counterexamples.
Lemma 10 (Null Coupling). Let c1 , c2 and w be parameters. Given two Laplace
distributions lap(c1 , w) and lap(c2 , w), centered at c1 and c2 respectively, and the
relation R = {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 − c1 = x2 − c2 }, the approximate coupling R]0,0 is valid.
Hsu [2017] gives an explicit construction for the witness distributions in the
proof of this lemma. Instead of rephrasing Hsu’s proof, we visualize the witness
joint distribution constructed by Hsu for the null coupling, and check the validity
requirements using the visualization. On the left of Figure 2.1, we plot two Laplace
distributions centered at 0 and 1, respectively. Let us instantiate the null coupling
relation R for these two distributions: R = {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 −0 = x2 −1}. In this case, the
relation R always connects a sample from the first Laplace distribution (centered
at 0) with a sample from the second Laplace distribution (centered at 1) of distance
1 to the right.
The vertical dotted lines in the left plot mark a pair of (x1 , x2 ) ∈ R. The horizontal dotted line highlights the probability of these two samples under their respective distributions. We see that the probability values are identical for this pair of
(x1 , x2 ) ∈ R. In fact, all related samples in R have the same probability. Intuitively,
having identical probability for related samples implies no event is differentiating
under R—hence the name null coupling.
We demonstrate a visualization of the witness distributions constructed by Hsu
[2017] for this null coupling. Null coupling uses the same joint distribution for both
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Figure 2.2: Marginalizations of null coupling witness
witnesses, so we visualize just one joint distribution on the right of Figure 2.1.
First, we check the marginal condition. This condition is easier to visually validate by viewing the witness distribution from the perspectives shown in Figure 2.2.
The left plot in Figure 2.2 demonstrates that the left marginalization of the witness
matches the Laplace distribution centered at 0, and the right plot demonstrates the
right marginalization matches the Laplace distribution centered at 1.
Next, we visually check the support condition. The support of witness distribution is a line on the horizontal plane x2 = x1 + 1. Note that this line is precisely
the set R. So, we know that the support of the witness is indeed a subset of R.
Finally, the distance condition is trivially true because the two witness distributions are identical, and we can easily check that 0-divergence is always 0 for
identical distributions by unfolding Definition 7.
We now introduce the shift coupling between two Laplace distributions and
inspect the visualization of an example shift coupling and the associated witness
distributions.
Lemma 11 (Shift coupling). Let c1 , c2 and w be parameters. Given two Laplace
distributions lap(c1 , w) and lap(c2 , w), a number s, and a number k such that |s +
c1 − c2 | ≤ k, let the relation R be {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 + s = x2 }. The approximate coupling
R]k/w,0 is valid.
The construction of the witness distributions can be found in Hsu [2017]. Again,
we focus on establishing an intuition behind shift coupling through visualizations
of the witness distributions.
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Figure 2.3: Shift coupling between two Laplace distributions
The left image of Figure 2.3 shows two Laplace distributions with width 1, and
the two distributions are centered at 0 and 1 respectively. We instantiate the coupling parameters with s = 2 and k = 1. The two vertical dotted lines on the left
mark a pair of samples in the relation R = {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 + 2 = x2 }. The right of Figure 2.3 shows the two witness distributions that establish the validity of this shift
coupling.
Let us visually check the first two validity conditions for shift coupling. Figure 2.4 shows the two marginalizations of the left and right witness distributions.
In particular, the witness distribution in green gradient is the left witness, whose
left marginalization matches lap(0, 1), and the witness distribution in red gradient
is the right witness whose right marginalization matches lap(1, 1).
The support condition is visually demonstrated by Figure 2.5. From this topdown perspective, we see that the support of both witness distributions lie on the
line x1 + 2 = x2 , and this is the shift relation we selected.
We can mutate the shift coupling in two ways and visualize these mutated
counterexamples. Figure 2.6 demonstrates a pair of mutated witness distributions
that break the support condition, but preserve the marginal condition. From the
first and second plot, we can observe that the distribution with green gradient is
still centered at 0, and the distribution with red gradient is still centered at 1. However, as the third plot shows, these two distributions no longer both span the line
x1 + 2 = x2 . In this counterexample, even though the joint distributions can simulate sampling from the related Laplace distributions, samples from one of the joint
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Figure 2.4: Shift coupling marginalization condition
distributions are no longer synchronized correctly in the intended relation R. So,
these joint distributions are not valid witnesses for the shift coupling between the
two Laplace distributions over the relation R = {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 + 2 = x2 }.
Figure 2.7 demonstrates a pair of mutated witness distributions that breaks the
marginal condition, but preserves the support condition. We can see that the joint
distribution with green gradient is still centered at 0 when marginalized towards
the left, but the right marginalization of the distribution colored in red gradient is
now centered at 1.5 instead of 1. The third plot shows both joint distributions still
span the support R. This pair of joint distributions are not valid witnesses for the
two Laplace distributions that are shown in Figure 2.3 due to the broken marginal
condition, but they can serve as valid witnesses for another pair of Laplace distributions that are centered at 0 and 1.5 respectively.
Approximate couplings can be built for many kinds of relations over samples.
Since (, δ)-differential privacy is a relation between two distributions produced
by a program on similar inputs, we can construct approximate couplings with a
carefully designed R to describe differential privacy. In particular, the fundamental property of approximate couplings [Barthe et al., 2013] tells us exactly how to
describe (, δ)-differential privacy using approximate couplings.
Lemma 12 (Fundamental property of approximate couplings Barthe et al. [2013]).
Let E1 and E2 be events for the domains τ1 and τ2 . Let µ1 :
τ1 and µ2 :
τ2 be
distributions over these domains. Let the relation R be defined by
R = {(x1 , x2 ) ∈ τ1 × τ2 | x1 ∈ E1 → x2 ∈ E2 }.

15

Figure 2.5: Shift coupling support condition
Then, given an approximate coupling R],δ , the following inequality on µ1 and µ2
holds:
Pµ1 [E1 ] ≤ e Pµ2 [E2 ] + δ
If we can find an approximate coupling for every identical pair of events, then
we have a proof of (, δ)-differential privacy by Lemma 12.
Differential privacy proofs by approximate coupling are effective for two reasons. The first reason is the implication from approximate coupling to differential
privacy. The second reason is that compositions of approximate couplings naturally follow from compositions of the related probability distributions. As a result,
approximate couplings form composable specifications for probabilistic programs.

2.3

A Program Logic for Differential Privacy

We now review how the program logic apRHL uses approximate couplings as
underlying proof objects to build a proof system for differential privacy.

2.3.1

The Object Language pWhile

The logic apRHL uses a small imperative programming language P W HILE as the
object language. P W HILE is the minimal imperative language, extended with a spe16

Figure 2.6: Broken witness distributions that violate the support condition

Figure 2.7: Broken witness distributions that violate the marginal condition
cial assignment form that samples Laplace noise. The datatypes in this language
involve booleans, numbers, and an array type that may contain any of the primitive types. We give the grammar of the language in Figure 2.8.
Expressions of P W HILE range over two disjoint sets of variables: a set Vars
of program variables—standard variables that can be read from and modified by
P W HILE programs, and a set L of logical variables that model constant parameters
in P W HILE programs. Expressions in P W HILE include arithmetic terms, comparison terms, and operations on arrays. The expression e1 :: e2 evaluates to a new
array value that places e1 at the head, followed by the array value of e2 . The expression [ ] is an empty array. The expression e1 ? e2 : e2 is a conditional term that
evaluates to the value of e2 or e3 depending on whether e1 evaluates to true or
false. Finally, expressions may use primitive operations O. Primitive operations
include array indexing, and array updates. All expressions can be typed, and we
only consider well-typed expressions.
P W HILE has a denotational semantics which models commands as functions
over program states. Formally, a program state m is a map from program variables
Vars to values. We write M for the set of program states over this set of variables.
To interpret terms in P W HILE, we also need an association between logical vari17

op := + | − | ∗ | / | > | ≥ | < | ≤
e := x ∈ Vars | y ∈ L | e1 op e2 | Z | Rω
e1 :: e2 | [ ] | e1 ? e2 : e3 | ¬ e | O(e, . . . , e)
w ∈ R>0
ω
c := x = e | c1 ; c2 |
x = lap(e, w) |
if e then c1 else c2 end |
while e do c end |
skip
Figure 2.8: Grammar of pWhile
ables and constant values. This association is called a logical context, and we write
ρ for a logical context.
An expression e with datatype τ is modeled by a function [[e]]ρ : M → τ , and
a command c is modeled by a function [[c]]ρ : M →
M . Non-termination from
commands is modeled by sub-distributions in
M . Interpretation of expressions
are total functions. Pathological expressions such as out-of-bounds indexing and
division by 0 produce well-typed default values, instead of crashing.

2.3.2

Judgments and Proof rules

An apRHL judgment has the general shape of ρ ` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q. Such a
judgment relates two programs c1 and c2 . The metavariables P and Q stand for
relational assertions, which are clauses over P W HILE expressions in a base logic.
These assertions are interpreted, under the logical context ρ, as subsets over pairs
of program states [[P ]]ρ , [[Q]]ρ ⊆ M × M . For clean notation, we omit the interpretation brackets [[·]]ρ for logical formulas in the subsequent discussion, and refer to
both the syntax and interpretation of logical formulas with the same term.
As an example, the assertion P , e1 h1i = e2 h2i + 1 represents the set of pairs of
program states
{(m1 , m2 ) | [[e1 ]]ρ (m1 ) = [[e2 ]]ρ (m2 ) + 1}
In other words, the assertion P relates program states where expression e1 evaluates to a value (under the first program state) that is 1 more than the value that
e2 evaluates to (under the second program state). In particular, the annotations h1i
and h2i distinguish interpretation in the first versus interpretation in the second
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program state.
The validity of an apRHL judgment is defined in terms of approximate couplings.
Definition 13 (Validity of an apRHL judgment). A judgment ρ ` c1 ∼,δ c2 :
P ⇒ Q is valid, if for any two program states in the precondition (m1 , m2 ) ∈ P , the
postcondition Q leads to an approximate coupling Q],δ over the output distributions
[[c1 ]]ρ (m1 ) and [[c2 ]]ρ (m2 ).
The logic apRHL provides a set of derivation rules for deriving valid apRHL
judgments. We call this set of derivation rules apRHL proof rules. Proof rules have
the form
P1

...

Pn

C
Here, each Pi above the inference bar is a premise of the proof rule. Premises can
be apRHL judgments or auxiliary judgments for side conditions. The conclusion C
below the inference bar is an apRHL judgment derived from the given premises.
Proof rules in apRHL are essentially recipes for composing approximate couplings
from the premises into another approximate coupling in the conclusion. Since logical contexts remain constant throughout an apRHL proof derivation, we follow
Hsu [2017]’s convention and omit the logical context ρ in the presentation of proof
rules.
Proof rules in apRHL can be roughly classified into three sets: (1) two-sided
rules, (2) one-sided rules, and (3) structural rules. There is an additional special
apRHL proof rule that formalizes a proof technique called “proof by pointwise
equality” for differential privacy.
Two-sided rules relate commands with the same structure—an assignment is
related to another assignment, a conditional statement is related to another conditional statement by matching branches, and a while loop is related to another while
loop by synchronizing loop iterations. One-sided rules relate commands that may
have different structures. These rules can analyze programs whose control flows in
two related runs may follow different paths. Structural rules may be applied to relate commands of any shape. These rules may weaken a postcondition, strengthen
a precondition, perform case analysis, and replace programs under analysis by semantically equivalent programs. In the following paragraphs, we enumerate important proof rules from each category, and discuss their use cases. Figure 2.9 categorizes what kinds of terms may be used to instantiate metavariables in an apRHL
judgment ρ ` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q.
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Metavar
ρ
c, ci , c0 , c0i
e, ei , e0 , e0i
x, xi
P, Q, R
w, wi
N
, 0
δ, δ 0

Description
logical contexts
pWhile command terms
pWhile expression terms
pWhile program variables
apRHL relational assertions
positive constants r ∈ R>0
ω
natural numbers n ∈ N
constants r ∈ R≥0 , and arithmetic terms over constants and logical
variables
constants in [0, 1], and arithmetic terms over constants and logical
variables
Figure 2.9: apRHL metavariables

Two-Sided Rules
S KIP

` skip ∼0,0 skip : P ⇒ P
The S KIP rule applies to the no-op command skip, and the rule says that any precondition P that holds before running skip still holds after running skip, since the
command skip does not change program states.
A SSN

P , Q [e1 h1i, e2 h2i/x1 h1i, x2 h2i]
` x1 = e1 ∼0,0 x2 = e2 : P ⇒ Q
The A SSN rule relates two assignment commands x1 = e1 and x2 = e2 . This
assignment rule is very similar to how assignment is specified in classic Hoare
Logic [Hoare, 1969], where the postcondition Q propagates “backward” toward
the precondition P . Here, the precondition is P is acquired by performing the simultaneous substitution of (e1 h1i, e2 h2i) for (x1 h1i, x2 h2i) on the postcondition.
S EQ

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q

` c01 ∼0 ,δ0 c02 : Q ⇒ R

` c1 ; c01 ∼+0 ,δ+δ0 c2 ; c02 : P ⇒ R
The S EQ rule relates sequential compositions of commands, by treating the postcondition for the initial pair of related commands as the precondition for the second pair of related commands. S EQ also adds up the approximate coupling costs.
The S EQ rule is perhaps unsurprising to readers already familiar with (relational)
20

Hoare Logic [Benton, 2004], but we remark that S EQ is a critical rule that enables
compositional reasoning over probabilistic programs. Even though c1 and c01 themselves may use randomness, the subsequent reasoning on c2 and c02 need not perform any direct analysis on the distributions produced by c1 and c01 —the intermediate relational assertion Q remains oblivious in probability distributions.
C OND

` P → e1 h1i = e2 h2i
` c1 ∼ c2 : P ∧ e1 h1i ⇒ Q ` c01 ∼ c02 : P ∧ ¬e1 h1i ⇒ Q
` if e1 then c1 else c01 end ∼ if e2 then c2 else c02 end : P ⇒ Q
The C OND rule relates two conditional commands by relating the “then” and “else”
branches. The side condition ` P → e1 h1i = e2 h2i states that related branch conditions must evaluate to the same value under program states in the precondition
P.
W HILE

` P ∧ ev h1i ≤ 0 → ¬e1 h1i ` P → e1 h1i = e2 h2i
∀k ∈ N, ` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ∧ e1 h1i ∧ ev h1i = k ⇒ P ∧ ev h1i < k
` while e1 do c1 end ∼N ,N δ while e2 do c2 end : P ∧ ev h1i ≤ N ⇒ P ∧ ¬e1 h1i
The W HILE rule relates two while loops. To relate two while loops, we need 5
ingredients: (1) a relational loop invariant P , (2) a known bound on the number of
iterations N for both loops, (3) a term ev that counts how many iterations remain,
(4) an implication that, under the loop invariant P , if the counter ev becomes 0 or
negative, then the loop guard must be false, and finally (5) under the loop invariant
P , the loop guards always evaluate to the same value. The term ev need not appear
in the related program syntax, and often ev is an arithmetic expression built from
a loop iteration variable i. W HILE requires the bound N to establish a finite upper
bound for the approximate coupling cost of the distributions produced by both
loops. W HILE also requires both loops to run in synchronized steps, since loop
guards always evaluate to the same value under the loop invariant.
An important technical detail is that each loop iteration has the same cost  for
its approximate coupling. In typical paper proofs of differential privacy, different
iterations of a loop may induce different privacy costs. In fact, in two example
apRHL derivations that we discuss later in Section 7.4, most iterations will induce
a cost of 0, while only a few distinct iterations induce a non-zero cost. Analysis
that can establish different costs among different loop iterations is important for
establishing a small privacy cost that does not grow linearly in the number of loop
iterations.
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The W HILE rule by itself does not enable such kinds of analysis, since  and δ are
constant values that cannot depend on program states. We will soon introduce the
apRHL structural rules, which enable such kinds of analysis when used together
with W HILE.
There are three proof rules for relating two Laplace commands. Each of these
rules selects a different kind of underlying approximate coupling for the two related Laplace distributions. In all three rules, the width parameter w must be a
constant.
L AP

x1 , x2 ∈
/ fvs(e1 , e2 )
P , |e1 h1i − e2 h2i| ≤ k ∧ ∀ v, Q [v, v/x1 h1i, x2 h2i]
` x1 = lap(e1 , w) ∼k/w,0 x2 = lap(e2 , w) : P ⇒ Q
The L AP rule relates two Laplace distributions so that their samples are indistinguishable. The related Laplace commands must have the same width parameter,
and their center parameters must be expressions that evaluate to values less than
a constant distance k apart. The logical constant k controls the cost of establishing
the underlying approximate coupling, and the cost scales linearly with the distance
between the two centers.
L AP N ULL

x1 , x2 ∈
/ fvs(e1 , e2 )
P , ∀v1 , v2 . v1 − v2 = e1 h1i − e2 h2i → Q [v1 , v2 /x1 , x2 ]
` x1 = lap(e1 , w) ∼0,0 x2 = lap(e2 , w) : P ⇒ Q
The L AP N ULL rule relates two Laplace distributions using Lemma 10, so that the
Laplace samples are always at the same distance apart as the centers are. Since null
couplings are “free” approximate couplings, the L AP N ULL rule also incurs no cost.
L AP G EN

x1 , x2 ∈
/ fvs(e1 , e2 )
P , |s + e1 h1i − e2 h2i| ≤ k ∧ ∀v1 , v2 . v1 + s = v2 → Q [v1 , v2 /x1 , x2 ]
` x1 = lap(e1 , w) ∼k/w,0 x2 = lap(e2 , w) : P ⇒ Q
The L AP G EN rule relates two Laplace distributions using Lemma 11. Under L AP G EN, the Laplace samples are at constant distance s apart. The shift distance s,
together with another constant k, must satisfy the inequality |s + e1 h1i − e2 h2i| ≤ k
to fulfill the premise of Lemma 11.
Choosing the appropriate Laplace rule is key to building an apRHL proof. Often, we can use different combinations of these three Laplace rules to reach a post22

condition Q that implies differential privacy. However, some combinations will
have a higher (, δ) privacy cost for the underlying approximate couplings. In these
situations, expert insights from paper proofs can often guide us towards an apRHL
proof with small privacy parameters.
One-Sided Rules Many one-sided rules relate a command with the trivial
command skip (with the exception of C OND -L). Relating a command c with skip
only progresses derivation on the side with the command c, and this allows us to
create connections between programs that step through different commands. Onesided rules are critical even for relating a program to itself because two runs of
the same program may follow different internal control flow, and step on different
commands along different paths.
Each of the listed one-sided proof rule also has a symmetric “right-sided” version, we elide these rules because they mirror the left-sided rules shown here.
In one-sided rules, we sometimes want to refer to just one-side of the related
program states under some relational assertion P . We write P h1i for the left projection on pairs of program states in P , and similarly P h2i for the right projection
on pairs of program states in P .
A SSN -L

` x1 = e1 ∼0,0 skip : P [e1 h1i/x1 h1i] ⇒ P
The rule A SSN -L relates an assignment with skip, if the postcondition can be propogated backwards to the precondition on the side that runs the assignment command.
L AP -L

P , ∀ v, Q [v/x1 h1i]
` x1 = lap(e1 , w) ∼0,0 skip : P ⇒ Q
The rule L AP -L relates a noise command with skip. Since sampling from a Laplace
distribution may produce any value, this rule states that a sampling command
can be related to skip, only if the postcondition can be propagated towards the
precondition by substituting the noised variable with any possible number. This is
similar to the treatment of A SSN -L, except for L AP -L, the assigned value is nondeterministic.
C OND -L

` c1 ∼,δ c : P ∧ e1 h1i ⇒ Q

` c01 ∼,δ c : P ∧ ¬e1 h1i ⇒ Q

` if e1 then c1 else c01 end ∼,δ c : P ⇒ Q
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The rule C OND -L relates a conditional command with a command c of any shape.
This rule assumes that the two branches in the conditional command can each be
related to the command c using the original precondition P augmented with the
value of the branch condition in each case.
W HILE -L

` c1 ∼0,0 skip : P ∧ e1 h1i ⇒ P
` P → P1 P1 h1i ` while e1 do c1 end lossless
` while e1 do c1 end ∼0,0 skip : P ⇒ P ∧ e1 h1i
The rule W HILE -L relates a while loop with skip, provided that each iteration of
the loop can be related to skip, and that we can prove the entire loop is lossless
under a relational assertion P1 that is implied by the loop invariant P .
In apRHL, a statement of the form P ` c lossless requires that the command
c terminates with probability 1, for any starting program state c in P . Although
apRHL does not give a derivation system for proving commands are lossless,
we can show programs are lossless by considering the probability distributions
{[[c]](m) | m ∈ P } that arise from interpreting the command c.
Structural Proof Rules
C ONSEQ

` c1 ∼0 c2 : P 0 ⇒ Q0
` P → P 0 ` Q0 → Q
` 0 ≤  ` δ 0 ≤ δ
` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q
C ONSEQ allows a prover to derive an apRHL judgment by strengthening its precondition, and weakening its postcondition. The approximate coupling costs  and
δ may also be replaced by larger values. Making privacy costs larger is also a form
of weakening—the privacy guarantee becomes weaker, as the privacy parameters
grow larger.
E QUIV

` c01 ∼,δ c02 : P ⇒ Q

c1 ≡ c01

c2 ≡ c02

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q
E QUIV allows a prover to derive an apRHL judgment over related programs by
proving a judgment over equivalent programs. The notation c1 ≡ c2 means that the
denotational semantics of the two commands [[c1 ]]ρ , [[c2 ]]ρ : M →
M are extensionally equal—for any starting program state m, the two distributions [[c1 ]](m) and
[[c2 ]](m) are the same. E QUIV enables a prover to perform program transformation,
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provided that the transformed code and the original code have equivalent semantics under any starting state. In differential privacy proofs, we often use E QUIV to
replace a while loop under proof with another one whose syntactic structure separates iterations with different approximate coupling costs. This transformation
allows constructions of apRHL proofs at desired privacy level.
C ASE

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ∧ R ⇒ Q

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ∧ ¬R ⇒ Q

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q
C ASE allows a prover to perform case analysis on an auxiliary assertion R, and
combine sub-derivations that use the auxiliary relation R and its negation ¬R for
a proof of the original judgment.
F RAME

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q

fvs(R) ∩ mvs(c1 , c2 ) = ∅

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ∧ R ⇒ Q ∧ R
F RAME allows a prover to derive a judgment by splitting the pre- and postcondition into conditions used for a sub-derivation, and a non-overlapping assertion
R. Non-overlapping means that the program variables mentioned in R are not
modified by the related programs. F RAME rules typically appear in separation
logic [Reynolds, 2002] for maintaining “unused resources” in the heap. In apRHL,
F RAME rule is used for maintaining logical conditions that do not participate in
sub-derivations. Readers familiar with Hoare Logic may wonder if the F RAME rule
could be subsumed by a conjunction rule like the following:
` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ R

` c1 ∼,δ c2 : P ⇒ Q ∧ R
However, this conjunction rule is unsound because the two premises state there
exist witnesses for Q],δ and R],δ , but this does not guarantee a witness for (Q ∧
R)],δ in general.
Pointwise Equality in apRHL Experts often approach differential privacy
proofs using the following pointwise differential privacy definition instead of Definition 5.
Definition 14 (-Pointwise Differential Privacy). Assume a similarity relation · ∼
· ∈ σ × σ. Let  ≥ 0 be a parameter. A program f : σ →
τ is differentially private,
if for all pairs of similar inputs x1 ∼ x2 , and for all output value v, the following
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inequality holds:
Pf (x1 ) [{v}] ≤ e Pf (x2 ) [{v}]
If a program f satisfies Definition 14, then f also satisfies (, 0)-differential privacy as defined in Definition 5. Proving differential privacy through Definition 14
allows the prover to focus on a single output at a time, while Definition 5 requires
the prover to show the inequality holds for all subsets of the output domain. The
pointwise proof technique often simplifies the differential privacy proofs of sophisticated algorithms.
The PW-E Q proof rule formalizes this proof technique in apRHL.
PW-E Q

∀ r, ` c1 ∼,0 c2 : P ⇒ e1 h1i = r → e2 h2i = r
` c1 ∼,0 c2 : P ⇒ e1 h1i = e2 h2i
The premise of PW-E Q states that, for all value r, if we can prove as a postcondition that e1 and e2 agree pointwise on r, then we can conclude as a postcondition
that e1 and e2 evaluate to the same value. The premise uses implication instead of
conjunction because some r values are impossible in the execution of c1 , and the
postcondition e1 h1i = r → e2 h2i = r in the premise is vacuously true for these
impossible values.
PW-E Q allows us to port pointwise paper proofs of differential privacy into
apRHL, establishing a formal and rigorous foundation for these existing paper
proofs of differential privacy.

2.4

A Probabilistic Lambda Calculus

We use a functional style probabilistic language that we call Pλ in Chapter 4 for
testing differentially private programs. The language Pλ is the call-by-value PCF
calculus extended with probability distributions [Plotkin, 1977], a primitive for
specifying the Laplace distribution, and numeric and boolean base types. In Chapter 4, we perform symbolic execution on Pλ terms as part of the testing method.
In this section, we introduce Pλ, its concrete operational semantics, symbolic operational semantics, and denotational semantics, and show that these semantics are
consistent with each other using the technique of logical relations [Statman, 1985].

2.4.1

Operational and Denotational Semantics

Figure 2.10 lists the syntax of Pλ—Pλ has arithmetic terms, comparison terms,
boolean terms, branch terms, monad >>= (bind) and return operators, and a spe26

w ∈ R>0
op := + | − | × | /
bop := ∧ | ∨
cop :=≤ | < | ≥ | >
τ := int | bool | real |
τ |τ → τ
t := x | fix x. t | t t | λ x. t |
true | false |
k ∈ Z | r ∈ Rω |
return t | t >>= t |
t op t | lap(t, w) |
t cop t | t bop t |
if t then t else t end
Figure 2.10: Syntax of pλ
cial primitive lap(t, w) for sampling from a Laplace distribution centered at the
first argument, with width w.
We give the typing judgments for Pλ in Figure 2.11. Pλ’s type system forbids
higher-order distribution types—types that appear inside the distribution monad
must be a base type. We rule out higher-order distributions because giving a denotational model in the higher-order setting requires sophisticated machinery [Heunen et al., 2017]. Since our testing method for differential privacy does not rely
on higher-order distributions, we exclude these types for a much simpler denotational model of Pλ. Additionally, Pλ’s typing judgment for fixpoints only accepts
fixpoints at arrow types, which is standard for call-by-value PCF [Winskel, 1993].
In this section, we define a call-by-value concrete operational semantics and a
denotational semantics for Pλ. We lay out the key steps for proving these two semantics agree with each other. In the following section, we give a non-deterministic
symbolic call-by-value operational semantics. We also describe methods for proving the symbolic operational semantics, under a probabilistic interpretation, agrees
with the concrete operational semantics, and, by extension, agrees with the denotational semantics as well. In particular, the concrete operational semantics reduces a
term to a distribution of values, while the symbolic operational semantics reduces
a term to a set of symbolic values with an associated path condition. By ensuring that concrete and symbolic operational semantics produce distributions that
agree with the denotational semantics, we know that our testing method produces
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T-Var

x:τ ∈Γ
Γ`x:τ

T-App

T-Abs

Γ ` t1 : σ → τ Γ ` t2 : σ
Γ ` t1 t2 : τ

Γ, x : σ ` t : τ
Γ ` λ x. t : σ → τ

T-Bind

Γ`t:

T-Return

Γ ` t : τ base τ
Γ ` return t :
τ
T-Arith

Γ`k:σ→
base σ
Γ ` t >>= k :
τ
σ

τ

T-Compare

Γ ` ti : τ Num τ
Γ ` t1 op t2 : τ

Γ ` ti : τ Ord τ
Γ ` t1 cop t2 : bool

T-If

T-Laplace

Γ ` t : real
Γ ` lap(t, w) :
real

T-Boolean

Γ ` ti : bool
Γ ` t1 bop t2 : bool

T-Fix

Γ ` t : bool Γ ` ti : τ
Γ ` if t then t1 else t2 end : τ

Γ, x : σ → τ ` t : σ → τ
Γ ` fix x. t : σ → τ

Figure 2.11: Typing rules of pλ

V-Abs

val λ x. t

V-Integer

k∈Z
val z

V-Real

V-Bool

r ∈ Rω
val r

b ∈ {true, false}
val b

V-Return

val v
val (return v)

Figure 2.12: Values in pλ
meaningful results with respect to the underlying semantic distributions.
We write t ;p t0 to mean that term t steps to term t0 with probability p under
the concrete operational semantics. Figures 2.13 and 2.14 list the concrete operational semantics inference rules. Following Saheb-Djahromi [1978]’s method, we
define the evaluation sequence as a random walk process on Pλ terms. Given a
term t, the initial state in this evaluation sequence is the point-mass distribution
that concentrates on the term t. The next step in the evaluation sequence disperses
probability mass from t to each t0 that is reachable with a positive probability. We
use the monad bind and ret combinators on probability distributions to compose
single steps in the random walk process.
In particular, the two operations bind :
τ → (τ →
σ) →
σ and ret :
τ →
τ are given by following definition. These two combinators give a monad
structure to (sub-)distributions.
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S-Beta

val v
(λ x. t) v ;1 t[x/v]

S-BindBeta

S-Fix

val v
(return v) >>= (λ x. k) ;1 k[x/v]

fix x. t ;1 t[x/fix x. t]

S-LaplaceSample

S-IfTrue

r ∈ Rω p = laplace(r, w)(v)
lap(r, w) ;p return v

if true then t1 else t2 end ;1 t1
S-Arith

vi ∈ Z ∨ vi ∈ Rω , i = 1, 2
v = evalarith (op, v1 , v2 )
v1 op v2 ;1 v

S-IfFalse

if false then t1 else t2 end ;1 t2

S-Compare

S-Bool

vi ∈ {true, false}, i = 1, 2
v = evalbool (bop, v1 , v2 )
v1 bop v2 ;1 v

vi ∈ Z ∨ vi ∈ Rω , i = 1, 2
v = evalcmp (op, v1 , v2 )
v1 cop v2 ;1 v

Figure 2.13: Reduction rules in operational semantics for pλ
Definition 15 (Distribution bind and ret).
τ → (τ →
σ) →
σ
X
µ(v) × (f v s)
bind µ f = λ s.
bind :

v∈τ

ret : τ →
ret v = λ v 0 .

τ
(
1 if v 0 = v,
0 otherwise

To distinguish object-level and metatheory-level monad terms, we always use
bind and the abbreviated ret for distribution combinators for metatheory terms,
and always use >>= and the non-abbreviated return for object language terms.
The distribution resulting from an n-step random walk is given by the function En :: exp →
exp—a function that takes a Pλ term, and produces a sub-
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S-App2

S-App1

val v1 t2 ;p t02
v1 t2 ;p v1 t02

t1 ;p t01
t1 t2 ;p t01 t2

S-If

S-Return

t ;p t0
return t ;p return t0

t ;p t0
if t then t1 else t2 end ;p if t0 then t1 else t2 end
S-Bind2

S-Arith1

val t k ;p k 0
t>>=k ;p t>>=k 0

t1 ;p t01
t1 op t2 ;p t01 op t2

S-Bool1

S-Bool2

t1 ;p t01
t1 bop t2 ;p t01 bop t2

t2 ;p t02
t1 bop t2 ;p t1 bop t02

S-Bind1

t ;p t0
t>>=k ;p t0 >>=k

S-Arith2

t2 ;p t02
t1 op t2 ;p t1 op t02
S-Compare1

t1 ;p t01
t1 cop t2 ;p t01 cop t2

S-Compare2

t2 ;p t02
t1 cop t2 ;p t1 cop t02

Figure 2.14: Contextual rules in operational semantics for pλ
distribution of Pλ values.
E0 (v) = ret v

if v is a value

E0 (t) = empty

En+1 (t) = bind λ t0 .


X

p En

t;p t0

En+1 (t) = En (t)

if there is no t0 such that t ;p t0 for any p

In order to define the “limit” of evaluation as n approaches infinity, we first review
some necessary theory on complete partial orders. The theory of complete partial
orders has been extensively studied. In this dissertation, we cite established results,
instead of reinventing proofs for complete partial orders.
Review of Complete Partial Orders
Definition 16 (ω-Complete Partial Order [Winskel, 1993]). An ω-Complete Partial
Order (abbreviated as CPO in the following discussion) is a set S with two properties:
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1. There is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric order relation ≤ on elements
of S.
2. Any countably infinite chain d0 ≤ d1 ≤ · · · ≤ dn ≤ . . . has a least upper bound,
written tn dn in S.
Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring [2009] prove that the unit interval [0, 1] is a
CPO. Additionally, let S be any set. Let us equip S with the “discrete order”, where
x ≤ y is defined by x and y being the same element in S, then S under this trivial
order is a CPO [Winskel, 1993]. Given two CPOs, a set of well-behaved functions
between two CPOs also form a CPO.
Definition 17 (Monotonic and Continuous Functions [Winskel, 1993]). Given two
CPOs D and E, a function f : D → E is monotonic, if
∀d, d0 ∈ D, d ≤ d0 ⇒ f (d) ≤ f (d0 )
A monotonic f is called continuous, if
tn f (dn ) = f (tn dn )
In other words, a continuous function is one that preserves both the order relation, and the least upper bound between two CPOs. Winskel [1993] (Chapter 8.3.3)
shows that continuous functions between two CPOs form a CPO of functions. In
particular, let F be this CPO of functions from a CPO D to a CPO E, the order
relation on F is defined pointwise:
f ≤ g iff ∀d ∈ D. f (d) ≤ g(d).
Recall that we model discrete sub-distributions
τ , τ → [0, 1] by functions
from an enumerable set τ to the unit interval [0, 1]. More precisely, we only consider
continuous functions from enumerable sets to the unit interval in this work. For
such a discrete distribution in τ → [0, 1], using the discrete CPO on τ , and the CPO
on [0, 1] by Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring [2009], we know that distributions
τ
form a CPO.
By Definition 15, it is clear that all distributions built from ret are continuous
functions. For bind, the following lemma states that, as long as the parameters to
bind are continuous functions, the resulting distribution is a continuous function.
Lemma 18 (bind is continuous). Given a distribution µ that is a continuous function
in τ → [0, 1], and a continuous function f : τ → (σ → [0, 1]), the distribution bind µ f
is a continuous function in σ → [0, 1].
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Proof. By unfolding definition.
Finally, the following “fixpoint induction principle” is useful for proving properties about least upper bounds in CPOs.
Theorem 19 (Fixpoint Induction [Winskel, 1993]). Let D be a CPO with a bottom
element ⊥, such that ⊥ ≤ x for all x ∈ D. Let f : D → D be a continuous function.
Let P be a property over elements in D. If we can prove P (⊥), and we can prove that,
for any x ∈ D, the property P (x) implies P (f (x)), then P holds for the least upper
bound P (tn f n (⊥)).
Equivalence of Semantics
Now, we can give the set of Pλ terms a CPO structure with the discrete order. Using Lemma 18, we can check that, for any n ≥ 0, the evaluation function En (·) is
a continuous function from the discrete CPO of Pλ terms to the CPO of distribution over Pλ values. Additionally, we can check that, for any term t, the sequence
E0 (t), . . . , En (t), . . . is a monotonic sequence of distributions over Pλ values. By the
CPO structure on distributions, there exists a least upper bound tn En (t) in the CPO
of discrete distributions over Pλ values.
We write E(t) for this least upper bound. This least upper bound is the distribution of values produced by evaluating a Pλ term under the concrete operational
semantics. The table below lists a few example Pλ terms, and the distribution of
values these terms reduce to under the concrete operational semantics. The last
example in the table refers to a term geometric, which is defined as:
(fix f : int →

int

(λ n. lap(0, 1)>>=λ coin. if coin ≥ 0 then return n else f (n + 1) end)) 1
Term
1+2
lap(0, 1)

Distribution
The point-mass distribution ret 3
A distribution µ such that µ(return v) =
laplace(0, 1)(v)
>>=
lap(0, 1)
λ v. return (v ≥ 0) A distribution µ that gives half the probability to return true and the other half to
return false
(fix x : int → int. x) 0
The empty distribution
The term geometric
A distribution µ, such that µ(return n) =
2−n for all n ≥ 1
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Next, we give a denotational semantics for Pλ that interprets probabilistic terms
as distributions over values in base types. We will then relate the operational semantics to the denotational semantics, and show the operational semantics computes the same distribution as the denotational semantics.
To define the denotational semantics, we first associate each type with a CPO.
We write [[τ ]] for the associated CPO of τ .
To model divergence, we introduce a distinct element ⊥ to the codomain of
functions that produce base types. Given any CPO S, the set S ∪ {⊥} is also a
CPO by extending S’s order relation with the property that ⊥ ≤ s for any s ∈
S [Winskel, 1993].
To simplify notation, we define an element ⊥τ at each type τ . For base types,
⊥τ , ⊥. For distribution types ⊥ τ , λ v.0, which is the empty distribution. We
will abbreviate the empty distribution with empty in the following discussion. For
arrow types, ⊥σ→ρ , λ x.⊥ρ , which is a function that maps all arguments to the
value ⊥ρ at the result type. In the equations below, we write [[τ ]]⊥ for [[τ ]] ∪ {⊥τ }.
[[int]] = Z
[[real]] = Rω
[[bool]] = {true, false}
[[

τ ]] =

[[τ ]]

[[σ → τ ]] = [[σ]] → [[τ ]]⊥
The CPO structures on base types are discrete CPOs. The CPO on a distribution
type
τ is the continuous function space from [[τ ]] to the unit interval, abbreviated
as [[τ ]]. Note that since Pλ’s type system insists the type within a distribution be
a base type, the associated CPO [[τ ]] for a distribution type
τ is a discrete CPO
over an enumerable set.
Next, given a well-typed term Γ ` t : τ , the denotational interpretation [[Γ ` t :
τ ]] ∈ [[Γ]] → [[τ ]]⊥ is a continuous function that maps a well-typed environment, to
an element in [[τ ]]⊥ . We write [[Γ]] for the set of well-typed environments that maps
each variable x ∈ dom(Γ) to a well-typed element in [[Γ(x)]]. We write env ∪ x 7→ v
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for a new environment that extends env with the association x 7→ v.
[[Γ ` x : τ ]](env ) = env (x)
[[Γ ` λ x. t : σ → ρ]](env ) = λ v. [[t]](env ∪ x 7→ v)
[[Γ ` fix x. t : σ → ρ]](env ) = tn f n (⊥σ→ρ )
where f (v) = [[t]] (env ∪ x 7→ v)
(
⊥τ
if [[t2 ]](env ) is ⊥
[[Γ ` t1 t2 : τ ]](env ) =
[[t1 ]](env ) ([[t2 ]](env )) otherwise
(
empty
if [[t]](env ) = ⊥
[[Γ ` lap(t, w) :
real]](env ) =
laplace(r, w)
where r = [[t]](env )


if [[t]](env ) = ⊥

⊥τ

[[Γ ` if t then t1 else t2 end : τ ]](env ) =

[[Γ ` return t :
[[Γ ` t>>=k :

τ ]](env ) =

[[t1 ]](env )


[[t ]](env )
2
(
empty

if [[t]](env ) = true
otherwise

if [[t]](env ) = ⊥

ret ([[t]](env )) otherwise

τ ]](env ) = bind ([[t]](env )) ([[k]](env ))

[[Γ ` t1 op t2 : τ ]](env ) = ([[t1 ]](env )) [[op]] ([[t2 ]](env ))
[[Γ ` t1 cop t2 : bool]](env ) = ([[t1 ]](env )) [[cop]] ([[t2 ]](env ))
[[Γ ` t1 bop t2 : bool]](env ) = ([[t1 ]](env )) [[bop]] ([[t2 ]](env ))
To simplify notation, we write [[t]]—omitting the typing context and the type of t on
the right-hand side of the equations above, and we also omit these elements in the
following discussion when the typing context and the type are clear from context.
We also write [[op]], [[cop]], and [[bop]] for associated arithmetic, comparison, and
boolean functions over semantic values. In particular, we assume these functions
are “strict”—if an argument to such a function is ⊥, then the function produces ⊥.
Now, we define a unary logical relation Cτ (·) ⊆ exp over closed terms. This
predicate generates a strong induction principle that helps us prove agreement between the operational and denotational semantics. This predicate relies on a typeindexed relation between distributions of Pλ syntactic values, and semantic values.
We first define this relation · =τ · ⊆
exp × [[τ ]]⊥ .
Definition 20. The relation · =τ · ⊆
exp × [[τ ]]⊥ is defined on base types, and
distribution of base types.
1. τ is a base type, then µ =τ v iff either v ∈ [[τ ]] and µ(v) = 1, or µ = empty and
v = ⊥.
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2. τ is
σ—a distribution over a base type, then for a distribution µ over syntactic values, and a distribution µ0 over semantic values, µ = σ µ0 iff for all
v ∈ [[σ]], µ(return v) = µ0 (v).
The following lemma about Definition 20 says that · =τ · respects the least
upper bounds on the CPOs from both sides.
Lemma 21. Let the type τ be either a base type or a distribution type, the set {µn }
be a chain of distributions over well-typed pλ values in τ , and the set {vn } be a chain
of elements in [[τ ]]. Given the condition ∀ i. µi =τ vi , the least upper bounds are also
related tn µn =τ tn vn .
Proof. By fixpoint induction (Theorem 19).
Now, we are ready to define the main logical relation.
Definition 22 (The Logical Relation Cτ (·)). The logical relation Cτ (·) is defined inductively over types by the following construction rules.
1. If τ is a base type, then Cτ (t) , ∅ ` t : τ ∧ E(t) =τ [[t]](∅).
2. If τ is
σ, then C σ (t) , ∅ ` t :
σ ∧ E(t) = σ [[t]](∅).
3. If τ is σ → ρ, then Cσ→ρ (t) , ∅ ` t : σ → ρ ∧ ∀t0 , Cσ (t0 ) ⇒ Cρ (t t0 ).
The logical relation Cτ (·) is defined on closed terms. To relate the operational
and denotational semantics for open terms, we first define a type-respecting subsitution for a typing context Γ.
Definition 23. A substitution γ is an association from variables to values.
We write Γ ` γ, pronounced γ type-respects Γ, if
1. the domains match dom(γ) = dom(Γ),
2. for each x ∈ dom(γ), γ(x) is a value and has type Γ(x), and
3. for each x ∈ dom(γ), let τ = Γ(x), the value associated to x is in the logical
relation Cτ (γ(x)).
Our main theorem (Theorem 26) states that all well-typed terms (once closed
under a type-respecting substitution) are in the logical relation Cτ (·). Proving Theorem 26 for fixpoint terms requires additional setup. We follow the methods of
Plotkin [1977] and Saheb-Djahromi [1978], and extend Pλ with a set of “finite”
fixpoint terms that approximate fix x. t terms both in the operational and denotational semantics. Extending Pλ with finite fixpoints allows us to apply Theorem 19
in the fixpoint case.
The finite fixpoint terms have the form fixn x. t. A finite fixpoint is annotated
by a natural number n, and can be unrolled at most n times. Operationally, finite
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fixpoints step with the following rule. In particular, the 0-th finite fixpoint fix0 x. t
does not step.
S-F IX S UCC

fixn+1 x. t ;1 t[x/fixn x. t]
These finite fixpoint terms enrich the original discrete order on Pλ terms.
O-VAR

x≤x

O-I NT

O-N UM

O-B OOL

z∈Z

r ∈ Rω

b ∈ {true, false}

z≤z

r≤r

b≤b

O-F IX A PPROX

i≤j
fixi x. t ≤ fixj x. t

t1 ≤

O-B IND

t≤t

k≤k

ti ≤

t0i

t1 ≤ t01

t2 ≤ t02

t1 op t2 ≤ t01 op t02

O-A BS

t ≤ t0

λ x. t ≤ λ x. t0

t ≤ t0

return t ≤ return t0
O-L APLACE

t ≤ t0

for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}

if t1 then t2 else t3 end ≤ if t01 then t02 else t03 end
O-A RITH

t2 ≤

t02

O-R ETURN

0

t>>=k ≤ t0 >>=k 0
O-I F

t01

t1 t2 ≤ t01 t02

fixn x. t ≤ fix x. t
0

fix0 x. t ≤ t0

O-A PP

O-F IX

O-F IX Z ERO

O-B OOL

t1 ≤ t01

t2 ≤ t02

t1 bop t2 ≤ t01 bop t02

lap(t, w) ≤ lap(t0 , w)
O-C OMPARE

t1 ≤ t01

t2 ≤ t02

t1 cop t2 ≤ t01 cop t02

Lemma 24. The extended set of pλ terms with finite fixpoints form a CPO.
Proof. Consider a chain of terms t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn ≤ . . . . If each ti does not contain
any finite fixpoint terms, then it must be the case that t0 = t1 = · · · = tn = . . . . Any
ti is the least upper bound in the chain.
If ti does involve finite fixpoints, then replacing all finite fixpoints terms with the
fixpoint term gives the least upper bound for the chain.
More importantly, we can prove that the evaluation function E(·) is a continuous function from the CPO of extended Pλ terms to distribution over Pλ values.
Lemma 25. If t1 and t2 are two well-typed pλ terms such that t1 ≤ t2 , then E(t1 ) ≤
E(t2 ). Furthermore, let {tn } be a chain of extended pλ terms, then tn E(tn ) = E(tn tn ).
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Proof. Monotonicity of E(·) is easy to check. Continuity of E(·) relies on the observation that for any fixpoint term fix x. t, the equation E(fix x. t) = tn E(fixn x. t)
holds.
Lemma 25 demonstrates that the operational semantics of a Pλ term is given by
the least upper bound of its approximations. In particular, if a Pλ term does not use
fixpoints, then any approximation is the term itself. A Pλ term that uses fixpoints
is approximated by a sequence of finite fixpoints with increasing number of unroll
steps.
We similarly extend the denotational semantics for the finite fixpoints:
[[Γ ` fix0 x. t : σ → τ ]](env ) = ⊥σ→τ
[[Γ ` fixn+1 x. t : σ → τ ]](env ) = f n+1 (⊥σ→τ ) where f (v) = [[t]] (env ∪ x → v)
From these definitions, we can verify that [[fix x. t]](env ) = tn [[fixn x. t]](env ). With
these facts, we are ready to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 26 (Well-typed terms are in Cτ (·)). Given any Γ ` t : τ , and Γ ` γ, let
the closed term γ(t) be the term acquired from substituting each open variable x in t
with γ(x). The term γ(t) is in the logical relation Cτ (γ(t)).
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment.
For fixpoints, we first prove that each fixn x. t is in Cσ→ρ (·). Unfolding the definition of the logical relation at arrow types, let the term t0n be a well-typed application
term that maximally applies the finite fixpoint term, such that t0n is typed at a base
type or a distribution type (call this type τ 0 ), then it suffices to establish agreement
for E(γ(t0n )) =τ 0 [[γ(t0n )]](∅). This condition indeed holds for the finite fixpoints with
any n.
Now, let t0 be a well-typed application term that maximally applies the fixpoint
term, and let {t0n } be the sequence of terms generated by replacing the fixpoint term
in t0 with the finite fixpoint terms. We already know E(γ(t0n )) =τ 0 [[γ(t0n )]](∅) for each
n from the results above. By Lemma 21 and Lemma 25, the least upper bounds on
both chains also agree with each other, which means E(γ(t0 )) =τ 0 [[γ(t0 )]](∅). This
concludes the proof.
As a corollary of this theorem, if t is a closed probabilistic term, meaning τ is
σ and Γ = ∅, then E(t) = σ [[t]](∅)—the operational semantics and the denotational semantics of t are essentially the same probability distribution modulo the
extra return that accompanies each value in the operational semantics.
Remark Our development follows from previous work by Saheb-Djahromi
[1978] on a probabilistic PCF with randomized choice, which itself is an extension
37

of Plotkin [1977]’s development for deterministic PCF. However, Saheb-Djahromi’s
work does not explicitly define the order relation on terms. Plotkin’s treatment of
PCF explicitly defines this partial order on terms, and proves that evaluation respects this partial order and the least upper bound on terms in the deterministic
case. Here, we merge Saheb-Djahromi’s presentation with Plotkin’s partial order
on terms, making this order relation on Pλ terms explicit. While the CPO structure on Pλ terms is an “artificial” structure created for proving equivalence of
semantics for fixpoints, the three CPOs on terms, operational distributions, and
semantic values highlight structure in the proof method—by relating finite approximations from each CPO, and by proving the relation =τ respects least upper
bounds through Theorem 19, the equivalence between operational and denotational semantics naturally follows. The following diagram summarizes this proof
method—the operational and denotational semantics of a term t are related by
connecting the operational and denotational semantics for each of t’s finite approximations (replacing fixpoints with finite fixpoints), and the equivalence at t is
established through the fixpoint induction principle.
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2.4.2

Symbolic Operational Semantics

The symbolic operational semantics of Pλ adapts directly from the concrete operational semantics. A single step in the concrete operational semantics models
evaluation as a single step of a random walk process on Pλ terms, and takes a term
to an intermediate distribution of terms. A single step in the symbolic operational
semantics takes a term to an intermediate set of terms, where the intermediate set
arises from the need to explore both branches when we reduce a conditional term.
Furthermore, in concrete operational semantics, reducing a Laplace sample term
gives a distribution of values based on the Laplace distribution. In symbolic operational semantics, reducing a Laplace sample term produces a fresh symbol. The
symbol simultaneously represents all possible sample values from a Laplace distribution. When symbolic evaluation processes a conditional term, the branch condition is refined by constraints that force the branch condition to true and false in
the exploration of the term’s two branches. This refinement indirectly places constraints on symbols used in branch conditions. This style of symbolic evaluation of
a Pλ term is useful for testing differential privacy (Chapter 4).
A single step of symbolic evaluation is given by judgments of the shape
hpc 1 , tr 1 , t1 i

hpc 2 , tr 2 , t2 i.

The term pc i is a symbolic boolean value called the “path condition”. A path condition is a conjunction of constraints on branch conditions along this execution path.
The term tr i is a map from each symbolic sample value to the Laplace distribution
parameters that produced this sample, and we call this map a trace.
A trace records the sampling instructions in an evaluation sequence. By assigning concrete values to symbolic samples in a trace and computing the probability
of these concrete valuation, we can recover a probabilistic interpretation for a set
of symbolic values. We will define this interpretation after we present the symbolic
evaluation reduction rules.
Finally, the term t1 in the triple hpc1 , tr1 , t1 i is the term to be reduced. A judgment hpc 1 , tr 1 , t1 i
hpc 2 , tr 2 , t2 i means that t1 symbolically reduces to t2 in one
step, while updating the path condition from pc 1 to pc 2 , and the trace from tr 1 to
tr 2 .
The symbolic operational semantics (Figure 2.15) defines a set of values that
are analogous to values from concrete operational semantics. The set of real and
boolean values, under the symbolic operational semantics, are extended from Rω
and bool to Rsym
and boolsym . The set Rsym
contains all of Rω , and additionally,
ω
ω
this set contains symbols x, y, z ∈ Sym, and arithmetic formulas (+, −, ×, /) built
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SVal-Abs

sval λ x. t

SVal-Int

k∈Z
sval k

SVal-Real

k ∈ Rsym
ω
sval k

SVal-Bool

b ∈ boolsym
sval b

SVal-Return

sval v
sval (return v)

Figure 2.15: Symbolic values of pλ
from symbols and constants. The set boolsym contains {true, false}, comparison
formulas (<, ≤, >, ≥, =?, 6=) between elements of Rsym
ω , and boolean connectives
(∧, ∨, ¬) over symbolic boolean values. We assume that the set Sym is disjoint from
the set of variable names for Pλ.
The evaluation sequence under the symbolic operational semantics is defined
by a function SE n :: boolsym × Trace × term → P (boolsym × Trace × term) that
takes a triple of a path condition, a trace, and a Pλ term to a set of such triples.
Plotkin [1976] demonstrates that the powerset construction P(·) forms a CPO,
where the order between elements of the powerset is defined in terms of set inclusion ⊆. Similar to our definition of E(·), we define SE(·) by taking the least upper
bound of the monotonic sequence induced from SE n (·). Additionally, we start the
symbolic evaluation for a term with the path condition true, and the empty trace
∅.
SE 0 (hpc, tr, vi) = {hpc, tr, vi}

if v is a symbolic value

SE 0 (hpc, tr, ti) = {}
SE n+1 (hpc, tr, ti) = ∪hpc,tr,ti

hpc0 ,tr0 ,t0 i SE n (hpc

SE n+1 (hpc, tr, ti) = SE n (hpc, tr, ti)

0

, tr0 , t0 i)

if no steps can be taken from t

The table below gives the symbolic evaluation result for the same examples seen
in Section 2.4.1.
Term
1+2
lap(0, 1)
lap(0, 1) >>= λ v. return (v ≥ 0)
(fix x : int → int. x) 0
The term geometric

Set
{htrue, ∅, 3i}
{htrue, s0 7→ lap(0, 1), s0 i}
{hs0 ≥ 0, s0 7→ lap(0, 1), return (s0 ≥ 0)i,
h¬ (s0 ≥ 0) , s0 7→ lap(0, 1), return (s0 ≥ 0)i}
{}
{hs0 ≥ 0, s0 7→ lap(0, 1), return 1i, . . . ,
hsn ≥ 0 ∧ (∧0≤i<n si < 0) ,
si 7→ lap(0, 1) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
return ni, . . . }
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SS-Beta

sval v
hpc, tr , (λ x. t) vi
hpc, tr , t[x/v]i

SS-Fix

hpc, tr , fix x. ti

hpc, tr , t[x/fix x. t]i

SS-BindBeta

sval v
hpc, tr , (return v) >>= (λ x. k)i

hpc, tr , k[x/v]i

SS-LaplaceSample

x # tr r ∈ Rsym
ω
tr , tr ∪ (x 7→ lap(r, w))
hpc, tr, lap(r, w)i
hpc, tr 0 , return xi
0

SS-IfTrue

v ∈ boolsym pc 0 , pc ∧ v
hpc, tr , if v then t1 else t2 endi
hpc 0 , tr , t1 i
SS-Arith

SS-IfFalse

sym

0

v ∈ bool
pc , pc ∧ ¬v
hpc, tr , if v then t1 else t2 endi
hpc 0 , tr , t2 i
SS-Bool

vi ∈ Z ∨ vi ∈ Rsym
ω , i = 1, 2
v = sevalarith (op, v1 , v2 )
hpc, tr , v1 op v2 i
hpc, tr , vi

SS-Compare

vi ∈ Z ∨ vi ∈ Rsym
ω , i = 1, 2
v = sevalcmp (op, v1 , v2 )
hpc, tr , v1 cop v2 i
hpc, tr , vi

sym

vi ∈ bool , i = 1, 2
v = sevalbool (bop, v1 , v2 )
hpc, tr , v1 bop v2 i
hpc, tr , vi

Figure 2.16: Reduction rules in symbolic operational semantics for pλ
We lift a set of symbolic outputs to a distribution by giving the set a probabilistic interpretation. This probabilistic interpretation arises from assigning values to
the symbolic samples, and computing the probability of such an assignment under
the associated trace for each symbolic output triple. This probabilistic interpretation allows us to define agreement between the symbolic operational semantics
and concrete operational semantics as an equality relation on distributions.
Each symbolic output triple is guarded by a path condition, which must evaluate to true for execution to reach this output, we first define appropriate assignments for a triple hpc, tr, vi as a map Θ from symbols in dom(tr) to Rω , such that
replacing each symbol in pc under Θ (written Θ(pc)) yields a boolean term that
evaluates to true.
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SS-App1

hpc, tr, t1 i
hpc, tr, t1 t2 i

SS-Return

hpc, tr, ti
hpc, tr, return ti

SS-If

hpc, tr, ti
hpc, tr, if t then t1 else t2 endi

SS-Bind1

hpc, tr, ti
hpc, tr, t>>=ki

SS-Arith1

hpc, tr, t1 i
hpc, tr, t1 op t2 i

S-Bool1

hpc, tr, t1 i
hpc, tr, t1 bop t2 i

S-Compare1

hpc, tr, t1 i
hpc, tr, t1 cop t2 i

SS-App2

sval v1 hpc, tr, t2 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t02 i
hpc, tr, v1 t2 i
hpc0 , tr0 , v1 t02 i

hpc0 , tr0 , t01 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t01 t2 i

hpc0 , tr0 , t0 i
hpc0 , tr0 , return t0 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t0 i
hpc0 , tr0 , if t0 then t1 else t2 endi
SS-Bind2

hpc0 , tr0 , t0 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t0 >>=ki

sval v hpc, tr, ki
hpc0 , tr0 , k 0 i
hpc, tr, v >>=ki
hpc0 , tr0 , v >>=k 0 i

SS-Arith2

hpc0 , tr0 , t01 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t01 op t2 i

hpc, tr, t2 i
hpc, tr, t1 op t2 i

S-Bool2

hpc0 , tr0 , t01 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t01 bop t2 i

hpc, tr, t2 i
hpc, tr, t1 bop t2 i

S-Compare2

hpc0 , tr0 , t01 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t01 cop t2 i

hpc, tr, t2 i
hpc, tr, t1 cop t2 i

hpc0 , tr0 , t02 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t1 op t02 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t02 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t1 bop t02 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t02 i
hpc0 , tr0 , t1 cop t02 i

Figure 2.17: Contextual rules in symbolic operational semantics for pλ
Definition 27 (Appropriate Assignment for Symbols). Given a symbolic output triple
with path condition pc and trace tr, an appropriate assignment for this output is a
map Θ ∈ dom(tr) → Rω , such that [[Θ(pc)]] = true. We write hpc, tri ` Θ to mean
that Θ is an appropriate assignment with respect to the path condition pc and trace
tr .
In the following discussion, to simplify notation, we write Θ(pc) to refer to the
boolean value v given by the equation [[Θ(pc)]] = v. Since path conditions cannot
contain fixpoint terms, we can justify the omission of interpretation brackets by
proving that for any symbolic boolean value in boolsym , the semantic value [[Θ(pc)]]
is never ⊥.
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Similarly, for a symbolic numeric value sv in Rsym
ω , we write Θ(sv) for the numeric semantic value acquired from [[Θ(sv)]].
Given hpc, tri ` Θ, we can compute the probability of Θ under the trace tr by
taking the product of probability values for concrete selection of symbols. Note
that since each Laplace distribution in the trace may contain parameters with symbols, we also need to instantiate these parameters under Θ. So, the probability of
an appropriate assignment hpc, tri ` Θ is given by the equation:
(Q
P (hpc, tri ` Θ) ,

x7→lap(r,w)∈tr

µ(Θ(x)) where µ = laplace(Θ(r), w), if tr 6= ∅
if tr = ∅

1,

Using the probability of an appropriate assignment, we can define the probablistic interpretation for a set of symbolic outputs.
Definition 28 (Probabilistic Interpretation of Symbolic Outputs). Given
S ∈ P (boolsym × Trace × τ ) ,
where τ is a set of symbolic booleans or numbers, the probability distribution induced
by S, written Ŝ, is defined as
Ŝ , λ v.

X
hpc,tr,svi∈S

(P
0,

hpc,tri`Θ s.t. Θ(sv)=v

P (hpc, tri ` Θ)

if there is no hpc, tri ` Θ such that Θ(sv) = v

Under the distribution Ŝ, the probability assigned to a value v, is a nested sum
of probability. For the inner sum at a symbolic value sv, we aggregate probability
of all appropriate assignments Θ such that Θ(sv) = v. This inner sum is computed
at each symbolic value in S, and the total of inner sums is the final probability
assigned to v. Note that because Θ(sv) is a syntactic value, this distribution only
assigns probability to Pλ syntactic values, similar to probability distributions produced by E(·).
Now, intuitively, we can say the symbolic semantics and the concrete semantics
agree on a term t, if the distribution E(t), and the distribution Ŝ are the same, where
the set S is given by SE(htrue, ∅, ti). To precisely establish this correspondence, we
again use a unary logical relation SCτ (·).
Definition 29 (The logical relation SCτ (·)). Given a closed term t, we define the
logical relation SCτ (t) by the following rules.
1. τ is a base type, then SCτ (t) , ∅ ` t : τ ∧E(t) = Ŝ, where S = SE(htrue, ∅, ti).
Furthermore, both E(t) and Ŝ are either proper point-mass distributions, or
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empty distributions.
2. τ is a distribution over a base type
σ, then SC σ (t) , ∅ ` t :
σ∧E(t) = Ŝ,
where S = SE(htrue, ∅, ti).
3. τ is an arrow type: τ = σ → ρ, then SCσ→ρ (t) , ∅ ` t : σ → ρ ∧ ∀ t0 . SCσ (t0 ) ⇒
SCρ (t t0 ).
To handle open terms, we again use type-respecting substitution (similar to
Definition 23).
Definition 30. A substitution γ from variables to values is type-respecting, written
Γ `sym γ, if
1. the domains match dom(γ) = dom(Γ).
2. for any x ∈ dom(γ), the term γ(x) is a value as defined by the concrete operational semantics val γ(x) and ∅ ` γ(x) : Γ(x), and
3. for any x ∈ dom(γ), the value is in the logical relation SCΓ(x) (γ(x)).
A slightly surprising aspect of Definition 30 is that these substitution environments exclude symbolic values with symbols. Symbols are only generated by reducing a Laplace distribution under the symbolic operational semantics, and each
symbol is always associated with the originating Laplace distribution. Substitution
of arbitrary symbols into a term t breaks the “well-scopedness” of symbols with
respect to the trace generated from evaluating SE(htrue, ∅, ti), and leads to a set
S with no valid probabilistic interpretation.
We use the following theorem to establish the logical relation SCτ (·) for all welltyped terms. The proof method also relies on extending Pλ with finite fixpoints
as approximations, and the proof steps are similar to those from Section 2.4.1. In
particular, the proof involves checking the probabilistic interpretation of a symbolically reduced Laplace term matches the distribution produced by E(·) on the
same term, and this step is shown by unfolding the definition of our probabilistic
interpretation for sets of symbolic outputs.
Theorem 31. Given Γ ` t : τ , and Γ `sym γ, the term γ(t) is in the logical relation
SCτ (γ(t)).
Proof. By induction on typing judgment.
Finally, as a corollary, we can prove that for any well-typed, closed term that has
a distribution type, the probabilistic interpretation of its symbolic outputs matches
the denotational semantics.
Corollary 32. Given ∅ ` t :
[[t]](∅) satisfy Ŝ = τ [[t]](∅).

τ , let S = SE(htrue, ∅, ti), the distributions Ŝ and
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Proof. By the previous theorem and unpacking the definition of C

τ (t),

and SC

τ (t).

The concrete operational semantics produces a distribution of values, while
the symbolic operational semantics produces a “flattened” representation of the
distribution that enumerates all of the internal branches. Theorem 26 and Corollary 32 tell us that the concrete and symbolic operational semantics of probabilistic
P λ terms yield representations of the same underlying distribution given by the
denotational semantics. In Chapter 4, we test differential privacy for a function
f : σ →
τ by taking a pair of similar inputs x1 ∼ x2 , and generating constraints that describe approximate couplings between [[f (x1 )]] and [[f (x2 )]]. In particular, the constraints are derived from E(f (x1 )) and SE(htrue, ∅, f (x2 )i). Knowing that E(f (x1 )) and SE(htrue, ∅, f (x2 )i) agree with the denotational distributions ensures that our constraints are really modeling the intended distributions
specified in by the program f .

45

Chapter 3
A Three-Level Differential Privacy
Type System
A rich line of previous work has studied differential privacy type systems for functional programming languages [Gaboardi et al., 2013b, Reed and Pierce, 2010a,
Winograd-Cort et al., 2017]. However, many real-world data analysis tasks are programmed in imperative programming languages. In [Zhang et al., 2019], we studied a three-level differential privacy type system called Fuzzi, based on the program logic apRHL (Approximate, Probabilistic, Relational Hoare Logic) [Barthe
et al., 2016]. The three-level type system contains a top-level sensitivity type system. Typing judgments from the top-level are elaborated into apRHL, which sits at
the middle level and serves as the foundation for formal reasoning of differential
privacy in the imperative language. Some type information from top-level typing
judgments are also elaborated into the base-level logic, which provides auxiliary
information required by apRHL proofs.
A differentially private program often combines small but tricky program fragments that serve as building blocks for differentially private data analysis. The
program logic apRHL provides expressive abstractions for experts to manually
prove these building blocks preserve privacy. However, proving differential privacy in apRHL for entire programs can be tedious. Fortunately, in many proofs for
larger programs, the expert knowledge of differential privacy concentrates on the
analysis of small differentially private building blocks, while the rest of the proof
just propagates “sensitivity” information and privacy costs. This suggests that we
could increase the range of possible use cases, especially for analysts who are not
privacy experts, by combining a small but extensible set of building blocks and the
corresponding apRHL proofs with a largely automated analysis that mechanically
completes the privacy proof of a whole program.
To enable this approach, Fuzzi builds a new layer of abstraction over apRHL to
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automate the mechanical parts of this proof. We call this layer the sensitivity logic.
This top-level sensitivity logic tracks sensitivities for program variables and privacy costs of commands through Hoare-triple-style judgments. The type information tracked by the sensitivity logic has a direct translation into lower-level apRHL
assertions. This allows the top-level type system to seamlessly interact with expert
proofs of differential privacy in the two lower layers.
We use the term mechanisms to refer to building blocks of differentially private
programs. Many mechanisms can be viewed as parameterized program templates
(macros), where the privacy properties depend on properties of the instantiation
parameters, which can themselves be expressions or commands. To integrate expert reasoning about mechanisms, we develop a framework for expressing mechanisms as macros and the corresponding parameterized proofs of differential privacy. This allows experts to extend the top-level type system using specialized a
typing rule for each mechanism, allowing non-experts to write applications that
combine these mechanisms in straightforward ways. This framework uses apRHL
and a base logic to give structured proofs of differential privacy.
We present a refreshed design of Fuzzi in this chapter. Following a review of
the definition of sensitivity in Section 3.1, and an overview of the core imperative
language (Section 3.2), we present the following contributions:
(1) We propose a sensitivity type system for tracking differential privacy (Section 3.3,Section 3.5). This type system is expressive enough to capture detailed sensitivity properties for a simple imperative core language; the sensitivity type system’s soundness is established via a direct embedding into
apRHL.
(2) We show how to connect manual proofs for privacy properties of mechanisms to the sensitivity type system, and develop proofs for several mechanisms that transform private datasets (Section 3.6).
(3) Using a prototype implementation of Fuzzi, we implement private machine
learning algorithms from four different classes, and show that Fuzzi’s typechecker can derive tight sensitivity bounds (Section 3.7).

3.1

Sensitivity

The top-level type system tracks sensitivity of program variables, and differential
privacy cost. We define sensitivity as an upper bound on the distance between values held by a program variable between two related runs.
The definition of distance is indexed by a datatype. In this type system, we
consider three scalar types—bool, int and real, and two container types—[τ ]
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(pronounced “vector” of τ ) and {τ } (pronounced “bag” of τ ). We place a restriction (Figure 3.1) on the datatypes of values that may be contained in bags—they
must only be compositions of scalar types and the vector type. We do not allow
datatypes such as bags of bags, or bags of vectors of bags. Vectors of bags are
allowed. This restriction prevents distracting theoretical complications when we
consider properties of the sensitivity type system. In our evaluation (Section 3.7),
we do not find nested bags useful, and this restriction does not prevent us from
expressing interesting programs in our experiments.
We use the notation dτ (·, ·) for the distance function defined at the type τ . Each
dτ is a function with type τ × τ → R≥0 ∪ {∞}—we allow infinity as a valid distance
value too.
Definition 33 (Distance for bool).
dbool (b1 , b2 ) =

(
0,

if b1 = b2

∞, otherwise

Definition 34 (Distance for int and real). For the two base types int and real,
the distance function is defined to be the absolute value of the difference between two
values:
dτ (v1 , v2 ) = |v1 − v2 |, τ = int or τ = real
The distance function for vectors is the L1 distance (Definition 3) for two vectors
with the same length, and ∞ otherwise.
Definition 35 (Distance for vectors). Given the distance function dτ for values within
a vector, the distance between two vectors with the same length L at type [τ ] is:
d[τ ] (vs1 , vs2 ) =

L−1
X

dτ (vs1 [i], vs2 [i])

i=0

Distance between two vectors with different length is ∞.
Definition 36 (Distance for bags). The distance function for bags is defined the be
the number of elements in one bag but not the other.
d{τ } (vs1 , vs2 ) = |vs1 \vs2 | + |vs2 \vs1 |
Here, the backslash operator is the multiset difference operator.
We say a program variable x with datatype τ has sensitivity s, if the distance
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between values of x in two related runs are bounded by s:
dτ (xh1i, xh2i) ≤ s
We use the annotations h1i and h2i to explicitly distinguish values of program variables between two related runs.
The type system sometimes benefits from knowing the exact constant value of
a term. Consider the multiplication expression with two operands e1 ∗ e2 . Suppose
we know e1 has some finite sensitivity value s, and e2 takes on a positive constant
value k, then the sensitivity of this entire expression is ks. However, suppose we
only know that e2 is an expression with sensitivity 0, then we have no choice but
to give ∞ as an estimation of the sensitivity for the entire expression, since the
distance between the results of this multiplication computation depends on the
magnitude of the value for e2 .
We also track this constant value information with sensitivities, by allowing
a refinement in the form of k, where k is a numeric constant. This design draws
inspiration from Benton [2004]’s work on (deterministic) relational Hoare Logic.
s := k, k ∈ Rω | r ∈ R+
ω
We define an ordering ≤ on sensitivities with the following rules:
k
r1

≤
≤

0, for any k
r2 , if r1 is numerically less than or equal to r2

The first rule states that constant values are 0-sensitive, while the second rule states
that sensitivity values can always be relaxed by making them larger. For example,
a 1-sensitive value is also 2-sensitive.
We also define the operations +s , ∗s , /s on sensitivity annotations. These operations are designed to give estimations of sensitivity values on binary arithmetic
expressions, and will be used in expression typing rules.
k1 +s k2 = k where k = k1 + k2
s1 +s s2 = s1 + s2
k1 ∗s k2 = k where k = k1 ∗ k2
k ∗s s = |k|s
s ∗s k = |k|s

s1 ∗s s2 = ∞ if s1 or s2 6= 0
0 ∗s 0 = 0
k1 /s k2 = k where k = k1 /k2
0/s 0 = 0
s1 /s s2 = ∞ if s1 or s2 6= 0

Note that the subtraction operation on sensitivity values can be computed by the
definition
s1 −s s2 , s1 +s (−1) ∗s s2
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σ
τ
literals
op
expr

:= int | real | bool | [σ]
:= σ | {σ} | [τ ]
:= n ∈ Z | r ∈ R
:= + | ∗ | / | < | ≤ | > | ≥ | == | ! = | && | ||
:= literals | x ∈ Vars | y ∈ L | expr op expr | expr [expr ]
update(expr , expr , expr ) |
[]τ | {}τ |
resize(expr , expr ) |
length(expr ) |
expr ? expr : expr
Figure 3.1: Language Grammar

cmd := x = expr | x = effexpr | x = M(expr, . . . , cmd, . . . ) |
M(expr, . . . , cmd, . . . ) | skip | cmd ; cmd |

x = lap expr , r ∈ R>0
|
ω
if expr then cmd else cmd end |
while expr do cmd end
effexpr := {cmd; expr}
Figure 3.2: Language Grammar (Continued)
With the exception of bags, if dτ (v1 , v2 ) = 0, then v1 = v2 . For bags, if their
distance is 0, the order of bag entries may still be different.
Remark In both the static computation of sensitivity types, and in the dynamic
evaluation of Fuzzi programs, we extend the division function and define n/0 = 0
for any n. This arrangement allows us to simplify the type system, and the semantics of pure expressions.

3.2

Language Syntax

Before we explain the sensitivity type system, we first give an overview of the core
imperative language. We reviewed apRHL in Section 2.3. Barthe et al. [2013, 2016]
and Hsu [2017] developed apRHL for formalizing proofs of differential privacy
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for imperative programs. The proof rules (Section 2.3) in apRHL are expressive
enough to capture the essence of many complex differentially private algorithms.
This formalization allows experts to prove differential privacy for small and tricky
program fragments at a high-level of abstraction.
The syntax of our core imperative language is shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2—it is mostly the same imperative language for apRHL as we have seen
in Section 2.3. Our language has a special assignment form that samples from the
Laplace mechanism and sets a program variable to the sampled value. In particular, the width parameter to the Laplace distribution must be a positive constant.
This core imperative language allows macro instantiations M(. . . ) on the righthand side of a deterministic assignment, and also where commands may appear.
In a macro instantiation term, M is the name of the macro, and the instantiation
parameters can be expressions and commands. Macros are replaced by the associated body for M in a preprocessing step, before the typechecker analyzes the
expanded program.
Since an expanded macro contains commands, the syntactic form x = M(. . . )
in Figure 3.2 implies commands may appear on the right-hand side of an assignment once a Fuzzi program is preprocessed. We use the syntactic form effexpr to
account for the terms that are results of macro expansion and appear on the righthand side of an assignment. We call these terms “effectful expressions”. An effectful expression is a command, followed by a pure expression, and is wrapped inside
a pair of curly braces. For evaluation, a term in the form of x = {c; e} is evaluated
by running c first, and then assigning the value of the pure expression e to program
variable x. In other words, the semantics of x = {c; e} is the same as the command
sequence c; x = e. This forms a limited version of function calls.
We have three scalar types bool, int, and real, which correspond to the set of
boolean values true and false, the set of integers Z, and the enumerable subset
of the reals Rω . We assume a default value for all possible types in the language—
false for boolean values, 0 for both integers and reals, and the empty vector and
the empty bag for container types.
For both vectors [τ ] and bags {τ }, the corresponding sets of values are lists
of values in τ . We tag these lists with type τ of its values. This is because our
language has a resize operation on container types, and when a container’s size
is increased, we fill the new positions with default values of the corresponding
type.
We write M for the set of program states over the set of program variables Vars.
A program state m ∈ M is an association from program variables to their values.
Our type system does not allow programs to change the datatypes of program
variables through assignments. Similar to the object language P W HILE for apRHL
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(Section 2.3), a Fuzzi program can use a set of logical variables L. Logical variables
are mapped to constants by a logical context ρ from L to Fuzzi values, and cannot
be modified.
The denotational semantics of Fuzzi closely follows the denotational semantics
of P W HILE for apRHL by Barthe et al. [2016]. We interpret expressions and commands in this language as functions over program states.
The semantics of an expression e with datatype τ is given by [[e]]ρ : M → [[τ ]], a
function that maps program states to a value. In particular, evaluating expressions
always produces a value. Pathological expressions, such as array lookup with an
out-of-bound index, evaluate to well-typed default values.
The semantics of a command c is given by [[c]]ρ : M →
M , a function that
maps program states to a sub-distribution of program states. The choice of subdistributions accounts for non-termination directly, without using a bottom value
for program states [Kozen, 1981].

3.3

Type Definitions

A typing judgment in the top-level sensitivity type system contains pre- and postcondition typing contexts, privacy cost annotations, and probabilistic versus deterministic annotations. Let ρ be a logical context (Section 2.3). The general form of
a typing judgment for expressions is: ρ ` e :s Γ ⇒ τ . The general form of a typing
judgment for commands is: ρ ` c :ε,δ Γ ⇒d Γ0 . The following table lists what each
metavariable stands for, and what values they might take on.
Metavariable

Description

Possible Values

ρ

The logical context

e

The typed expression

s
c

The sensivitity annotation
The typed program command

A map from logical variables in L to values
Terms in the expr grammar
rule
0, 1, 0, 1, . . .
Terms in the cmd grammar
rule
x :1 τ, y :2 σ, z :0 [σ]

Γ, Γ0

Typing contexts that map program variables to sensitivities
and datatypes
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Metavariable
, δ
d

Description

Possible Values

The privacy cost values

Constants and terms over
logical variables in ρ
The symbol - for deterministic computation, or the
symbol ∼ for probabilistic
computation

Annotation for deterministic/probabilistic computation

The validity of a typing judgment is given by an associated apRHL judgment.
To define the associated apRHL judgment for a typing judgment, we first provide
a translation of the sensitivity typing context into apRHL relational assertions. A
typing context Γ is translated into a relational assertion that constrains each program variable x ∈ dom(Γ) pointwise.
[[Γ]] =

^
x:s τ ∈Γ

(
xh1i = xh2i = k,
dτ (xh1i, xh2i) ≤ s,

if s is k for some k
otherwise

For example, a typing context Γ , w :5 int, x :1 τ, y :0 σ, z :∞ ρ is translated into
the following assertion:
wh1i = 5 ∧ wh2i = 5 ∧ dτ (xh1i, xh2i) ≤ 1 ∧ dσ (yh1i, yh2i) ≤ 0 ∧ dρ (zh1i, zh2i) ≤ ∞
In the following discussion, we write Γ(x) for the sensitivity associated with x
in Γ. When we need to refer to a variable’s datatype, we will write x :s τ ∈ Γ to
state x’s datatype is τ in Γ. We may omit the sensitivity annotation s when we are
just referring to the datatype τ . We write Γ1 ≤ Γ2 if both typing contexts contain the
same set of variables and associated datatypes in their domain, and each associated
sensitivity annotation satisfies Γ1 (x) ≤ Γ2 (x).
As a reminder of notation on apRHL assertions from Section 2.3, given any
relational assertion P , we write P h1i for the left projection on the set of related
program states, and similarly write P h2i for the right projection. Now, given a
typing context Γ, since [[Γ]] is an apRHL relational assertion, we write [[Γ]]h1i for the
left projection on the set of program states related by Γ, and similarly [[Γ]]h2i for the
right projection.
The sensitivity type system tracks whether a command is deterministic or uses
randomness. A probabilistic program c is called deterministic, if for any program
state m, the distribution [[c]](m) is either the empty distribution, or a point-mass distribution ret(m0 ) for some output program state m0 . For example, any command
that does not use the Laplace mechanism is deterministic.
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Now, we have all the information for defining validity of expression and command typing judgments.
Definition 37 (Validity of Expression Judgment). An expression typing judgment
ρ ` e :s Γ ⇒ τ is an inductively constructed judgment. An expression typing judgment
is valid, if for all pairs of program states (m1 , m2 ) ∈ [[Γ]], the values [[e]]ρ (m1 ) and
[[e]]ρ (m2 ) satisfy the sensitivity bound s at type τ .
In particular, if s is k for a constant k, then [[e]]ρ (m1 ) = [[e]]ρ (m2 ) = k. Otherwise,
the inequality dτ ([[e]]ρ (m1 ), [[e]]ρ (m2 )) ≤ s must hold.
Definition 38 (Validity of Command Judgment). A command typing judgment ρ `
c :ε,δ Γ ⇒da Γ0 is a conjunction of the following propositions:
(1) The apRHL statement ρ ` c ∼ε,δ c : [[Γ]] ⇒ [[Γ0 ]] is valid.
(2) If the annotation d is −, then the program c is deterministic. Otherwise d is ∼,
and the program c may be probabilistic.
Expression typing judgments are not elaborated into lower-level logics, but we
will prove any derivable expression typing judgment is valid under the Fuzzi expression typing rules. We use the validity property of derivable expression typing
judgments in soundness proofs command typing judgments.
Command typing judgments hold two pieces of information simultaneously—
the underlying apRHL judgment, and whether the program is deterministic or
probabilistic. The deterministic and probabilistic annotations of a command simplify the soundness proofs for some typing rules, and are useful for our development of extensions to the language (Section 3.6).

3.4

Operations and ordering on annotations

Since deterministic programs are a special case of probabilistic programs, there is
a natural reflexive ordering on annotations, and we define a binary operation ∨
(pronounced “join”) that returns the more general annotation between two.
For deterministic and probabilistic annotation, we let − ≤ ∼, and define the
join operator by the following equations:
−
∼
−
∼

∨
∨
∨
∨

∼
−
−
∼

=
=
=
=

∼
∼
−
∼

Note that d1 ≤ d1 ∨ d2 and d2 ≤ d1 ∨ d2 for any d1 and d2 .
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Weaken

` e :s1 Γ ⇒ τ s1 ≤ s2
` e :s 2 Γ ⇒ τ

Strengthen

` e :s Γ0 ⇒ τ Γ ≤ Γ0
` e :s Γ ⇒ τ

Constant

k literal
` k :k̇ Γ ⇒ real

Plus

Mult

τ = int or τ = real
` e1 :s1 Γ ⇒ τ ` e2 :s2 Γ ⇒ τ
s = s1 +s s2
` e1 + e2 :s ⇒ τ

τ = int or τ = real
` e1 :s1 Γ ⇒ τ ` e2 :s2 Γ ⇒ τ
s = s1 ∗ s s2
` e1 ∗ e2 :s ⇒ τ

Cond-Expr-0

` cond :0 Γ ⇒ bool
` e1 :s1 Γ ⇒ τ
` e2 :s2 Γ ⇒ τ
s = max(s1 , s2 )
` cond ? e1 :e2 :s Γ ⇒ τ

Cond-Expr-∞

` cond :∞ Γ ⇒ bool
` e1 :s1 Γ ⇒ τ
` e2 :s2 Γ ⇒ τ
` cond ? e1 :e2 :∞ Γ ⇒ τ

Figure 3.3: Fuzzi expression typing rules
Since these annotations can only take on two different values, the ordering and
the join operation do not have much interesting structure to be explored. These
operations are used to make the typing rule presentations more concise.
For sensitivity annotations, deterministic annotations, and probabilistic annotations, when we write x < y, this means x ≤ y and x 6= y.

3.5

Typing Rules

The sensitivity type system gives typing rules for deriving the sensitivity of expressions, and rules for updating program variable sensitivities in pre- and postcondition typing contexts for commands. Similar to proof rules in apRHL, since
the logical context ρ remains constant throughout a typing derivation, we omit the
logical context ρ in typing rules.
We show a subset of expression typing rules in Figure 3.3, the complete set
of rules can be found in Appendix B. The typing rules on arithmetic expressions
try to compute accurate sensitivity values using the operators +s , ∗s and /s . These
operators also account for situations where we cannot give accurate sensitivity
estimates. The expression typing rules allow indexing, updating, and resizing on
vectors, but refuse to typecheck these operations on bags.
Using expression typing rules, we can derive accurate sensitivity for a wide
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range of arithmetic terms. As an example, given two well-typed numeric operands
` e1 :1 Γ ⇒ real and ` e2 :2 Γ ⇒ real, we can derive ` e1 + (−1) ∗ e2 :3 Γ ⇒ real
using a combination of C ONSTANT, P LUS and M ULT:
` (−1) :(−1) Γ ⇒ real
` e2 :2 Γ ⇒ real
s = (−1) ∗s 2 = |−1| ∗ 2 = 2
` e1 :1 Γ ⇒ real

` (−1) ∗ e2 :2 Γ ⇒ real

1 +s 2 = 1 + 2 = 3

` e1 + (−1) ∗ e2 :3 Γ ⇒ real
We prove the soundness of the expression typing rules by induction. We discuss
the cases for C OND -E XPR -0 rule, the W EAKEN and S TRENGTHEN rules, as they are
the most interesting cases.
Lemma 39 (Expression typing rules are valid). Given ` e :s Γ ⇒ τ derived from
rules in Figure 3.3, expression e satisfy all conditions listed in Definition 37.
Proof. By induction on the expression typing judgment.
Cond-Expr-0 We need to show that the sensitivity of the conditional expression
is bounded by the maximum of the sensitivity between branch expressions.
Knowing that cond is 0-sensitive and is a boolean value, we can show [[cond ]](m1 ) =
[[cond ]](m2 ) by definition of distance on boolean values. So, the related results of the
entire conditional expression are either ([[e1 ]](m1 ), [[e1 ]](m2 )) or ([[e2 ]](m1 ), [[e2 ]](m2 )).
In the first case, induction hypothesis shows the distance between the two values
is bounded by s1 , and in the second case, similarly induction hypothesis shows the
distance is bounded by s2 . Since s1 and s2 are both bounded by s = max(s1 , s2 ).1 The
entire expression has sensitivity s.
Weaken This rule allows us to relax the conclusions of a typing judgment on an
expression. The case for s1 = s2 is immediate. So, let us consider the case for s1 < s2 .
If we relax the sensitivity annotation from s1 to s2 , and s1 6= s2 , then by induction
hypothesis, we know dτ ([[e]](m1 ), [[e]](m2 )) ≤ s1 . Additionally, since we know s1 < s2 ,
we can conclude dτ ([[e]](m1 ), [[e]](m2 )) ≤ s2 .
Strengthen This typing rule allows us to strengthen the typing context for expressions. Again, the case where Γ = Γ0 is immediate. So, we consider the case where
1

If both sensitivity annotations are k1 and k2 , then the sensitivity value 0 is chosen as the max.
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Γ < Γ0 . In this case, we have a typing judgment ` e :s Γ0 ⇒ τ , and by induction hypothesis, we know for any program states (m1 , m2 ) ∈ [[Γ0 ]], the inequality
dτ ([[e]](m1 ), [[e]](m2 )) ≤ s holds.
Now, we have a typing context Γ that contains the same set of variables as Γ0 , and
we know Γ(x) ≤ Γ0 (x). So, for any (m1 , m2 ) ∈ [[Γ]], we know it must be the case that
(m1 , m2 ) ∈ [[Γ0 ]] as well by the elaboration of typing contexts shown in Section 3.3.
This implies the new typing judgment is valid.
The expression typing rules satisfy the following two properties that allows us
to extend a typing context Γ, and also contract Γ when some variables are unused.
We write fvs(e) for the set of free variables in e. The set of free variables of an
expression can be recursively computed from the union of free variables in its subexpressions.
Lemma 40 (Extension). Given a judgment ` e :s Γ ⇒ τ , and y ∈
/ dom(Γ). Define
0
0
0
the typing context Γ by Γ , Γ, y :s0 σ. The judgment ` e :s Γ ⇒ τ is also derivable.
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment.
Lemma 41 (Contraction). Given a judgment ` e :s Γ ⇒a τ , for any x ∈ dom(Γ)
such that x ∈
/ fvs(e), define the typing context Γ0 by Γ0 , Γ\x—the typing context
that excludes x from Γ. The judgment ` e :s Γ0 ⇒ τ is also derivable.
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment.
We show the core typing rules on commands in Figure 3.4. The soundness of
these rules rely on the corresponding two-sided apRHL proof rule shown in Section 2.3.
The L APLACE rule has an interesting postcondition typing context—it sets the
sensitivity of the modified variable x to 0, even though the value of x is now random. This is because we use the apRHL rule L AP to relate the samples from two
executions, so that related samples are indistinguishable. This allows the sensitivity type system to process the following commands, while assuming x has sensitivity 0. Intuitively, variables with 0 sensitivity are non-differentiating between
two related runs, and this typing rule teaches the type system that adding Laplace
noise to values with finite sensitivity “releases” private information.
The S EQ rule composes the typing contexts of two commands, by using the
postcondition from the first command as a precondition of the second one. This
typing rule also adds up the privacy costs from both commands for the aggregated
privacy costs of the composed command. The probabilistic versus deterministic
annotation is taken to be the more general one from the two composed commands.
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Assign

` c :0,0 Γ ⇒− Γ0 ` e :s Γ0 ⇒ τ
` x = {c; e} :0,0 Γ ⇒− Γ0 [x 7→ s]

Laplace

` e :s Γ ⇒ real b is a constant in R>0
` x = lap(e, b) :s/b,0 Γ ⇒∼ Γ[x 7→ 0]

Seq

` c1 :ε1 ,δ1 Γ1 ⇒d1 Γ2 ` c2 :ε2 ,δ2 Γ2 ⇒d2 Γ3
d = d1 ∨ d2

Skip

` skip :0,0 Γ ⇒− Γ
Cond

` e :0 Γ ⇒ bool

` c1 ; c2 :ε1 +ε2 ,δ1 +δ2 Γ1 ⇒d Γ3
d = d1 ∨ d2
` c1 :ε1 ,δ1 Γ ⇒d1 Γ1

` c2 :ε2 ,δ2 Γ ⇒d2 Γ2

` if e then c1 else c2 end :max(ε1 ,ε2 ),max(δ1 ,δ2 ) Γ ⇒d max(Γ1 , Γ2 )
While

` e :0 Γ ⇒ bool ` c :0,0 Γ ⇒− Γ
` while e do c end :0,0 Γ ⇒− Γ

Figure 3.4: Fuzzi core typing rules
This style of composition closely follows the S EQ proof rule from apRHL, and this
typing rule’s soundness directly follows from the S EQ proof rule.
The C OND rule assumes the branch condition is a 0-sensitive expression. Since
this expression is a boolean, being 0-sensitive implies the branch condition evaluates to the same value in related runs. We do not statically know which branch the
command takes in two related runs, but both runs must take the same branch. The
privacy cost, and sensitivity annotations are taken to be the larger ones among the
two branches. We write max(Γ1 , Γ2 ) for a new typing context with the same set of
variables as Γ1 and Γ2 , and the sensitivity associated with each variable is taken to
be the larger one.
One important technical subtlety is that the version of apRHL from [Hsu, 2017]
is a program logic under which derivable judgments only relate terminating programs (Lemma 4.3.3 in [Hsu, 2017]). This is because the proof rule for while loops
in that work allows probabilistic commands with non-zero privacy costs as loop
bodies, and the while loop proof rule requires a finite bound on the number of iterations to bound total privacy cost, excluding non-terminating loops. Requiring
Fuzzi to prove termination for all typed programs would unavoidably rule out
some useful ones. Fortunately, we only need a subset of apRHL proof rules and an
alternative apRHL while loop proof rule that accepts loops with no privacy cost,
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and these are all sound even if programs only co-terminate. All typeable Fuzzi
programs co-terminate, and this property follows from the associated apRHL judgment for a Fuzzi typing judgment.
The W HILE rule assumes that the loop condition is 0-sensitive, and that the
loop body preserves the sensitivity typing context as an invariant. This typing rule
follows from the following alternative apRHL W HILE * rule, which allows us to
relate while loops that do not incur privacy costs.
W HILE *

` c1 ∼0,0 c2 : P ∧ e1 h1i ⇒ P

` P → e1 h1i = e2 h2i

` while e1 do c1 end ∼0,0 while e2 do c2 end : P ⇒ P ∧ ¬e1 h1i
The current set of typing rules on expressions and commands are not flexible
enough to derive useful sensitivity bounds for many interesting programs. For example, on the following example program that computes the “sign” of each value
in an input bag, the type system struggles to show that the output bag of sign values has the same sensitivity as the input—our expression typing rules do not allow
any direct update, index or resize operations on bags.
i = 0;
while i < length ( input ) do
output = update ( output , i ,
input > 0 ? 1 : ( input == 0 ? 0 : -1) ;
i = i + 1;
end

We can manually prove that output has the same sensitivity as input in apRHL.
If this manually justified sensitivity information can be passed into the top-level
type system, then programs that use this code fragment can be automatically typechecked.

3.6

Extensions to the Type System

We design an extension feature to bundle useful mechanisms with a manual apRHL
proof for the mechanism’s sensitivity and privacy property. Formally, an extension
is a 3-tuple (fsyn , gtype , ptype ).
Here, the first component fsyn is a macro, taking program fragments such as
expressions and commands as arguments, returning a command or an effectful
expression as the result. The second component gtype is a theorem that quantifies
over the program fragments passed to fsyn , and gtype states the type information of
the expanded code from fsyn . The premises of gtype assume properties over arguments of fsyn , and the conclusion of gtype has the same shape as a command typing
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judgment ` c :ε,δ Γ ⇒d Γ0 that describes the effect of c (the expanded code) on preand postcondition sensitivity context, the privacy costs, and whether the expanded
code is deterministic or probabilistic. Finally, the last component ptype is the proof
of this theorem.
In this section, we present a few extensions inspired by the combinators from
Fuzz [Reed and Pierce, 2010b], and an extension that provides better asymptotic
aggregation of privacy costs than S EQ. We show how each extension is expanded,
present the type information theorems as inference rules, highlight key steps from
the proofs of each typing rule, and describe the use cases for each extension.

3.6.1

Bag Map

The macro of the bag map extension (Figure 3.5) has the form bmap (in, tin , e). The
first argument in is the program variable that holds the input bag. The second
argument tin holds a temporary copy of each value in the input bag, as the program
iterates over the input bag. The third argument e is an expression that may use tin
to compute an output value, and the value of e is written to the output bag in each
iteration.
The expanded code of bag map is an effectful expression, which may be used
on the right hand side of an assignment command to write the output bag value
to a program variable x. The expanded code uses the program variables i and out
to implement iteration over the input bag. We assume that i and out are unique
names selected by the macro expansion process, and both i and out are not used
anywhere else in the program.
Intuitively, if the expression e uses tin as the only sensitive input data, then the
sensitivity of the output bag is the same as the sensitivity of the input bag, since
each different bag entry may contribute to at most one different output value. In
addition to tin , the expression e may use non-sensitive results of previous computations.
The B AG -M AP typing rule says that, assuming that e is 0-sensitive when tin is
0-sensitive, and that the input bag in has sensitivity s, then the output written to
program variable x will also have sensitivity s. The auxiliary variables used in the
expanded code are assigned the trivial ∞ sensitivity at the end of the loop.
There are a few complications in the proof of the B AG -M AP typing rule. First,
the expanded code uses a while loop to iterate over the input bag, and the loop
runs one iteration for each value in the input bag. However, sensitive bag values
may have different sizes, which means we cannot directly apply the usual while
loop proof rule, because the while rule requires the two related loops to run in
“synchronized steps”—that each ith iteration from one loop is related to the ith
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Bag-Map

x : {σ} ∈ Γ ` e :0 Γ, tin :0 τ ⇒ σ
` x = bmap (in, tin , e) :
Γ, in :s {τ }, tin :∞ τ, i :∞ int, out :∞ {σ}
⇒− Γ[x 7→ s], in :s {τ }, tin :∞ τ, i :∞ int, out :∞ {σ}
{

}

i = 0;
out = resize ( out , length ( in ) ) ;
while i < length ( in ) do
t in = in [ i ];
out = update ( out , i , e ) ;
i = i + 1;
end ;
out

Figure 3.5: Typing rule for bag map
iteration from the other loop. Second, we need to ensure the expression e only
receives sensitive input from the variable tin . We discuss how to address each issue
here.
Non-synchronized loops Instead of directly establishing a relation over loop ∼
loop, we establish an equivalent relation on equivalent programs loop; skip ∼
skip; loop by first applying the apRHL E QUIV rule (Section 2.3). We build models of what bag map computes using one-sided apRHL proof rule W HILE -L and
W HILE -R, and prove the sensitivity constraints in the base logic. By the apRHL
C ONSEQ rule, we can conclude such an apRHL proof. These one-sided rules allow
us to reason about a while loop much like the kind of reasoning a deterministic,
non-relational Hoare Logic would allow. The notable difference is that W HILE L and W HILE -R has an additional requirement that these one-sided loops must
terminate, which we fulfill by leveraging the fact that evaluating an expression e
always terminates. We leave the details to Appendix C.
Dependency analysis To address the second issue, we need to leverage the sensitivity type system to perform dependency analysis, and to prevent expression e
from “sneaking in” additional sensitive input. We can extract this dependency information from the sensitivity type system by asking the type system some “what
if” questions, and examining the answers produced by the type system.
In the case of bag map, we can ask what if the program variable tin does not
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hold any sensitive data? Would the expression e still be sensitive under that assumption? In the case of B AG -M AP, we want e to be 0-sensitive under that assumption. Once we suppress the sensitivity contribution of tin , if e still has non-0
sensitivity, then the remaining sensitivity must come from additional sensitive inputs. Furthermore, note that we typecheck expression e under a typing context that
excludes the variables in, i , and out to prevent e from using them.
This analysis is sound but conservative—some expressions that satisfy this requirement may get rejected. For example, in the expression (y−y)+tin , the variable
y may hold sensitive data, but the sensitive value of y does not influence the final
result of this expression. However, the sensitivity type system cannot tell that is the
case because the sensitivity of y − y is twice the sensitivity of y given our typing
derivation on subtraction terms (Section 3.3), and this makes the sensitivity of the
entire expression non-0 even after suppressing the contributions from tin .
More precisely, the following lemma is true.
Lemma 42. Given a judgment ` e :0 Γ ⇒a τ , let vs = {x ∈ dom(Γ) | 0 < Γ(x)}. The
set of free variables of e does not overlap with vs—fvs(e) ∩ vs = ∅.
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment. Weaken, Strengthen, and Var are
the interesting cases.
Weaken We know ` e :s Γ ⇒a τ , and s ≤ 0. The case where s = 0 is immediate.
Now we consider the case where s is k for some k. In this case, we can prove an
auxiliary fact that e must be either a single variable, or an arithmetic expression
over variables with constant value types, because the constant value type is only
produced by Var, Plus, Mult, and Div. We can show, for each of these forms,
if the expression has a constant value type, then it must not involve any sensitive
variable. This allows us to conclude fvs(e) ∩ vs = ∅.
Strengthen We know ` e :0 Γ0 ⇒a τ for some Γ ≤ Γ0 . Let vs0 be the set of
sensitive variables under Γ0 , and vs be the set under Γ. Because Γ ≤ Γ0 , we know
vs ⊆ vs0 . By IH, we know fvs(e)∩vs0 = ∅. So it must be the case that fvs(e)∩vs = ∅
as well. This concludes the case for Strengthen.
Var We know e = x, fvs(e) = {x} and Γ(x) = 0. This implies x ∈
/ vs and
{x} ∩ vs = ∅.
Writing Γ0 for the subset of Γ that only contains non-sensitive variables, let Γ0
be the extended typing context Γ0 , tin :0 τ . The dependency analysis gives us (by
repeated application of Lemma 41) the judgment ` e :0 Γ0 ⇒ σ. The validity of this
judgment implies [[e]]ρ is a function that only relies on the value of tin and the nonsensitive subset of related program states, and this property allows us to prove the
sensitivity argument for B AG -M AP. We present a complete proof of B AG -M AP in
Appendix C.
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Vector-Map

` e :0 Γ, tin :0 τ ⇒ σ s < ∞
` e :k Γ, tin :1 τ ⇒ σ k < ∞
` x = vmap (in, tin , e) :
Γ, in :s [τ ], tin :∞ τ, i :∞ int, out :∞ [σ] ⇒−
Γ[x 7→ ks], in :s [τ ], tin :∞ τ, i :∞ int, out :∞ [σ]
{

}

i = 0;
out = resize ( out , length ( in ) ) ;
while i < length ( in ) do
t in = in [ i ];
out = update ( out , i , e ) ;
i = i + 1;
end ;
out

Figure 3.6: Typing rule for vector map

3.6.2

Vector Map

The macro of the vector map extension (Figure 3.6) has almost the same form as
that of bag map—vmap (in, tin , e). The expanded code is, in fact, identical to the
expanded code of bag map, and vector map can be used to compute a new vector whose entries are uniformly derived from each value of an input vector. The
vector map typing rule has a few subtle but important differences compared to
B AG -M AP. This typing rule requires that the expression e has a finite sensitivity k
when tin is 1-sensitive, and that tin is the only sensitive input to e using the same
dependency analysis from B AG -M AP. The conclusion of the typing rule states that
the sensitivity of the output vector is k multiplied by the sensitivity of the input
vector.
The difference between the V ECTOR -M AP typing rule and the B AG -M AP typing rule stems from the difference between vector and bag distance definitions.
V ECTOR -M AP requires that the input vector has a finite sensitivity, which implies that both vectors have the same length. This condition allows us to reason
about the main body of V ECTOR -M AP in synchronized loop iterations through the
apRHL W HILE rule.
To justify that the output sensitivity is scaled exactly by the sensitivity of e,
we need to first prove two facts about scaling typing contexts and the effects on
expression sensitivities.
For any 0 < k < ∞, let kΓ be a typing context where each sensitivity annotation
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is scaled by k in Γ. A constant value annotation c scaled by k remains as c.2
Lemma 43. Given a typing judgment ` e :s Γ ⇒ τ , we can derive ` e :ks kΓ ⇒ τ .
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment.
Lemma 44. Let Γ be a typing context, and k be a positive number. Define the typing
contexts Γ0 , Γ1 , and Γk by Γ0 , Γ, x :0 σ, Γ1 , Γ, x :1 σ, and Γk , Γ, x :k σ.
Given judgments ` e :0 Γ0 ⇒ τ and ` e :s Γ1 ⇒ τ , we can derive the judgment
` e :ks Γk ⇒ τ .
Proof. If k = 1, then we can immediately conclude. We do a case analysis on whether
k > 1 or k < 1.
If k > 1, then we know Γ, x :k σ ≤ kΓ, x :k σ. By Lemma 43 and an application of
Strengthen, we can conclude this case.
If k < 1, writing Γpub for the subset of Γ that only contains non-sensitive variables,
and Γpriv for the subset of Γ that only contains sensitive variables. By Lemma 42,
we know fvs(e) ∩ Γpriv = ∅. In other words, x ∈ dom(Γpriv ) implies x ∈
/ fvs(e). We
repeatedly apply Lemma 41 to derive ` e :s (Γpub , x :1 σ) ⇒ τ . Note that Γpub = kΓpub ,
and we can derive ` e :ks (Γpub , x :k σ) ⇒ τ by an application of Lemma 43. By
repeated application of Lemma 40, we can restore Γpub into Γ, and derive ` e :ks
Γk ⇒ τ .
Lemma 44 is the critical insight that allows us to show the sensitivity of the
output vector is a linearly scaled value based on the sensitivity of the input vector.
From the definition of vector distance (Definition 35), we recall that the distance
between two vectors are the sum of distances at each corresponding index, and that
this total sum linearly scales with a factor k if the distance at each corresponding
index linearly scales with k. We present a complete proof in Appendix C.

3.6.3

Partition

The partition extension (Figure 3.7) is used to split a bag into a vector of bags based
on a deterministic computation that derives an integer key from each input bag
value. The partition extension can be used to, for example, split a bag of income
values into low-, mid-, and high-income groups based on threshold values. The
typing rule guarantees that the resulting partition vector has the same sensitivity
as the input bag. This is the first time we see a nested data structure in an extension
typing rule, and we discuss what the sensitivity on a vector of bags entails.
2

Note that scaling is different from the operator ∗s on sensitivities. Here, we are directly changing sensitivity annotations, while the ∗s operator gives conservative estimates on how sensitivity
annotations combine for a multiplication expression.
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Partition

` eidx :0 Γ, tin :0 τ ⇒ int
` nparts :0 Γ ⇒ int
` x = partition (in, nparts , tin , eidx ) :
Γ, in :s {τ }, tin :∞ τ, i :∞ int, out :∞ [{τ }]
⇒− Γ[x 7→ s], in :s {τ }, tin :∞ , i :∞ int, out :∞ [{τ }]
{

}

i = 0;
out = resize ( out , nparts ) ;
while i < length ( in ) do
tin = in [ i ];
if 0 <= eidx and eidx < nparts then
out = update ( out , eidx ,
resize ( out [eidx ] ,
length ( out [eidx ]) +1) ) ;
out = update ( out , eidx ,
update ( out [eidx ] ,
length ( out [eidx ]) -1 ,
tin ) ) ;
else
skip
end ;
i = i + 1
end ;
out

Figure 3.7: Expanded code for partition
By unfolding the definition of sensitivity and distance function defined on vector of bags, we know that if two vectors of bags have finite distance k, then the bag
distance at each corresponding index of the two vectors sum up to k. This matches
our expectation based on the sensitivity for input bags—since partition just places
each value from an input bag into a designated output bag within a vector, the aggregated bag distance over the output vectors should be bounded by the distance
between the input bags.
There is one important argument called nparts supplied to the partition extension, which must a non-sensitive expression. The value of nparts decides the number of sub-bags the partition extension creates. Readers may wonder why not just
create more partitions as we iterate over the values in the input bag? The reason
is that such a partition creates an output vector whose length depends on the input bag. Since the two input bags may have different values, the derived output
vectors can have different lengths. This difference in size results in unbounded dis-
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Bag-Sum

` bound :k Γ ⇒ real
k≥0
` x = bsum (in, bound ) :
Γ, in :s {real}, i :∞ int, out :∞ real
⇒− Γ[x 7→ ks], in :s {real}, i :∞ int, out :∞ real
{

}

i = 0;
out = 0;
while i < length ( in ) do
if in [ i ] < - bound then
out = out - bound
else
if in [ i ] > bound then
out = out + bound
else
out = out + in [ i ]
end
end ;
i = i + 1;
end ;
out

Figure 3.8: Typing rule for bag sum
tance between the output vectors. So, the partition extension asks the programmer
to supply an expected number of sub-bags, and simply discard any data whose
computed key is out-of-bounds. The formal justification of the PARTITION typing
rule is similar to that of B AG -M AP, since PARTITION also involves a “map” step
that computes an integer key from each element of the input bag. The full proof is
in Appendix C.

3.6.4

Bag Sum

The bag sum extension (Figure 3.8) aggregates a bag of numeric values into a single numeric value by clipping and summing them. The clipping step is critical to
ensure the output of bag sum has bounded sensitivity. Recall that bag distance
is defined as (Definition 36) the size of symmetric set difference, and a bounded
distance between two bags places no restriction on values within the bag. For example, two bags with values {1, 2} and {1, 2, 100} have distance 1, but the sums
of their values differ by 100. Clipping each value in the bag to the range of [−k , k ]
allows us to bound the sensitivity of the sum to ks—if at most s values need to be
added or removed to make two bags identical, and each value contributes at most
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a difference of magnitude k to the sum, then the overall difference is bounded by
the product ks.

3.6.5

Advanced Composition

The fifth extension, A DV-C OMP, expands to a command instead of an effectful expression. The expanded command is a loop that runs the supplied command c for n
times, where n is a statically known constant. This extension provides a special privacy cost accounting mechanism known as Advanced Composition [Dwork et al.,
2010]. Compared to sequential composition (used by the typing rule S EQ) which
just adds up privacy costs, A DV-C OMP gives an asymptotically better  that grows
√
at the rate of O( n), at the cost of a small increase in δ. A simple composition of
loop iterations would cause  to grow linearly. The programmer chooses the increase in δ by providing a small constant number w as an argument to ac(). In
the typing rule A DV-C OMP, the premise ` w :γ Γ ⇒ real requires the term w to
be either a constant, or a term involving only constants, and that the type system
can statically derive that w always evaluates to the known constant γ. Similarly,
the premise ` n :k Γ ⇒ int requires the term n to be either a constant, or a term
involving only constants, and that the statically known value of n is k.
Adv-Comp

` c :ε,δ Γ ⇒∼ Γ
` n :k Γ ⇒ int k > 0
Γ ⇒ real γ > 0
` w :γ p
∗
ε = ε 2k ln(1/γ) + kε(eε − 1)
δ ∗ = kδ + γ
` ac(n, w, c) :ε∗ ,δ∗ Γ, i :∞ int ⇒∼ Γ, i :k int
i = 0;
while i < n do
c ; i = i + 1;
end

Figure 3.9: Typing rule for advanced composition
A DV-C OMP is useful for programs that iteratively release data, and it allows
programs to run for more iterations while staying under the same privacy budget.
However, it is worth noting that A DV-C OMP does not always give a better privacy
cost than simple composition: when the  cost of c is large, the term k(e − 1)
dominates, and this term again grows linearly with loop iterations, in addition to
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the multiplicative factor e − 1.
The soundness of this typing rule directly follows from the apRHL Advanced
Composition proof rule.

3.7

Evaluation

We evaluate Fuzzi’s effectiveness by implementing differentially private training
algorithms of logistic regression, ensemble of logistic regression models, naive
bayes, and k-means. We want to know whether (1) Fuzzi can express these algorithms, and (2) whether the typechecker derives sensitivity bounds comparable
to results of a careful manual analysis, and (3) whether the final privacy costs are
within a reasonable range.
We find that Fuzzi can indeed express all training algorithms, and that it correctly derives sensitivity bounds comparable to results from a manual analysis.
However, the privacy costs that Fuzzi derives are a bit disappointing. The reason
is that our sensitivity type system focuses on deriving accurate sensitivities, an important building block of differential privacy. Tracking sensitivities is somewhat
orthogonal to the question of how to most tightly aggregate privacy costs, which
is achieved via composition theorems that sit on top of the sensitivity calculations.
Our focus in this work is on tracking sensitivity, and the result is that Fuzzi may report a larger-than-optimal privacy cost. However, stronger composition theorems
can be added as extensions: we give an example of this by reusing the advanced
composition results formalized in apRHL.

3.7.1

Logistic Regression

We first investigate a binary classification problem through logistic regression. We
take 12,665 handwritten digits (either 0 or 1) from the MNIST database [LeCun and
Cortes, 2010]. We use 11,665 digits for training, and leave 1,000 digits for evaluation. Each digit is represented by a 28 × 28 grayscale image plus a label indicating
whether it is 0 or 1. The image and its label are flattened into a 785-dimensional
vector. We then use gradient descent to train a standard logistic regression model
that classifies these two shapes of digits. We apply differential privacy here to protect the privacy of each individual image that participates in the training step. In
other words, differential privacy limits an adversary’s ability to tell whether a particular image was used for training the logistic regression model. To achieve differential privacy, we modify gradient descent with a gradient clipping step. Gradient
clipping is a common technique for implementing differentially private gradient
68

descent [Abadi et al., 2016, Papernot et al., 2017].
We iterate the gradient descent calculation with the A DV-C OMP extension. With
100 passes over the training set, we reach a training accuracy of 0.933 and an evaluation accuracy of 0.84. We measure accuracy as the fraction of images correctly classified by the model. The differentially private model’s accuracy is comparable to
the accuracy of a logistic regression model without differential privacy (0.88) [Lecun et al., 1998]. In our implementation, 100 passes incur privacy costs  = 11.02
and δ = 10−6 . Our  privacy cost is larger than the results achieved by [Abadi et al.,
2016], due to our use of a simpler composition theorem; Abadi et al. invented a
specialized “moments accountant” method to derive tighter aggregated privacy
costs given a similar sensitivity analysis.

3.7.2

Teacher Ensemble

Next, we build on the logistic regression model, together with ideas from [Papernot et al., 2017] to design an ensemble model—a collection of models—that classifies
0 and 1 digits from the MNIST database. Papernot et al. [2017] give a general approach for providing privacy guarantees with respect to the training data. First,
partition the private training data into k parts, and apply a training procedure on
each part to build a private model. These k private models form a Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE). Then, on a public but unlabeled dataset, this
private set of models release private scores for each public but unlabeled data, and
these private scores are then clipped, summed up, and released as a public label
through differential privacy. This public dataset, together with noised labels, can
now be used to train any student model as a post-processing step, which preserves
the privacy of the original training data. Note that we do not require the teacher
models to be trained with differential privacy: only the aggregation step involves
differential privacy.
We split the training dataset of MNIST digits into five parts through the PARTI TION extension. We then independently train a logistic regression model without
gradient clipping or noise on each part. We apply Papernot et al. [2017]’s idea to
release public labels on another 100 images. With privacy cost  = 20.0 and δ = 0.0,
the noisy labels reach an accuracy of 0.82 on these 100 images. The large  value is
related to the small size of the training set, and the small amount of teacher models. Since we only have 5 private scores for each image, the noise scale must be
small to preserve the utility of the scores, resulting in large . Increasing the number of teacher models would decrease the amount of training data in each partition,
resulting in poorly trained teacher models.
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3.7.3

Naive Bayes

We next train a simple spam detection model using the Spambase dataset from UCI
Machine Learning Repository [Dheeru and Karra Taniskidou, 2017]. The binarylabeled dataset (spam or non-spam) consists of 57 features, mostly of frequencies
for words from a given dictionary, with additional features describing run-lengths
of certain word sequences. We binarize all features from the dataset to simplify the
model—instead of how frequently a word appears, we just use the information of
whether the word exists or not. We use 4500 samples for training, and 100 samples
for evaluation. Our privacy goal in this experiment is to limit an adversary’s ability
to guess whether a particular document participated in training.
We achieve a training accuracy of 0.70 and evaluation accuracy of 0.69, with
privacy costs  = 7.70 and δ = 0. This classification accuracy is slighly worse than
the accuracy of 0.72 of a non-private naive bayes model that we trained from the
same dataset.

3.7.4

K-Means

Finally, we perform a k-means clustering experiment using the iris dataset from
[Fisher, 1936]. This dataset contains 3 kinds of iris flowers, with 50 flowers from
each class. Our experiment randomly select one data point from each class as the
initial public centroids to the k-means algorithm. We use the PARTITION extension
to map each data point to its closest centroid, and create partitions accordingly.
Other than the three data points used to initialize centroids, we used all other data
for training.
We found that the accuracy of the clustering algorithm varies depending on the
initial centroids selected: running the experiment 100 times, all with 5 passes over
the data set, we observed lowest accuracy of 0.55 and highest accuracy of 0.9, with
median accuracy of 0.69. Increasing the iteration count does not reduce this spread.
We implemented a non-private version of the same algorithm, and observed lowest accuracy of 0.59, highest accuracy of 0.96, and median accuracy of 0.59 on 100
experiments. Similar to naive bayes, we see a slight drop in classification accuracy
compared to the non-private implementation.
Each run has a privacy cost of  = 21.0, and δ = 0.0. The large  cost here is
related to the small size of the training set. In a small dataset, each data point has
a larger impact on the released centroids; in order to reach a reasonable level of
classification accuracy, we choose to apply the Laplace mechanism with a smaller
noise level, resulting in larger  cost.
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3.8

Limitations

Limitations of sensitivity Fuzzi’s type system interface strikes a careful balance between expressiveness and complexity. Our approach is sufficient for expressing similarity relations on primitive values and can capture top-level sensitivity for vectors and bags. However, Fuzzi’s type system cannot express sensitivities for individual values within a vector. For example, the report noisy max algorithm assumes that two numeric vectors are similar, if the coordinate-wise distance
at each index is bounded by 1. Fuzzi cannot express such a similarity relation in
terms of its sensitivity types.
Lack of support for datatype abstraction Vectors and bags are well-studied
objects in the differential privacy literature, and they have first class support in
Fuzzi. However, Fuzzi has no facility to specify general abstract datatypes and
their similarity relation. Fuzzi must know how to translate a similarity relation into
an apRHL assertion, and this translation cannot be extended in the current design.
This limitation may force programmers to contort code in order to represent a highlevel concept through arrays. An example algorithm that cannot be expressed in
Fuzzi due to lack of abstraction is the binary mechanism [Chan et al., 2011], which
builds a tree of partial sums of the input data, and accumulates intermediate values
whose sensitivity is proportional to the depth of the tree.
Potential Implementation Vulnerabilities Fuzzi uses a countable subset of
numbers as a model for numeric values, but the implementation uses floatingpoint numbers. Mironov [2012] shows that naively sampling from the Laplace distribution with floating-point numbers may result in vulnerable programs that fail
to noise the least significant bits in the input sensitive data.
Fuzzi’s type system checks that typed programs co-terminate, but programs
in Fuzzi are still vulnerable to timing channel attacks [Haeberlen et al., 2011]. An
adversarial programmer could craft a bag map expression that takes much longer
to compute on some input than others. This side channel allows an attacker to
distinguish runs with high confidence.
The first issue can be alleviated by a careful implementation of the Laplace
mechanism that incorporates Mironov [2012]’s mitigation strategy, while the second issue is more fundamental. Fuzzi’s type system would need to approximate
execution time for typed programs, which we do not address in this work.
Performance loss due to copy assignment Fuzzi uses copy assignments for
array updates. We have worked with relatively small datasets in our experiments,
71

and the sizes of these arrays have not caused severe performance problems. However, realistic machine learning tasks operate on datasets that are many orders
of magnitudes larger, and Fuzzi likely cannot handle computations over these
datasets efficiently. To adapt Fuzzi’s theory for a semantics that allows sharing
and mutation, we need to create a new flavor of apRHL that can reason about
heaps. One potential direction is to integrate separation logic [Reynolds, 2002]
into apRHL. Barthe et al. [2019b] demonstrate a probabilistic separation logic, but
that work focuses on a different direction of modeling probabilistic independence
through separation.
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Chapter 4
Testing Differential Privacy
Our three-level type system connects manually written differential privacy proofs
for small but intricate privacy mechanisms with the rest of a larger program. However, the type system itself provides no assistance for developing sophisticated differentially private mechanisms. Previous work has shown that even experts sometimes get these mechanisms wrong [Lyu et al., 2016].
A recent line of work has produced increasingly automated validation and
counterexample generation systems that can certify or refute implementations of
sophisticated algorithms such as the sparse vector technique [Dwork and Roth,
2014]. For example, LightDP [Zhang and Kifer, 2017] uses a lightweight dependent type system along with some annotations; StatDP [Ding et al., 2018b] is a
fully automated statistical testing framework for discovering violations of differential privacy; Albarghouthi and Hsu [2017] demonstrate a completely automated
proof synthesis system for differential privacy using variable approximate coupling proofs. ShadowDP [Wang et al., 2019] uses a proof technique called “shadow
execution” to improve upon LightDP, reduce requirements on annotations, and
improve performance of verification.
In this section, we present DPCheck—a differential privacy testing framework.
DPCheck uses a hybrid of statistical testing and proof search [Zhang et al., 2020].
DPCheck can correctly distinguish private and non-private variants of all benchmark algorithms studied in previous work, in addition to an algorithm called
PrivTree [Zhang et al., 2016]. PrivTree is a probabilistically terminating algorithm—
the probability of PrivTree not terminating after n iterations quickly diminishes as
n increases, but there is no statically known loop bound. PrivTree has been cited as
a challenging case by Zhang and Kifer [2017].
The key insight behind DPCheck is that we can combine information from instrumented and symbolic executions of a program to constrain privacy proofs over
specific executions, and then combine these constraints from a large number of
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executions to detect whether potential proofs exist. The DPCheck symbolic interpreter uses information gathered by the instrumented interpreter to build a simple
static analysis of the program’s privacy properties, making automated detection of
privacy leaks feasible, even for challenging algorithms.
Following a review of a widely-used differential privacy proof technique for
sophisticated algorithms and its formalizations in apRHL (Section 4.1), we provide
these main contributions:
(1) We present a testing strategy for differential privacy adapted from a pointwise proof technique (Section 4.2).
(2) We prove that the testing strategy always correctly accepts a class of wellbehaved differentially private programs, and prove that, in principle, the
testing strategy’s probability of incorrectly accepting non-private programs
decreases exponentially as test size increases, for a class of ill-behaved programs (Section 4.3).
(3) We evaluate this testing strategy and show that DPCheck can detect nonprivate variants with common programming mistakes, and published mistakes on sophisticated benchmark algorithms, and that DPCheck accepts correct implementations of all these algorithms. In particular, we demonstrate
that DPCheck can distinguish correct and incorrect variants of PrivTree (Section 4.5).
(4) We present a practical workflow that uses DPCheck to re-implement and test
the core differential privacy mechanisms in the Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS) [Petti and Flaxman, 2019] designed for 2020 US Census; we also
show statistical evidence that our re-implemented core mechanism behaves
identically as the unmodified DAS.

4.1

Pointwise Proof of Differential Privacy

To show how DPCheck tests differential privacy, we first review how proofs of differential privacy are constructed, with the report noisy max algorithm as a running
example. Then we discuss how to adapt the same ideas for testing.
Differential privacy experts often approach (, 0)-DP proofs of sophisticated
mechanisms in a “pointwise” way using the following condition on output distributions of a randomized program.
Definition 45 ((, 0)-pointwise differential privacy). A randomized program f : τ →
σ is (, 0)-pointwise differentially private, if for all similar inputs x1 ∼ x2 , the
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probability of any possible output value v ∈ σ satisfies the inequality:
Pf (x1 ) [{v}] ≤ e Pf (x2 ) [{v}]
Definition 45 implies (, 0)-differential privacy (Definition 5) [Kasiviswanathan
and Smith, 2008], and offers a more approachable path towards proving differential privacy—we can prove the probability difference is bounded for one output at
a time.
Concretely, given a pair of similar inputs for f , we can prove (, 0)-differential
privacy by demonstrating that (1) no matter what output value the first execution yields, the second execution can also produce the same output, and (2) the
multiplicative difference in the total probability of all executions that lead to these
identical outputs is bounded by the prescribed .

4.1.1

Review of apRHL

Hsu [2017] formalized the pointwise proof technique in apRHL. The key benefit of
using apRHL to carry out pointwise proofs is that we can use the approximate coupling abstraction (Section 2.2) to bound probability difference at a fairly high-level,
without having to directly reason about the underlying distribution conditioned
on each output. We have seen apRHL judgments in Section 2.3 and Chapter 3, but
we provide another brief summary for the relevant parts here.
A general apRHL judgment has the form ` c1 ∼,δ c2 : Φ ⇒ Ψ, where c1 and c2
are related randomized programs. A top-level apRHL judgment that proves some
program c is differentially private would relate c to itself. Here, Φ is a precondition
on the inputs to c between related runs, and Ψ is a deterministic postcondition on
values produced by running c. The postcondition Ψ is lifted into a relation over
the output distributions of c through apRHL’s approximate lifting machinery. The
parameters (, δ) represent the “cost” of lifting Ψ into a relation over distributions.
When Ψ asserts that the related outputs of c are equal, the validity of such an
apRHL judgment implies differential privacy for the program c, and the parameters (, δ) are the privacy cost.
We will use the report noisy max algorithm [Dwork and Roth, 2014] as a running example. We can implement report noisy max with the following Haskell
code. The function rnm adds noise sampled from independent Laplace distributions with width 1.0 to each numeric value in an input list, and returns the index
of the largest noisy value through a helper function rnmAux. The type constructors
DPCheck and DPCheckM mark pure and probabilistic Pλ terms (Section 2.4) that are
embedded in Haskell. These terms largely behave identically to Haskell values in
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their index type. For example, a term with type DPCheck Double can be passed to
the usual arithmetic operators +, −, ∗, / in Haskell. Additionally, these embedded
terms have introspectable abstract syntax trees, and can be passed to program analysis procedures used by DPCheck. The implementation of such an embedding in
Haskell is explained in Section 6.1, but those details are orthogonal to the discussion in this chapter.
rnm :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheckM
Int
rnm (x:xs) = do
xNoised <- lap x 1.0
xsNoised <- mapM (\y. lap y 1.0) xs
rnmAux xsNoised 0 0 xNoised
rnm [] = error "rnm: received empty input"
rnmAux :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheck Int -> DPCheck Int
-> DPCheck Double -> DPCheckM
Int
rnmAux []
_ maxIdx _ = return maxIdx
rnmAux (x:xs) lastIdx maxIdx currMax = do
let thisIdx = lastIdx+1
if (x .> currMax)
(rnmAux xs thisIdx thisIdx x)
(rnmAux xs thisIdx maxIdx currMax)
The rnmAux function remembers the index of the largest noisy value, and returns
the remembered index at the end.
To state rnm is (2, 0)-differentially private in apRHL, we first encode the similarity relation for the inputs of rnm in the precondition. Two similar inputs of rnm
must have L∞ distance (Definition 4) bounded by 1, which we encode using the
assertion ∧i |xs1 [i] − xs2 [i]| < 1. Then, to state differential privacy, we assert the
outputs of two runs of rnm on similar inputs are identical in the postcondition:
` out 1 ← rnm xs1 ∼2,0 out2 ← rnm xs2
: (∧i |xs1 [i] − xs2 [i]| < 1) ⇒ out 1 h1i = out2 h2i.
Two important apRHL proof rules are used in the privacy proof of report noisy
max. These are the L AP -G EN and PW-E Q rules (Section 2.3). The L AP -G EN rule allows us to connect Laplace samples in two executions with a deterministic relation
through apRHL’s approximate couplings. In particular, this deterministic relation
allows us to assume that the samples drawn from the Laplace distribution on the
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two runs are at a fixed distance k apart.
L AP -G EN

P , |k + e1 h1i − e2 h2i| ≤ k 0

k, k 0 , w are constants

` x ← lap(e1 , w) ∼k0 /w,0 x ← lap(e2 , w) : P ⇒ xh1i + k = xh2i
This proof rule may seem too good to be true, since it allows us to assume related
samples are always at a deterministic distance k apart. What makes this work is
that we are not considering two particular samples; rather, we are relating the entire
support from two Laplace distributions simultaneously. Furthermore, establishing
such a relation in the postcondition does not come for free. We can choose any
k, but the privacy cost also depends on k. The underlying approximate couplings
that justify this proof rule are called “shift couplings” (Lemma 11), and we refer to
these k values as “shift values” in the following discussion.
The PW-E Q rule is a formal description of the pointwise proof technique: if
we can show that, for each possible output value r ∈ τ , one execution returning r
implies that the other execution also returns r, then these pointwise facts constitute
a complete differential privacy proof.
PW-E Q

∀r ∈ τ, ` c1 ∼,0 c2 : Φ ⇒ e1 h1i = r → e2 h2i = r
` c1 ∼,0 c2 : Φ ⇒ e1 h1i = e2 h2i
The terms e1 and e2 here represent the outputs of c1 and c2 respectively. The power
of PW-E Q is that, for each possible output r ∈ τ , we are allowed to choose a different set of approximate couplings in the subderivation for this r. To prove report
noisy max is differentially private, we apply exactly this strategy: given any output
r from one execution of rnm, we choose some sequence of shift values so that the
noisy max also occurs at r in the second execution, forcing the second run to also
return r.

4.1.2

An Example Pointwise Proof

Let us consider a paraphrase of a proof by Dwork and Roth [2014] for rnm that establishes (2, 0)-differential privacy. We present this proof by sketching applications
of L AP -G EN and PW-E Q, and emphasizing steps in the proof that will become key
ingredients for testing by putting boxes around equations. This proof can be carried out completely formally in apRHL with a few additional proof rules, but we
present it informally for simplicity.
Theorem 46. rnm is (2, 0)-differentially private.
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Proof. The implementation rnm creates a list of noisy values based on its input. Let
r be any possible output of running rnm. Let argmax be the function that returns
the index of the largest value in a list. When rnm runs on a list of input values, the
program first adds Laplace noise to each of these values, then iterates over the noisy
values, while keeping track of the index of the maximum value seen so far, and finally
returns that index. We write qs01 and qs02 for the two intermediate lists of noisy values
obtained from the two input lists qs1 and qs2 . Then, if r is the result of running rnm
on qs1 , it is easy to see that r = argmax qs01 .
Next, we apply PW-Eq to use the pointwise proof technique. Since we assumed
one run of rnm returned index r, we need to show that it is always possible for the
second run of rnm on qs2 to return the same index r. We demonstrate this possibility
by carefully choosing shift values with applications of the Lap-Gen rule. Concretely,
we need to ensure r = argmax qs02 , under some choice of the shift values that connect
each qs01 [i] and qs02 [i].
In particular, we choose the following sequence of shift i values such that qs02 [i] =
qs01 [i] + shift i :
(
1
if i == r
shift i =
(4.1)
qs2 [i] − qs1 [i] otherwise
We will prove that this choice implies the maximum value in the second noisy list
also occurs at index r. We know that −1 < qs2 [i] − qs1 [i] < 1 for all i by the fact
that qs1 and qs2 are similar inputs. In particular, qs2 [i] − qs1 [i] < 1. Adding qs01 [i] to
both sides of this inequality gives
qs01 [i] + (qs2 [i] − qs1 [i]) < qs01 [i] + 1
Since qs02 [i] = qs01 [i] + (qs2 [i] − qs1 [i]) if i 6= r and qs02 [r] = qs01 [r] + 1, it follows that
r = argmax qs02 .
So far, we have shown that for any output r from the first run, it is possible for
rnm to produce the same output r with the similar input on the second run. Next, we
need to calculate the  privacy cost incurred by the approximate couplings between
qs01 and qs02 , and prove  is at most 2.
Consider the privacy cost of the ith approximate coupling that relates qs01 [i] with
qs02 [i]. By apRHL proof rules, any k 0 such that k 0 /1 ≥ |shift i + qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]| is a valid
cost. We choose the smallest valid cost value for each i by taking the equality. Call
P
this privacy cost cost i . By the apRHL Seq rule, the total privacy cost is
cost i . So,
P
we need to show
cost i < 2.
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To bound the sum, we do a case analysis on whether i = r. In the case of i = r,
cost r = |1 + qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]|

by definition of shift r

≤ 1 + |qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]|

by triangle inequality

<1+1=2

by input similarity relation

(4.2)

In the case of i 6= r,
cost i = |(qs2 [i] − qs1 [i]) + (qs1 [i] − qs2 [i])|

by definition of shift i

=0

(4.3)

With Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3), we know
concludes the (2, 0)-differential privacy proof for rnm.

4.2

P

cost i = cost r < 2. This

From Proving to Testing

The key proof steps for rnm are:
(1) Assume an arbitrary output r from running rnm on one of the input lists.
(2) Select a sequence of shift values (Equation (4.1)) to connect noised samples
from one run with noised samples from the other run.
(3) Show that the second run, whose Laplace samples are fixed through the shift
values, leads to the same output r.
(4) Compute the total privacy cost for this pair of connected executions as the
sum of individual privacy cost values induced by the chosen shift values,
and show this total is less than the prescribed  = 2 (Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3)).
In order to convert these steps into a testing procedure, we need to check that, for
any run of rnm on qs1 that produces an output r, there exists a sequence of shift
values, such that the dual execution of rnm on qs2 produces the same output r.
The dual execution of rnm on qs2 has all of its noised samples fixed by the noised
samples from the first run and the chosen sequence of shift values.
There is an important restriction on how many different sequences of shift values we can use while constructing this kind of proof—the PW-E Q rule allows exactly one sequence of shift values for each possible output value r. Our testing
procedure must also obey this restriction. So, for testing, we must group runs of
rnm on qs1 by their output, and check for the existence of a single sequence of shift
values for all runs within each group simultaneously.
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With this in mind, the first step in testing is to run rnm on qs1 for a large number
of times and group the runs by their final output values.
Next, we need to find the shift values. In steps 2 and 3 of the proof above, we
used Dwork and Roth [2014]’s expert insights to select a good sequence of shift
values, which allowed us to show that the dual execution must result in the same
output. In testing, we will start with hypothetical (symbolic) shift values and hope
these symbols can be assigned suitable constants later: we create one symbolic shift
value for each qs01 [i] per group, and relate qs01 [i] and qs02 [i] through the following
equation:
qs02 [i] = qs01 [i] + shift i

(4.4)

Each ith shift value within the group also induces a cost i privacy cost value. For
testing, the symbol cost i is lower bounded by the inequality constraint from L AP G EN:
|shift i + qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]|
costi ≥
(4.5)
w
We start with these hypothetical cost values, and hope to find constants that we
can assign to each cost i that satisfies the constraints imposed by L AP -G EN.
Here, the term qs1 [i] is the concrete value supplied as the center argument to
the ith call of the sampling instruction lap(·, ·) in the first execution, shift i is a
symbolic value, qs2 [i] is the concrete center used in the ith call of lap(·, ·) in the
dual execution, and w is a constant for the width of the Laplace distribution used
in rnm. So, qs02 [i] can be represented as arithmetic terms over the shift i symbols and
concrete sampling results, as long as we know what qs1 [i] and qs01 [i] are.
The listings Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 give the procedure DPCHECK() and
a sub-procedure COUPLE() that implement the testing process. The input parameters for DPCHECK() are: the program under test f , the pair of similar inputs
x1 ∼ x2 , and finally the expected privacy cost . Let us instantiate f with rnm, 
with 2.0, assume a set of similar inputs qs1 and qs2 , and walk through the testing
process given by the pseudocode.
To capture qs1 and the samples qs01 for testing, we repeatedly run rnm on qs1
with a profiling interpreter Eprofile (·, ntrials) that instruments the lap(·, ·) sampling
instructions, recording the center, width, and the sampled value for each call. We
group each unique output r together with the associated traces of Laplace calls
into a bucket. For simplicity, we hardcode the number of repeated runs ntrials to
500 in the pseudocode, but in general this parameter can be tuned.
The procedure DPCHECK() symbolically executes rnm on the second input, using a symbolic interpreter Esymbolic (·). A symbolic interpreter is a function that takes
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Algorithm 1 DPCheck Testing Procedure
1: procedure dpcheck(f , x1 , x2 , )
2:
buckets ← Eprofile (f (x1 ), 500);
. Gather buckets from 500 runs
3:
outputs sym ← Esymbolic (f (x2 ));
4:
for each output, traces ∈ buckets do . Check satisfiability of SMT model for
each bucket
5:
shift 1 , shift 2 , . . . , shift n ← fresh();
6:
cost 1 , cost 2 , . . . , cost n ← fresh();
7:
model ← couple(output, traces, outputs sym ,
8:
shift
P 1 , . . . , shift n , cost 1 , . . . , cost n );
9:
model ← model ∧ ( i cost i ≤ ) ;
10:
if sat?(model ) then
11:
continue
12:
else
13:
return Failure
14:
end if
15:
end for
16:
return Success
17: end procedure
a closed randomized program, and produces an enumeration for the set of triples
(path condition, trace, and value) using the symbolic semantics of Pλ introduced
in Section 2.4.
For each bucket (a unique output and a set of traces for this output), we need
to show there exists approximate couplings (represented as a sequence of shift
values) that connects all traces in the bucket to the samples from a symbolic run on
qs2 , such that the symbolic run produces the same output, and that the associated
privacy cost constraints and the shift coupling constraints are satisfied.
The procedure DPCHECK() iterates over each bucket, and attempts to find such
a coupling. Concretely, we generate an SMT model with hypothesized shift values
and approximate coupling cost values using the sub-procedure COUPLE(), and ask
if the resulting model is satisfiable.
The sub-procedure COUPLE() iterates over each concrete trace, and generates
a clause that constrains the shift values on this concrete trace. Specifically, on each
concrete trace, an inner loop iterates over each symbolic triple hpc, tr sym , vsym i, and
generates a constraint that is the conjunction of:
1. the equality condition on concrete and symbolic output value (line 6 of COU PLE()),
2. the path condition pc on this symbolic triple (line 6 of COUPLE()),
3. the coupling constraints between each corresponding pair of Laplace sam81

Algorithm 2 DPCheck Testing Procedure (continued)
1: procedure couple(output, traces, outputs sym , shift 1 , . . . , shift n , cost 1 , . . . , cost n )
2:
model ← new();
3:
for each tr ∈ traces do
4:
clause ← new();
5:
for each houtput sym , tr sym , pci ∈ outputs sym do

6:
constraint ← output =? output sym ∧ pc;
7:
for each i, lap, lap sym ∈ enumerate(zip(tr , tr sym )) do

8:
constraint ← constraint ∧ lap sym .sample =? lap.sample + shift i ;
9:
constraint ← constraint∧

10:
cost i ≥ |shift i + lap.center − lap sym .center|/lap.width ;
11:
end for
12:
clause ← clause ∨ constraint;
13:
end for
14:
model ← model ∧ clause;
15:
end for
16:
return model ;
17: end procedure
ples (line 8 of COUPLE()), and
4. the coupling cost lower bound constraints (line 9 of COUPLE()).
Since each concrete trace only needs to match with some symbolic output, the clause
is a disjunction over the constraint terms generated from the inner loop. Nevertheless, all concrete traces must have dual executions, and for this reason, the model for
a bucket is a conjunction over the clause for each concrete trace. Enforcing the path
condition, the equality constraint on outputs, and the shift constraints on pairs of
samples (Equation (4.4)) are the testing analog of step 2 and 3 from the proof.
Finally, to bound the total privacy cost (as in step 4 of the proof), we extend
each model with a constraint that bounds the total cost (line 8 of DPCHECK()):
X

cost i ≤ 2

(4.6)

i

The boxed formulas form the main ingredients for the SMT model that encodes
the existence of valid couplings within a bucket. The satisfiability query on this
model can be dispatched by an off-the-shelf SMT solver—we use Z3 [De Moura
and Bjørner, 2008]. If the solver returns a satisfying solution for the hypothesized
constants, then we know the probability distributions produced by running rnm on
this particular pair of qs1 and qs2 likely satisfy the probability inequality relation
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for (2, 0)-differential privacy. Of course, the satisfying solution does not guarantee
differential privacy because we use sampled traces to constrain a potential proof
for differential privacy, instead of universally quantifying our formulas over all
possible samples in one execution.
At the core of both the proof and the SMT model is a relation between qs01 and
qs02 . To highlight the key insights that allowed us to turn a proof technique into
a testing procedure, we abstract away from details about rnm for a moment, and
consider the question—what are the structure of the proof goal in a pointwise proof
and the structure of the SMT model? By answering this question, we can highlight
the similarity between the proof method and the testing procedure.
2
1
be the set of runs on qs1 with output r, and similarly Tr qs
be the set
Let Tr qs
r
r
for qs2 . In the apRHL pointwise proof, we are effectively proving this proposition:
qs2
qs1
qs2
1
∀ r, ∃ (R ⊆ Tr qs
r × Tr r ) , ∀ (tr 1 : Tr r ) , ∃ (tr2 : Tr r ) , R tr1 tr2

To paraphrase, for every output r, we are demonstrating a relation R such that for
any run leading to output r on the input qs1 , we can find a run leading to the same
output r on the input qs2 , such that R relates these two traces.
There are a few additional constraints on R—we must be able to lift R into a
valid approximate coupling over the internal distributions of the program, and
the associated approximate coupling cost must be bounded by  = 2. We will elide
those details for now and focus on the structure of the formula presented above.
In testing, we observe a set of different output values r̂1 , r̂2 , . . . , r̂n , and a set
of sampled traces for each of these output values by first running rnm on qs1 . The
associated SMT models are independent from each other, and we focus on a single
output value r̂.
Let the set of sampled traces from runs on qs1 that lead to the output r̂ be
ˆ 11 , tr
ˆ 12 , . . . , tr
ˆ 1n . If the proposition above has a proof, then it must be the case
tr
that each sampled trace has a corresponding dual execution trace related under R.
The symbolic model we build for output r̂ encodes this condition, and the model
has the following structure:
ˆ 11 tr21
∃ R, ∃ tr21 , R tr
ˆ 12 tr22
∧ ∃ tr22 , R tr
∧ ...
ˆ 1n tr2n
∧ ∃ tr2n , R tr

(4.7)

Intuitively, the symbolic model is derived by substituting the universally quanti-
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fied tr1 from the proof goal with each of the sampled trace, and then forming a
large conjunction under the same approximate coupling relation R for all sampled
traces. The SMT model can be considered as an “approximation” of the proof goal
on the output r̂, and as we take more sampled traces and build a larger model, this
approximation becomes more “accurate”.1
In principle, if the SMT model approximates the proof goal well, then such
models built from non-differentially private programs should rarely have valid
solutions. In the next section, we consider the probability of DPCheck failing to
detect faults in an ill-behaved program. We call this kind of failure a false positive
failure—the testing framework incorrectly accepts a bad program as differentially
private.

4.3

Testing Guarantees

In this section, we classify “well-behaved” programs that are never rejected by
DPCheck. We also assume a distribution of related inputs, as seen in random differential privacy (RDP) [Hall et al., 2013], to quantitatively define “ill-behaved”
programs under a distribution of inputs.
Let us first consider an alternative view of the privacy cost parameters  and δ.
Definition 47 (Privacy Loss Random Variable). Let µ1 :
τ and µ2 :
τ be two
(v)
distributions with identical support. Define a function f : τ → R. Let f (v) = ln µµ21 (v)
.
The privacy loss random variable is a distribution pv(µ1 , µ2 ) :
R, and is defined
as:
X
pv(µ1 , µ2 )(x) =
µ1 (v)
v∈supp(µ1 ) s.t. f (v)=x

Definition 48 ([Kasiviswanathan and Smith, 2014]). Two distributions µ1 and µ2 are
(, δ)-pointwise indistinguishable, if the probability mass of pv(µ1 , µ2 ) in the interval
[−, ] is at least 1 − δ.
Note that (, δ)-pointwise indistinguishability implies (, δ)-differential privacy
(Definition 5), and this pointwise indistinguishability is a generalization of pointwise differential privacy (Definition 45) to δ > 0. Furthermore, we are effectively
constructing (, 0)-pointwise indistinguishability proofs when applying the pointwise method Section 4.1.
1

To focus on the connection between proving and testing, we also elide some additional constraints
on the symbolic traces on each tr 2i in Equation (4.7). In particular, the symbolic traces must obey
corresponding path conditions.
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Definition 49 ([Hall et al., 2013]). Assume a fixed distribution of similar inputs I :
(σ × σ). A randomized program f : σ → τ is called (, δ, α)-random differentially
private if, with probability at least 1 − α, sampling similar inputs (x1 , x2 ) from I leads
to (, δ)-pointwise indistinguishable distributions f (x1 ) and f (x2 ).
We can give some intuition to Definition 49 by considering visual graphs of the
privacy loss random variable under similar inputs. First, assume a distribution I
of similar inputs. Next, let us sample nine pairs of similar inputs from I, and draw
their privacy loss random variables as graphs centered at 0 on the horizontal axis.
We shade each graph with blue if its area is at least 1 − δ in the interval [−, ], and
red otherwise.
Under Definition 48, the two distributions are (, δ)pointwise indistinguishable if the shaded area is blue. Using this visual criterion, the definition of (, δ, α)-random
differential privacy says that, if we repeatedly sample
similar inputs from I, and inspect the corresponding
graph of the privacy loss random variable, then with
probability at least 1 − α, we will see a blue graph. The
example graphs show seven privacy loss random variables whose area in the interval [−, ] is at least 1 − δ (colored in blue), and two whose area is less than 1 − δ
(colored in red). Visually, if we extend this grid with privacy loss random variables
drawn from more and more similar inputs from I, then the parameter α bounds
the fraction of red graphs in the entire grid.
Drawing intuition from random differential privacy, we define “well-behaved”
and “ill-behaved” programs next. A program is -well-behaved, if f is (, 0)-DP,
and if f ’s path conditions are both necessary and sufficient for proving (, 0)differential privacy through the pointwise proof technique and couplings between
Laplace distributions.
Lemma 50. If a program is -well-behaved, then f is never rejected by the testing
framework when tested for any 0 ≥ .
Proof. The construction of the SMT model uses f ’s path conditions to constrain the
hypothesized sequence of shift values for each output. If f ’s path conditions are both
necessary and sufficient and a pointwise proof of privacy exists for f , then the SMT
solver will always find a satisfying solution to the model (Equation (4.7)). So the
program under test never gets rejected.
We might hope that all (, 0)-differentially private programs are -well-behaved.
However, this is not the case because there may exist (, 0)-differentially private
programs that have no pointwise proof. Furthermore, such a program may have
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a pointwise proof, but its path conditions may be unnecessarily strong. In Section 4.5, we will see a recently discovered variant of the report noisy max algorithm, whose optimal  privacy cost is rejected by the testing framework because
the algorithm’s path conditions are too strong. The testing framework does accept
this variant of report noisy max with a non-optimal , for which its path conditions
are both necessary and sufficient.

4.3.1

Ill-Behaved Programs

Intuitively, an ill-behaved program f is a program for which, with high probability,
inputs drawn from I cause f to exhibit bad behavior. In the definition of RDP
(Definition 49), upper bounds on probability are used to limit the chance of bad
behavior, and the definition explicitly defines (, δ)-pointwise indistinguishability
as “good behavior” for differential privacy.
DPCheck detects violations of differential privacy in ill-behaved programs by
discovering bad execution traces for which no valid couplings exist. To quantify
such programs, we use lower bounds on the probability of bad behavior. In the
same style of definition for RDP, our definition of “ill-behaved” explicitly defines
“bad behavior” in terms of execution traces.
We first quantify what traces are considered “bad” for a given privacy cost .
Definition 51 (-bad execution trace). Fix a pair of similar input (x1 , x2 ) to a program f . An execution trace tr1 drawn from running f on x1 is called -bad,
(1) if there are no dual executions of f (x2 ) that lead to the same output, or
(2) if among all dual executions tr2 of running f on x2 , the minimal approximate
coupling cost is more than .
A pair of “bad” inputs are inputs that lead to bad traces with high probability.
Definition 52 ((, δ)-bad input). A pair of similar inputs (x1 , x2 ) is called (, δ)-bad
for a program f , if the probability of drawing an -bad execution trace from f (x1 ) is
at least δ.
An ill-behaved program is a program for which many inputs under I lead to
bad traces.
Definition 53 ((, δ, α)-ill-behaved program). Fix an input distribution I, we say f
is (, δ, α)-ill-behaved under I, if the probability of drawing a (, δ)-bad input for f
from I is α.
We give an example buggy program, and unpack each of Definition 51, Definition 52, and Definition 53 on this buggy program to give concrete examples of a
86

bad execution trace, a pair of bad inputs, and show that the buggy program itself
is ill-behaved.
The following buggy version of report noisy max was inadvertently created
during our development for a suite of correct benchmark algorithm implementations. This version of report noisy max forgets to add noise to the first value in its
input list.
rnmBug :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheckM
Int
rnmBug (x:xs) = do
xsNoised <- mapM (\y. lap y 1.0) xs
rnmAux xsNoised 0 0 x
rnmBug [] = error "rnm: received empty input"
Let us fix a pair of similar inputs to rnmBug—[1, 1, 1, 1] and [0, 1, 1, 1]. Consider an
execution trace tr1 where the three noised values become 2/3, 2/3, and 2/3, so that
this execution trace leads to the return value 0. What are the dual executions of
rnmBug on [0, 1, 1, 1] that lead to the same output? Those are the executions where,
after adding noise, the three 1s now become negative. So, we know 2/3+shift 1 < 0,
2/3+shift 2 < 0 and 2/3+shift 3 < 0. In other words, shift i < −2/3. By Equation (4.5),
the minimal associated privacy cost for such a dual execution then is
X

|shifti + (1 − 1)| =

i

X

|shifti |

i

=−

X

shift i

i

> 3 ∗ 2/3 = 2
So, this is a 2-bad execution trace for rnmBug given the similar inputs [1, 1, 1, 1] and
[0, 1, 1, 1].
Is this pair of inputs an (, δ)-bad input for rnmBug for some choice of  and δ?
Fix  = 2, we can show, for some positive δ, this input is (2, δ)-bad for rnmBug. In
particular, based on a similar analysis as above, if we draw any execution trace
from running rnmBug on [1, 1, 1, 1] such that all three noised values sum up to more
than 2, but each is less than 1, then the privacy cost for a dual execution that returns
the same output is forced to be more than 2. So, a lower bound on δ here is just the
probability of three independent Laplace samples summing up to more than 2 and
each sample being less than 1. All three samples are independently drawn from a
Laplace distribution centered at 1 with width 1:
"
δ , Px1 ,x2 ,x3 ∼lap(1,1)

#
X
i
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xi > 2 ∧ xi < 1 > 0

So, we know δ is non-zero, and this pair of inputs are a pair of (2, δ)-bad input for
rnmBug.
Finally, we demonstrate a distribution I under which rnmBug is (2, δ, α)-ill be1
haved for an α ≥ 256
. The distribution I just flips a fair coin 8 times, using the first
four bits as 0 and 1 values to generate one input list, and the last four bits for the
other input list. Note that these two lists are similar inputs for rnm by construction.
From the analysis above, we know that there is at least 1 pair of input—[1, 1, 1, 1]
and [0, 1, 1, 1]—that is (2, δ)-bad for rnmBug. There are 28 = 256 different pairs of
inputs under I, and there may be other (2, δ)-bad inputs for rnmBug, but we know
with probability 1/256 we will get one of the (2, δ)-bad inputs. So, under this I,
1
rnmBug is (2, δ, α)-ill-behaved for some α ≥ 256
.

4.3.2

Probability Bound for False Positive Failure

We now present the main theorem that bounds the probability of failing to reject
ill-behaved programs.
Theorem 54. Given a fixed distribution I over similar inputs, a positive integer
k, an (, δ, α)-ill-behaved program f , an interval [C1 , C2 ], and a positive value θ, the
probability that DPCheck fails to reject f on a (, 0)-differential privacy test is at most
−θ
e−dα(1−e ) under the following assumptions.
(1) The test uses at least d pairs of independently sampled inputs.
1
) independently sampled traces in
(2) The test uses at least m ≥ 1δ (θ + nk ln C2 −C
ω
instrumentation.
(3) The program f makes at most k calls to the Laplace sampling instruction in any
run.
(4) The program f has at most n output buckets (Section 4.2).
(5) All possibly valid shift i values for f under I are bounded in the interval [C1 , C2 ].
We provide a proof in Appendix A.
Values of C1 and C2 are bounded by machine limits in practice. Taking C1 and
C2 to be the extreme ends of double-precision floating point numbers ±1.798 ×
1
10308 , and ω to be machine epsilon of doubles 2−52 . The factor ln C2 −C
is just 746.5,
ω
a small requirement on the number of sampled traces in this extreme case.
Both C1 and C2 can also be determined more carefully once we know the program f , its input similarity relation (which is encoded in I), and f ’s expected privacy cost . In the case of rnm, we know that cost i ≤  must be true in order for the
total privacy cost to be bounded by . Using this inequality together with Equation (4.5), we can derive C1 and C2 for rnm:
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We know |shift i + qs2 [i] − qs1 [i]| ≤  by Equation (4.5). The left hand side can be
rewritten into
|shift i − (qs1 [i] − qs2 [i])|
By reverse triangle inequality, we know
||shift i | − |qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]|| ≤ |shift i − (qs1 [i] − qs2 [i])|
Next, we do case analysis on the sign of |shift i | − |qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]|. If this expression
is positive, then
|shift i | − |qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]| ≤ |shift i − (qs1 [i] − qs2 [i])| ≤ 
|shift i | ≤  + 1 by input similarity relation for rnm
If this expression is negative, then |shift i | ≤ |qs1 [i] − qs2 [i]| ≤ 1. In either case, the
magnitude |shift i | is bounded by max(1, +1), and since  = 2 for rnm, we can choose
C1 = −3 and C2 = 3.
Although we presented the testing strategy through the example algorithm rnm
, the testing process requires no special input particular to rnm. In fact, we can
use the same process described here to check the differential privacy property of
many other algorithms. In Section 4.5, we describe a variety of algorithms tested
using this strategy. We also present the recently discovered report noisy max with gap
algorithm, whose optimal privacy cost cannot be established using this strategy,
though the testing strategy can accept a claim with twice the optimal privacy cost
for report noisy max with gap.

4.4

Implementation

We now describe the testing process more concretely, showing type signatures of
Haskell functions that implement key testing steps.
The testing framework takes as inputs a program under test, prog :: σ →
DPCheck ( τ ), a generator, gen :: IO (σ, σ), that produces pairs of similar inputs
for prog, and a privacy parameter . The type constructor DPCheck is a generalized algebraic datatype [Vytiniotis et al., 2006] that gives the abstract syntax tree
of Pλ terms (Section 2.4). The testing framework then checks, for a large number
of (x1 , x2 ) pairs produced by gen, that there is evidence for a pointwise proof of
(, 0)-DP for the two distributions prog x1 and prog x2 . If for some pair of (x1 , x2 )
the testing framework fails to find such evidence, then prog is rejected.
To check that the distributions produced by a pair of similar inputs are properly
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related, we need to construct SMT models as shown in Equation (4.7) between the
Laplace distribution samples used in runs of prog x1 and prog x2 . We first acquire
concrete execution traces from a large number (call it N ) runs of prog x1 . We denote
the output from the ith run by ri :: τ , and the sample trace from the ith run by
tri :: Trace, where
data SampleInfo =
{ sample :: Double, center :: Double, width :: Double }
type Trace = [SampleInfo]
Haskell gives us for free the following projections to extract sample, center, and
width values from a SampleInfo:
sample :: SampleInfo -> Double
center :: SampleInfo -> Double
width :: SampleInfo -> Double
With the collected outputs r1 , . . . , rN , and traces tr 1 , . . . , tr N , we perform a “bucketing” process so that all traces that lead to the same output value r are grouped
together.
type Buckets τ = Map τ [Trace]
bucket :: [(τ , Trace)] -> Buckets τ
A value of the type Buckets τ is a collection of buckets; a particular key-value pair
in this map is a single bucket.
Next, we perform symbolic execution on prog x2 . This step first involves the
following Haskell function
explore :: DPCheckM

τ -> Stream (SBool, STrace, τ )

The explore function implements the symbolic operational semantics of Pλ as described in Section 2.4. This function systematically enumerates the set of symbolic values given by the symbolic operational semantics. Concretely, the function
explore enumerates the symbolic values in breadth first order, such that symbolic
values reached with n steps of reduction under the relation appear before those
reached with n+1 steps of reduction under the relation. Enumerating in breadth
first order allows us to leverage Haskell’s laziness, and symbolically execute programs that may unroll a fixpoint indefinitely. The resulting Stream from explore
can be infinite, and the tail of the stream is only computed when symbolic outputs
from the tail is demanded by surrounding computation.
Consider a particular set of runs on x1 with the output r, and let the associated
bucket contain the traces tr i1 , . . . , tr ik . Among the stream of symbolic outputs, we
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will look for those with outputs that match r, and build Equation (4.7) between
the concretely sampled traces and the symbolic Laplace samples using a Haskell
implementation of the COUPLE() procedure (Section 4.2).
If all SMT models derived from the collected buckets are satisfiable, we consider this a passing test, and we do not reject (, 0)-DP claim for prog. On the other
hand, if for some output r, Z3 tells us the model is unsatisfiable, then prog does not
have a pointwise proof using the steps outlined in Section 4.2. This is not a disproof
of differential privacy, since the pointwise proof technique is not complete, but it
is at least a signal that should prompt us to look at the program skeptically.
The Haskell code below sketches the testing process on an input program, a
generator of similar inputs x1 and x2 , the number ntrials of concretely sampled
traces to draw for testing, and an expected privacy cost eps.
expectDP prog gen ntrials eps = do
inputs <- gen
let (concrete, symbolic) = prog inputs
models <- coupleAll concrete symbolic ntrials eps
results <- mapM checkConsistency models
return (all isSat results)

4.4.1

Bucketing Numeric Values

Our testing steps involve a “bucketing” procedure that groups sampled traces that
lead to the same outputs. This step is easy for algorithms that yield a small number of different outputs, as we only need to perform equality tests to group the
sampled traces. However, we are also interesting in testing algorithms that may
directly output numeric values derived from Laplace samples. For example, in
Section 4.5, we can find two algorithms, smart sum and sparse vector with gap,
that both yield Double values, and these outputs are computed from Laplace samples. It is highly unlikely that any two runs of smart sum or sparse vector with gap
will produce the same Laplace samples, even if these runs internally follow the
same exact control flow path. So, we cannot simply use equality tests to bucket the
outputs on these algorithms.
Instead, we choose a heuristic that trades off some completeness for allowing us
to test algorithms that may return sampled Double values. At runtime, our profiling
interpreter Eprofile attaches a distribution provenance to each sampled value and
to any arithmetic terms that involve sample values.
For example, if x1 and x2 are two independent samples from the Laplace distribution with center 0 and width 1, then x1 and x2 each have distribution provenance
lap10,1 and lap20,1 , and an expression such as x1 · x2 has distribution provenance
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lap10,1 · lap20,1 . The superscript allows us to distinguish the distribution provenance
of x1 ·x2 from x1 ·x1 , and thus recognize that these are two different distributions. If
the center passed to the Laplace mechanism is a numeric value that does not have
a its own provenance, then the center is just the numeric value itself. If the center
has a distribution provenance, then the resulting sample has a nested provenance.
For example, if x2 is used as the center of a Laplace mechanism call with width 1,
then the sample from that call has the provenance structure:
lap3lap2

0,1 ,1

The testing framework then buckets output sample values based on structural
equality between distribution provenance values when the sampled numeric output values are not equal. Since most algorithms that do return sampled values only
sample from a handful of different output distributions, this heuristic significantly
cuts down the number of output buckets for such algorithms.
This heuristic does not sacrifice soundness with respect to the PW-E Q proof
rule. PW-E Q allows us to construct one pointwise proof for each unique output.
Here, our heuristic still adheres to this quota; in fact, the heuristic goes a step further by posing an even more stringent quota that only allows one coupling proof
for each unique distribution provenance structure—there are always fewer different distributions than there are different outputs. In our evaluation, we rely on
this heuristic to test several benchmark algorithms that return sampled Double values. Attaching distribution provenance to sample values introduces some interpretation overhead, but we do not observe any significant bottleneck in the instrumented interpretation step—most of testing time is spent on building SMT models
and solving them.

4.5

Evaluation

We want to answer the following questions:
(1) Can DPCheck detect bugs in both simple and complex algorithms?
(2) Can DPCheck assist implementations of real-world systems that use differential privacy?
To answer both questions, we first use DPCheck to distinguish private and nonprivate variants of 10 differential privacy benchmark algorithms from the literature. Next, we use DPCheck in a practical workflow to re-implement and test core
privacy mechanism from DAS [Petti and Flaxman, 2019].
For each of the 10 algorithms, we build both a correct implementation, and sev-
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Figure 4.1: Test results and coverage comparison on benchmark algorithms
eral non-private variants. We expect the testing framework to accept the correct
implementation for all algorithms, and to reject all non-differentially private variants. The results are shown in Figure 4.1. We place a 3 in the “Correct” row if the
correct implementation is accepted under the optimal privacy cost, and we put a
3 in the “Buggy” row if all non-differentially private variants of this algorithm are
rejected. For the report noisy max with gap (rnmGap) algorithm, we write 3∗ to indicate that the testing framework does not accept its correct implementation under
the optimal privacy cost, but does accept with twice the optimal privacy cost.
We also compare the coverage over these ten benchmark algorithms between
our testing framework and related frameworks in Figure 4.1. For each related
framework, a 3 indicates that the framework in the corresponding row can successfully analyze the the algorithm in the corresponding column. An 7 indicates
that the framework in the corresponding row cannot be used to test or verify the
algorithm in that column. A 3? indicates that the authors of this framework have
not presented an evaluation of the algorithm in that column, but that we believe
the framework is expressive enough to handle this algorithm. Similarly, an 7? indicates our belief that the algorithm in the corresponding column is beyond the
capabilities of that framework.
Figure 4.1 shows that our testing framework correctly accepts private implementations and rejects faulty variants of all previously studied benchmark algorithms. Additionally, it is the first framework able to distinguish correct and faulty
variants of PrivTree.
We discuss details of each benchmark algorithm first. Experiments on DAS are
discussed in a following subsection.
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4.5.1

Report Noisy Max

We presented the source code of a correct implementation of report noisy max in
Section 4.1, and an incorrect implementation in Section 4.3. The privacy analysis in
Section 4.1 shows that this algorithm is (2, 0)-differentially private.
To test report noisy max, we need to generate inputs whose L∞ distance (Definition 4) is bounded by 1. We implement such a generator manually. We repeatedly
run tests on the correct implementation using a cloud virtual machine. All experiments on report noisy max reported no faults.
To check the non-private version is rejected by the testing process, we use the
same test input generator. Our testing framework catches this mistake quickly. This
observation matches our expectation based on the analysis of rnmBug in Section 4.3.

4.5.2

Sparse Vector Technique

The sparse vector algorithm takes a vector of numbers as a private input, a threshold value thresh as a public input, a size parameter n as a public input, and returns
a boolean vector that encodes the indices of all noised values that are larger than
a noised copy of the threshold. Two input vectors are similar if their L∞ -distance
is bounded by 1 (Definition 4). For example, if the input vector is [1, 3, 2, 5], the
size parameter is 2, and the threshold is 1. Assuming the noised input vector is
[2.1, 1.9, 2.5, 3.0], and assuming the noised threshold is 2.0, the returned boolean
vector is [True, False, True]. Note that sparse vector immediately returns the
maintained boolean vector when the accumulated number of True values reaches
the size parameter n. Alternatively, assuming the noised vector is [1.8, 1.9, 2.5, 3.0],
and assuming the noised threshold is still 2.0, the returned booleans are [False,
False, True, True].
We implement sparse vector with the following source code. Here, nil is an
empty vector, and snoc is a function that creates a new vector by appending an
element to the input vector.
sv :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheck Integer
-> DPCheck Double -> DPCheckM
[Bool]
sv xs n thresh = do
let width = 4.0 * fromIntegral n
thresh' <- lap thresh 2.0
xs'
<- mapM (\x. lap x width) xs
svAux xs' n thresh' nil
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svAux :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheck Integer -> DPCheck Double
-> DPCheck [Bool]
-> DPCheckM
[Bool]
svAux []
_ _
acc = return acc
svAux (x:xs) n thresh acc
| n <= 0
= return acc
| otherwise = do
let recur n' acc' =
svAux xs n' thresh acc'
if (x > thresh)
(recur (n-1) (snoc acc True))
(recur n
(snoc acc False))
Lyu et al. [2016] studied six published variants of sparse vector, among which
only two actually satisfy differential privacy with the intended  privacy parameter. The implementation shown here is a correct version proposed by Lyu et al.,
named Algorithm 1 in the authors’ publication. This variant is (1, 0)-differentially
private. Our testing framework correctly rejects all four faulty variants, and accepts the two correct variants of sparse vector. We use the same generator for report noisy max to sample similar inputs for sparse vector.

4.5.3

Prefix Sum

The prefix sum algorithm takes a vector of numbers, and returns a vector of the
same length, where each ith value in the result is the sum of values at index
0, 1, . . . , i. Two vectors are similar for prefix sum, if their L1 -distance (Definition 3)
is bounded by 1. The prefix sum algorithm achieves (1, 0)-differential privacy by
adding Laplace noise with width 1 to each of the values in the input list before
summing. We implement prefix sum with the following code:
ps :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheckM
ps xs = do
xs' <- mapM (\x. lap x 1.0) xs
return (psAux (reverse xs') nil)

[Double]

psAux :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheck [Double]
-> DPCheckM
[Double]
psAux []
acc = acc
psAux (x:xs) acc =
psAux xs (cons (sum (x:xs)) acc)
The reverse :: [a] → [a] function comes from Haskell’s standard library, taking
a list and producing the same elements in the reversed order. Since the helper
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function psAux accumulates the prefix sums in the reverse order, we need to reverse
the noised inputs to get prefix sums in the correct order for the final output.
We manually implement another input generator to test prefix sum. We also
test a non-private variant of prefix sum that forgets to add noise to the first value
in its input vector (a similar mistake appears in rnmBug). We expect the correct implementation to always be accepted, and the incorrect variant to be rejected. Our
experiment results matches this expectation.

4.5.4

Smart Sum

The smart sum algorithm, also known as the binary mechanism, is an improvement over prefix sum that provides (2, 0)-differential privacy guarantees, but releases noised running sums with much smaller asymptotic error [Chan et al., 2011].
Running sums released through smart sum instead of prefix sum may observe improved utility due to decreased amount of noise.
The core idea behind smart sum is to aggregate inputs into blocks of the same
size, and only add noise for the sum over each block. A noised running sum can
then be derived by adding up noised sums for a few blocks, and any additional
noised inputs for the remaining tail. Here, we implement smart sum where blocks
have size = 2 with the following program:
smartSum :: [DPCheck Double]
-> DPCheckM
[Double]
smartSum xs = smartSumAux xs 0 0 0 0 nil
smartSumAux :: [DPCheck Double] -- ^The inputs
-> DPCheck Double
-- ^The next partial sum
-> DPCheck Double
-- ^This partial sum
-> DPCheck Integer -- ^Iteration index
-> DPCheck Double
-- ^The un-noised raw sum
-> DPCheck [Double] -- ^The accumulated list
-> DPCheckM
[Double]
smartSumAux []
_
_ _ _
results = return results
smartSumAux (x:xs) next n i sum results = do
let sum' = sum + x
if_ (((i + 1) `imod` 2) .== 0)
(do n' <- lap (n + sum') 1.0
smartSumAux xs n'
n' (i+1) 0
(results `snoc` n'))
(do next' <- lap (next + x) 1.0
smartSumAux xs next' n (i+1) sum' (results `snoc` next'))
We inadvertently created a non-private variant of smartSumAux by passing a wrong
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parameter in a recursive call to itself. We show the buggy helper function below,
and highlight the difference with a comment.
This incorrect variant does not correctly calculate noised running sums, and is
not differentially private. smartSumBug passes the un-noised value sum' at a call site
where 0 should have been used. This greatly increases privacy cost when we add
noise to the sums of the affected blocks, thus causing violations of (2, 0)-DP.
smartSumBug []
_
_ _ _
results = return results
smartSumBug (x:xs) next n i sum results = do
let sum' = sum + x
if_ (((i + 1) `imod` 2) .== 0)
(do n' <- lap (n + sum') 1.0
smartSumBug xs n'
n' (i+1) sum' (results `snoc` n'))
-- should pass 0 instead of sum' ^
(do next' <- lap (next + x) 1.0
smartSumBug xs next' n (i+1) sum' (results `snoc` next'))
We reuse the input generator for prefix sum for testing smart sum, and our
testing framework correctly accepts smartSum and rejects its incorrect variant.

4.5.5

Report Noisy Max with Gap

Ding et al. [2019] recently proposed novel variants of report noisy max and sparse
vector algorithms that release more information about the input data at no additional privacy cost.
For report noisy max with gap, the extra information released is the numerical
gap between the largest noised value and the second largest noised value. The
implementation is very similar to report noisy max:
rnmGap :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheckM
(Integer, Double)
rnmGap [] = error "rnmGap received empty input"
rnmGap [_] = error "rnmGap received only one input"
rnmGap (x:y:xs) = do
xNoised <- lap x 1.0
yNoised <- lap y 1.0
xsNoised <- mapM (`lap` 1.0) xs
ifM (xNoised .> yNoised)
(rnmGapAux xsNoised 1 0 xNoised yNoised)
(rnmGapAux xsNoised 1 1 yNoised xNoised)
rnmGapAux :: [DPCheck Double]
-> DPCheck Integer

-- ^input data
-- ^last iteration index
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-> DPCheck Integer
-- ^current max index
-> DPCheck Double
-- ^current maximum
-> DPCheck Double
-- ^current runner-up
-> DPCheckM
(Integer, Double)
rnmGapAux []
_
maxIdx currMax currRunnerUp =
return $ pair (maxIdx, currMax - currRunnerUp)
rnmGapAux (xNoised:xs) lastIdx maxIdx currMax currRunnerUp = do
let thisIdx = lastIdx + 1
ifM (xNoised .> currMax)
(rnmGapAux xs thisIdx thisIdx xNoised currMax)
(ifM (xNoised .> currRunnerUp)
(rnmGapAux xs thisIdx maxIdx currMax xNoised)
(rnmGapAux xs thisIdx maxIdx currMax currRunnerUp)
)
Report noisy max with gap keeps track of the runner-up at each iteration in addition to the current maximum value and its index in the input list, and eventually
returns the index of the largest value, and the difference between the maximum
and the runner-up. We reuse the same input generator for report noisy max to test
report noisy max with gap with the same privacy parameter  = 2.
However, our testing framework rejects this claim. We manually inspected the
generated SMT model to investigate the cause of rejection. Our manual analysis
shows that the path conditions effectively requires the algorithm to also release
the index of the runner-up value, and this is equivalent to running report noisy
max twice—once to find out the index of the largest value, and a second time to
find out the largest among the remaining values. Running report noisy max twice
induces a privacy parameter  = 2·2 = 4. We check this conjecture by testing report
noisy max with gap again with  = 4, and the testing framework indeed accepts
this claim.
This is a case where the path conditions gathered from symbolic execution are
too strong. Ding et al. [2019] use an analysis that does not require releasing the
index of the runner-up noised value to prove report noisy max with gap is (2, 0)differentially private, but our testing framework cannot automatically derive a
similar analysis—the testing framework can only gather facts collected from path
conditions.
We also test an incorrect variant of report noisy max with gap that does not add
noise to the first two elements in its input list. This is a bug that we deliberately
created to mimic a similar issue found in rnmBug. Our testing framework correctly
rejects this buggy variant of report noisy max with gap.
rnmGapBug :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheckM
(Integer, Double)
rnmGapBug [] = error "rnmGapBug received empty input"
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rnmGapBug [_] = error "rnmGapBug received only one input"
rnmGapBug (x:y:xs) = do
xsNoised <- mapM (`lap` 1.0) xs
ifM (x .> y)
(rnmGapAux xsNoised 1 0 x y)
(rnmGapAux xsNoised 1 1 y x)

4.5.6

Sparse Vector with Gap

Sparse vector with gap [Ding et al., 2019] is an improvement over sparse vector that
releases the numeric gap between noised input and the noised threshold, when the
noised input value is above the noised threshold.
Compared to sparse vector, instead of returning a boolean vector, sparse vector
with gap returns a list of optional values. Each nothing represents the absence of
any value, and each just x represents a gap value for an over-the-threshold input.
The size parameter n again bounds the number of above-threshold optional values
that sparse vector with gap can emit before the rest of the computation is cut short.
Unlike report noisy max with gap, sparse vector with gap’s optimal privacy
cost is accepted by our testing framework. Intuitively, this is because the set of path
conditions gathered in a symbolic execution of svGap are the same as that of sparse
vector, and a manual analysis can show that the additional equality constraint on
gap values between two dual executions incurs no additional privacy cost.
svGap :: [DPCheck Double] -> Integer -> DPCheck Double
-> DPCheckM
[Maybe Double]
svGap xs n threshold = do
noisedThreshold <- lap threshold 2.0
noisedXs <- mapM (`lap` (4.0 * fromIntegral n)) xs
svGapAux noisedXs n noisedThreshold nil
svGapAux :: [DPCheck Double]
-> Integer
-> DPCheck Double
-> DPCheck [Maybe Double]
-> DPCheckM
[Maybe Double]
svGapAux []
_n _thresh acc = return acc
svGapAux (x:xs) n thresh acc
| n <= 0 = return acc
| otherwise =
ifM (x .> thresh)
(svGapAux xs (n-1) thresh (acc `snoc` just (x - thresh)))
(svGapAux xs n
thresh (acc `snoc` nothing))
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We also implement an incorrect version of sparse vector with gap that ignores the
size parameter n. This is a manually created bug that mimics one of the published
faulty variants of sparse vector discussed by [Lyu et al., 2016]. This incorrect variant is rejected by DPCheck.

4.5.7

PrivTree

PrivTree [Zhang et al., 2016] is a differentially private algorithm for building spatial
decomposition trees that approximate occupied regions of space. We implement a
one-dimensional version of PrivTree over the unit interval. The input is a list of
points on the unit interval, represented by a bag of points. Two inputs are similar
if their bag-distance is at most 1 (Definition 36).
Our implementation of PrivTree produces a distribution over spatial decomposition trees over the unit interval, represented by the type Map Node (). A Node in
the tree is a sub-interval of the unit interval: type Node = (Double, Double). In our
implementation, the final output of the spatial decomposition is a collection of leaf
nodes in the spatial tree, and the internal nodes are implicitly represented by their
constituent sub-intervals.
For example, if the input points are {0.1, 0.3}, then PrivTree may output a tree
with leaf nodes (0.0, 0.25), (0.25, 0.5), and (0.5, 1.0). The first two leaf nodes are
occupied by the input points, while the last leaf node is unoccupied. This last leaf
node, although unoccupied, appears in the output because this interval is created
when we split the unit interval into (0.0, 0.5) and (0.5, 1.0).
A naive attempt at building such spatial decomposition trees is to take the
classic QuadTree algorithm [Finkel and Bentley, 1974], and use Laplace noise to
turn QuadTree into a differentially private algorithm. This naive approach would
maintain a queue of spatial sub-regions to be analyzed. On each iteration, the
naive algorithm uses Laplace mechanism to obtain a noisy count of nodes in this
sub-region, and decide whether this sub-region should be split into smaller subregions based on a pre-determined threshold value. Authors of PrivTree [Zhang
et al., 2016] demonstrate that this method has two significant drawbacks: (1) maximum depth of the spatial tree must be bounded to ensure the algorithm has finite
privacy cost, and (2) predetermining a good threshold value that leads to accurate
spatial decomposition trees is difficult.
PrivTree solves both issues by removing the depth bound requirement and the
predetermined threshold. Our implementation of PrivTree is shown here:
privTree :: [Double] -> DPCheckM
(Map PrivTreeNode1D ())
privTree xs =
privTreeAux xs [rootNode] (S.singleton rootNode) (lit emptyTree)
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privTreeAux :: [Double]
-- ^input points
-> [PrivTreeNode1D]
-- ^unvisited nodes
-> S.Set PrivTreeNode1D
-- ^current leaf nodes
-> DPCheck (Map PrivTree1D ()) -- ^current tree
-> DPCheckM
(Map PrivTreeNode1D ())
privTreeAux points queue leafNodes tree
= case queue of
[] -> return tree
(thisNode:more) -> do
let biasedCount =
countPoints points thisNode
- depth thisNode * k_PT_DELTA
biasedCount' <ifM (biasedCount .> (k_PT_THRESHOLD - k_PT_DELTA))
(return biasedCount)
(return $ k_PT_THRESHOLD - k_PT_DELTA)
noisedBiasedCount1 <- lap biasedCount' k_PT_LAMBDA
let updatedTree = updatePT (lit thisNode) tree
ifM (noisedBiasedCount1 .> k_PT_THRESHOLD)
(do let (left, right) = split thisNode
let leafNodes' =
S.insert right
(S.insert left
(S.delete thisNode leafNodes))
privTreeAux points (more++[left,right]) leafNodes'
updatedTree
)
(privTreeAux points more leafNodes updatedTree)
PrivTree is challenging for automatic verification for at least two reasons. The first
is that PrivTree terminates probabilistically—the probability of PrivTree not terminating after n iterations of its main loop diminishes as n increases. The second one
is that the privacy cost analysis of PrivTree involves non-linear arithmetic terms
that depend on input values [Zhang and Kifer, 2017].
The first characteristic poses issues for static analysis, as we cannot statically
know for how many iterations PrivTree will run. Our testing framework’s symbolic interpreter relies on Haskell’s laziness to produce an infinite stream of symbolic outputs. Furthermore, recall from Section 4.2 that our testing procedure only
needs symbolic output trees that match those observed from the instrumented
runs. PrivTree creates strictly more leaf nodes as its main loop iterates, so our testing procedure can eagerly cut off the rest of the infinite search once it realizes that
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all future iterations will produce trees that do not match those observed in the
instrumented executions, saving the testing framework from infinite unrolling. In
the implementation of DPCheck, we give programmers an advanced configuration
option to decide how much of the symbolic output stream should be consumed
when such flexibility is necessary. This option is necessary for testing PrivTree.
The second characteristic poses issues for tools aimed at automatically generating proofs of differential privacy. Such tools must reason over all possible input
values, and these input values must be universally quantified at proof-generation
time, which means intermediate privacy costs that depend on input values must
be represented by expressions over the unknown inputs. For PrivTree, these intermediate privacy costs involve transcendental functions over the values derived
from the input. Such models are undecidable [Richardson, 1968], and can only be
solved in a best-effort way by SMT solvers.
On the other hand, our testing framework chooses a pair of concrete input values and evaluates PrivTree over these inputs. This requires only simple reasoning
by the SMT solver over these intermediate cost terms, as the only unknowns are
the hypothesized sequence of shift values (Equation (4.4)).
Our testing framework correctly accepts this implementation of PrivTree over
the unit interval. We also implement an incorrect version based on the naive approach, but without placing a depth bound on the tree created. Our testing framework correctly rejects this buggy variant.

4.5.8

Noisy Sum, Noisy Count, and Noisy Mean

The noisy sum, noisy count, and noisy mean algorithms are simple mechanisms
that aggregate private numeric values. We show their implementations below:
noisySum :: [DPCheck Double] -> DPCheckM
noisySum xs = lap (sum xs) 1.0

Double

noisyCount :: [Int] -> Int -> DPCheckM
Double
noisyCount xs threshold = do
let c = length (filter (>= threshold) xs)
lap (fromIntegral c) 1.0
noisyMean :: [DPCheck Double] -> Double -> DPCheckM
(Double, Double)
noisyMean xs clipBound
| clipBound < 0 = error "noisyMean: received clipBound < 0"
| otherwise = do
s <- clippedSum xs 0
noisedS <- lap s (fromIntegral clipBound)
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noisedC <- lap count 1.0
return (noisedS, noisedC)
where clippedSum []
acc = return acc
clippedSum (x:xs) acc =
ifM (x .>= lit clipBound)
(clippedSum xs (acc + lit clipBound))
(ifM (x .< lit (-clipBound))
(clippedSum xs (acc - lit clipBound))
(clippedSum xs (acc + x)))
count = fromIntegral_ (lit (length xs))
The inputs to noisy sum are similar if their L1 -distance is at most 1, and noise sum
is 1.0-differentially private. The input lists to noisy count are similar if their bag
distance is at most 1, and the parameter threshold is public data. This algorithm
just counts the number of values above the given threshold, and adds noise before
releasing the count. The noisy count mechanism is also 1.0-differentially private.
For noisy mean, two numeric lists are similar if their bag distance is at most
1, and the parameter clipBound is public data. Noisy mean is 2-differentially private. A critical intermediate step in noisy mean is to clip each input value into the
range [−clipBound, clipBound] before summing. This step removes extreme outliers, which could lead to violations of differential privacy if not clipped. Also note
that noisy mean does not directly return a single numeric value as the mean, instead it returns the numerator and the denominator used to compute the mean in
a pair. This arrangement is necessary for avoiding non-linearity in SMT model for
testing noisy mean.

4.5.9

Disclosure Avoidance System

Every ten years, the US Census Bureau conducts a survey to count the total population in the US. This survey provides critical information for the Federal Government to adjust allocation of funds, as well as representation in the US House
of Representatives, where each state gets a number of delegates proportional to
its population. For the 2020 Census, the Census Bureau developed an open-source
Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS) to aggregate raw survey data into population
counts. DAS applies differential privacy to protect the privacy of survey participants.
DAS aims to produce differentially private population counts for each geographical unit within each of the six geographical levels in the US: the whole nation, states, counties, “census tracts”, “block groups”, and single city blocks [Petti
and Flaxman, 2019]. This process would be straightforward if the only require103

ment is differential privacy: just count the population within each unit, and add
appropriately sampled noise to each count. However, such a census report would
contain inconsistent counts: for example, the total population in a state might be
different from the sum of the population counts from all counties within the state,
and there might even be negative counts for units where the precise count before
adding noise was small. The Census Bureau has a list of data quality requirements
that rules out these inconsistencies, and the final report must satisfy these constraints.
To address these issues, DAS applies a “Top-Down Algorithm”. This algorithm
consists of two phases. The first phase calculates precise counts for all geographical
units, then adds appropriately sampled noise to produce noisy public counts.
The second phase iterates over the geographical hierarchy, ordered from coarsest (nation) to finest (block). Each step takes the noisy counts from two adjacent
levels, and perturbs them using constrained optimization. This phase perturbs
noisy counts to rule out inconsistencies, while the optimization objective keeps
the overall perturbation of noisy counts as small as possible.
The outputs from the first phase already satisfies differential privacy. Because
differential privacy is robust to arbitrary post-processing [Dwork et al., 2006], the
outputs from the second phase satisfies differential privacy too.
For this evaluation, we first manually identified DAS’s core mechanism. The
core mechanism calculates the scale of noise distributions, and release noisy counts
for each geographical unit. We re-implemented this core mechanism in the embedded language, and used DPCheck to test that this mechanism is not rejected. We
also tested a few faulty variants that involved common programming mistakes—
sampling noise with wrong scale parameters, and iterating with off-by-one mistakes. Finally, DPCheck implements a feature that allows us to pretty-print the
embedded program as a Python3 program, and we use this feature to extract the
re-implemented code back to Python3.
We try to experimentally detect violations of differential privacy by randomly
generating similar inputs for the core mechanism, running DPCheck with the generated lists, and checking that each test reports no violation. We repeat this process
in a non-terminating loop running on a cloud virtual machine that collects test logs
and raises alarms for any test failure. The size of the input lists increase with each
passing test, up to 100.
We observed that tests occasionally fail due to a tiny over-use of the -privacy
budget—in the range of 10−12 to 10−15 . We believe this was caused by rounding
errors from the floating-point operations that calculate noise distribution parameters in the re-implemented core mechanism. We also observed that if we introduce
a slack of 10−12 to , then all test cases passed. This suggests that the total privacy
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cost incurred is a small value plus the intended  in the re-implemented code.
We expect the original DAS to also have this property, since its Python3 implementation also uses floating-point arithmetic. We confirmed this conjecture by
intercepting the raw inputs to the core privacy mechanism in DAS, and aggregate
the privacy cost incurred by the 64-bit noise distribution parameters through 128bit float arithmetic. This comparison reveals that the total privacy cost is around
1.03 × 10−11 more than expected. Of course, this extra privacy cost is very small,
and does not significantly degrade the privacy protections of DAS.
Finally, to confirm that our re-implemented privacy mechanism behaves identically as the original version, we replace the original core mechanism with the
extracted Python3 code. We then apply the following test setup to compare the
behavior. For each trial:
(1) We run both versions of DAS 500 times.
(2) Assuming that both groups of outputs come from the same distribution, we
run a statistical test to check if there is evidence to reject this assumption.
(3) We record the p-value from this test.
If our null-hypothesis—that both versions of DAS behave identically—is true, then
we should observe that the recorded p-values follow a uniform distribution on the
interval [0, 1] [Murdoch et al., 2008]. Accordingly, we perform a final hypothesis
test on the recorded p-values to check if there is any evidence that suggests otherwise.
Running DAS requires census data as inputs. The US Census Bureau tested
DAS using 1940 Census data [Ruggles et al., 2020]. On the entire set of 1940 Census
data, each run takes roughly 6 hours to complete on our test machine. Since we
need to perform 1000 runs per trial, and many trials to record enough p-values, we
cannot afford to run DAS on the entire dataset.
Instead, we subsample around 1 percent of the data, and perform the experiments on this smaller dataset. On this subset, each run takes roughly 10 minutes,
and produces a vector of 287509 counts. We parallelize the trials with 12 machines
to speed up the process.
On each trial, we need a statistical test that can invalidate our null hypothesis based on the observations of the output vectors. We use permutation testing [Chung and Romano, 2016] for this task. The permutation test takes two groups
of samples as inputs. In this case, the two groups are each 500 vectors. The test
randomly swaps vectors between these two groups, and compares a test statistic
derived from the difference of sample mean vectors before and after swapping.
Intuitively, if both groups of samples truly come from the same distribution, then
the test statistic should not change much due to swapping.
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Each trial produces a p-value. Tests that consistently produce very small p-values invalidate
our null hypothesis that both DAS behaves identically. Here, we are checking for the lack of such
evidence: when our assumption is true, the pvalues should appear as samples drawn from a
uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We perform a final Komogorov-Sminov test [Massey,
1951] to check if there is any evidence to reject the hypothesis that p-values are uniformly drawn. This final test produces a p-value of 0.68, signaling a lack of such
evidence. We also plot a histogram of the collected p-values. These results produce
no evidence for us to reject the null-hypothesis that both DAS behave identically.

4.6

Limitations

Gap from Theoretical Guarantees Due to scaling issues, DPCheck currently
does not allow us to run tests large enough to give meaningful guarantees on
upper bounds of false positive probability for programs that only occasionally
demonstrates bad execution traces. For example, if a program is ill-behaved with
δ = 10−5 , then by Theorem 54 we need at least 105 sampled traces. Our current
evaluation uses between 500 and 5000 sampled traces for each pair of sampled inputs. The theoretical lower limit on sampled traces is at least 20 times larger than
our current test parameter for such a program. Furthermore, the size of the SMT
model grows linearly with the number of sampled traces. Since the time it takes
to solve these symbolic models grows exponentially in terms of formula size, testing with 105 sampled traces may conservatively slow down testing time by k 20 for
some base exponent k. Theorem 54, in principle, gives us a way to statistically validate random differential privacy for the program under test, but with these scaling
issues, DPCheck is more useful for catching bugs than for validation.
Numerical Implementation Issues We study DPCheck’s testing guarantees by
assuming a countably infinite subset of all representable numbers, where neighboring numbers have constant gap ω. DPCheck’s implementation uses 64-bit floats,
whose gaps between neighboring numbers are not constant. We sidestep this issue
in our experiments by carefully crafting test input generators so that only small
floating-point numbers are used, for which the gap is a constant 2−52 . This issue
can be remedied by using fixed-precision numbers in the implementation instead.
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Chapter 5
Compiling to Secure Distributed
Computation
Google is using differential privacy to collect statistics on popular domains from
the Chrome web browser [Erlingsson et al., 2014b]. Apple is using differential privacy to train models for predictive typing, and to identify processes with high
energy or memory usage [Apple, Apple Differential Privacy Team, 2017]. These
existing deployments typically use local differential privacy: each user device independently adds noise to its data, and then uploads the noised data to a central
server, where data across all user devices are aggregated. This process is efficient
but introduces too much noise in the aggregation step. Google [Bittau et al., 2017]
notes that, even with a billion user devices, signals from a million users can be easily missed. Systems with local differential privacy can reduce noise for improved
utility, but this reduces differential privacy guarantees to a meaningless level [Tang
et al., 2017].
An alternative is to collect data using global differential privacy: each user device directly uploads un-noised data to a central server, and the central server only
adds noise after aggregating the raw data. This process clearly reduces the amount
of noise used in the computation, making the results more precise. However, the
aggregator now must be trusted to not misuse the raw sensitive data.
Roth et al. [2020] build a system called Orchard that uses additively homomorphic encryption to perform aggregation of raw user data. Additively homomorphic encryption allows the central server to perform addition over ciphertexts of
raw numeric data collected from users, without directly observing the un-noised
raw data. The aggregated ciphertext is then decrypted and noised by a randomly
elected committee of user devices through secure multiparty computation. The aggregator receives the noised data in the clear. Throughout the entire computation,
the aggregator can never directly access the raw user data, or the aggregated but
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un-noised user data.
This allows Orchard to perform 14 different queries under the global differential privacy setting, without asking users to trust the central aggregator. Before
Orchard, no system could answer more than one of these queries at scale, using
only a single, untrusted aggregator.
Orchard relies on a Fuzz-inspired lambda calculus with four primitive operators on bags and the Laplace mechanism to encode differentially private queries.
The four bag operators are bag map, sum, filter, and partition. A critical component of Orchard is a compiler that transforms a query written in this higher-level
language into a sequence of low-level instructions that orchestrate rounds of aggregation, decryption, and sampling of noise in this distributed and secure setting.
We present the compiler component of Orchard in this chapter1 . We assume
queries have already been checked as differentially private (using a Fuzz-like linear type system, or by testing). Following a high-level introduction of the secure
multiparty computation primitive in Section 5.1, and an overview of the query
language in Section 5.2, we provide the following main contributions:
(1) We present a detailed design of a compiler that normalizes and transforms
queries into instructions that rely on a distributed computation primitive for
orchestrating computation.
(2) We introduce an optimization pass to reduce the total rounds of distributed
computation for the generated code.
We discuss our evaluation of the compiler in Section 5.6, and its limitations in
Section 5.7.

5.1

Collect-and-Test Primitive

Roth et al. [2019] developed a predecessor of Orchard, called Honeycrisp. Honeycrisp can efficiently answer one specific query using global differential privacy,
with an untrusted aggregator. Under Honeycrisp, user devices encrypt their private data through additively homomorphic encryption, and upload only the ciphertext to the aggregator. Honeycrisp assumes the encrypted data are vectors of
numbers, and the aggregator is interested in adding up all vectors collected across
users. The aggregator can sum up the ciphertexts of these encrypted vectors without accessing their unencrypted representation, thanks to additively homomorphic encryption. Finally, to prevent the aggregator from decrypting individual ciphertexts, Honeycrisp delegates a small committee of 20-40 randomly selected user
devices, and uses secure multiparty computation (MPC) to perform the task of key
1

[Roth et al., 2020] is a complete exposition of Orchard.
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generation and decryption on the committee. Large computations over MPC with
many participants are prohibitively expensive, but the tasks assigned to the small
committee by Honeycrisp are within current implementation limits. This design
enables the aggregator to carry out the bulk of the computation without ever seeing unencrypted raw data from individual users.
Honeycrisp internally uses a primitive called Collect-and-Test (CaT) to orchestrate the computation described above. CaT first asks each user device to compute
a vector of numbers, and encrypts it with a key generated by the committee. The
encrypted vectors are uploaded to the aggregator by each user device, and the aggregator performs addition over encrypted vectors. Finally, the aggregator proves
to the committee that it has computed the sum of vectors correctly. If the proof is
accepted, the committee decrypts the sum, and adds noise to each coordinate in
the vector, before releasing the noised vector back to the aggregator.
A key insight from Orchard’s design is that the same CaT primitive can be used
to run many general queries. Orchard leverages CaT to orchestrate computations
over user data, and elect committee for key generation, decryption and adding
noise. By reusing CaT, we can effectively remove trust on the centralized aggregator. Instead, we only need to trust that the randomly elected committee members
do not collectively misbehave.

5.2

Query Language

We show the grammar of the query language in Figure 5.1. The query language is
effectively two simply typed lambda calculus, one designed for writing top-level
queries (under grammar rule t), and the other one designed for writing computations that happen on client devices (under grammar rule e), which we will refer to
as “inner terms”. We assume two disjoint sets of program variable names ηe and ηt
for inner terms and top-level queries respectively. The calculus described by grammar rule e is STLC extended with tuples, and pattern matching on optional values,
but otherwise entirely standard. The calculus described by grammar rule t does
not have branching, but allows applications of bag operations, and is extended
with a distribution monad and the Laplace mechanism. We assume all inputs to
the compiler is a top-level query as described by the grammar rule t. Top-level
queries have several syntactic restrictions—input bags to bag operations must be
variables, and the e arguments to each of the bag operations must be inner terms.
The only way data may pass from top-level query terms to inner terms are through
explicit captures in the form of capture x for some x ∈ ηt .
The typing rules are largely similar to those of the simply typed lambda calcu109

:= [τ ] | {τ } | Double | Int | Bool | τ → τ |
τ | Maybe τ | () | (τ, . . . , τ )
:= x, y, z, · · · ∈ ηe
:= u, v, w, · · · ∈ ηt
:= 0, 1, 2, . . . , ∈ N
:= v ∈ R
:= n | r | var e | capture var t | e e | λ var e : τ. e |
let var e = e in e | let (var e , . . . , var e ) = e in e | e op e
if e then e else e end |
Just e | Nothing |
case e of
Just(x) → e
Nothing → e
t := n | r | var t | t t | λvar t : τ. t | t op t
let var e = e in t | let var t = t in t | let (var t , . . . , var t ) = t in t |
lap(t, r) | x ← t;; t | return t |
bmap e var t | bfilter e var t | bsum r var t | bpartition k e var t

τ
var e
var t
k, n
r
e

Figure 5.1: Syntax of query language
lus, but the typing judgments carry two typing contexts for variables in ηe and ηt
separately, and we use the letters Λ and Γ for them respectively. We write Λ; Γ `top
t : τ for the typing judgment of a top-level query term, and Λ; Γ ` e : τ for the
typing judgment of an inner term. A notable rule is the C APTURE typing rule for
inner terms. C APTURE only typechecks variables with a “capturable” type. A capturable type is either a scalar type, a vector of a capturable type, or a tuple of a few
capturable types (Figure 5.2). This explicit capture form can incorporate released
data from previous computation steps into the map, filter, or partition arguments
for bag operations.
Operationally, bag map bmap f x applies a function f uniformly over a bag of
values with datatype τ , and outputs a bag of values with datatype σ. Bag sum
bsum r x clips each numeric value in a bag x to a finite range of [−r, r], and returns
the sum of clipped values. Bag filter bfilter f x uses a boolean predicate function
f to select a subset of values within a bag x, and bpartition k f x splits a bag x into
a k-tuple2 of bags using a “partition function” f that computes a partition index
for each bag value.
2

k must be a constant integer value.
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Capture-Scalar

τ = Int ∨ τ = Bool ∨ τ = Double
capturable τ

Capture-Vec

capturable τ
capturable [τ ]

Capture-Tuple

∀ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} capturable τi
capturable (τ1 , τ2 , . . . , τk )
Figure 5.2: Capturable types

We show the typing rules for top-level query terms in Figure 5.3. The types we
give to bag filter and bag partition may appear unusual: these two operators produce output bags that contain optional values of type Maybe τ , instead of type τ .
This type design reflects the distributed nature of query execution. For Orchard, a
valid top-level query is a function that receives a bag of values as its only input.
The values of this bag are not physically on the aggregator’s machine. Instead, each
bag value represents a single “row” of user data, and each user device contributes
exactly one row to this distributed bag. When a query runs against raw data on
user devices, the computation encoded in, for example, the boolean filter predicate
for bag filter runs directly on individual user devices. When the filter predicate
drops a particular user’s data, that does not mean the user stops participating in
the rest of the distributed protocol. This implies we cannot ignore the presence
of any bag value throughout the entire computation. So, instead of dropping values, these bag operations mask filtered out values with Nothing to signal that these
values should not contribute to computations that use the output bag, and following computations may each make their own decision about how to process these
Nothing values.

5.3

Query Execution and bmcs()

At a high level, a data analyst uses Orchard in the following way:
(1) The analyst submits a query as a centralized program that computes the desired answer based on a hypothetical immutable database that contains data
from all user devices for the analysis.
(2) Orchard transforms this program into a distributed computation that relies
on the CaT primitive. The transformed code relies on a concrete implementation of CaT, which we call bmcs() (broadcast, map, clip, and sum).
(3) Orchard executes the distributed computation, using additively homomor111

Abs-Top

Λ; Γ, x : τ `top t : σ
Λ; Γ `top λ x : τ. t : τ → σ

App-Top

Λ; Γ `top t1 : σ → τ Λ; Γ `top t2 : σ
Λ; Γ `top t1 t2 : τ

Let-Inner

Let-Top

Λ; Γ ` e : τ Λ, x : τ ; Γ `top t : σ
Λ; Γ `top let x = e in t : σ

Λ; Γ `top e : τ Λ; Γ, x : τ `top t : σ
Λ; Γ `top let x = e in t : σ

Let-Tuple-Top

Λ; Γ, x1 : τ1 , . . . , xk : τk `top t0 : σ
Λ; Γ `top t : (τ1 , . . . , τk )
Λ; Γ `top let (x1 , . . . , xk ) = t in t0 : σ
BSum

BMap

x : {τ } ∈ Γ Λ; Γ ` f : τ → σ
Λ; Γ `top bmap f x : {σ}

BFilter

x : {Double} ∈ Γ r ∈ R
Λ; Γ `top bsum r x : {Double}

x : {τ } ∈ Γ Λ; Γ ` f : τ → Bool
Λ; Γ `top bfilter f x : {Maybe τ }

BPartition

k ∈ N σ1 , . . . , σk = {Maybe τ }
x : {τ } ∈ Γ Λ; Γ ` f : τ → Int
Γ `top bpartition k f x : (σ1 , . . . , σk )

Λ; Γ `top t : τ
Λ; Γ `top return t :

τ

Laplace

Bind

Λ; Γ `top t1 :
τ Λ; Γ, x : τ `top t2 :
Λ; Γ `top x ← t1 ;; t2 :
σ

Return

σ

Λ; Γ `top t : Double w ∈ R w > 0
Λ; Γ `top lap(t, w) :
Double

Figure 5.3: Top-level query typing rules
phic encryption to ensure the analyst never directly observes raw data in the
clear, and finally returning only the noised answer to the analyst.
Orchard requires the top-level query to be a closed term with type {τ } →
σ. The
input to this function is the hypothetical database of all user data, and the function
adds noise to release an aggregated result in type σ. As a concrete example, we can
express one step of the k-means clustering algorithm with the following program
(we omit type annotations, and repeated introductions of let and λ for cleaner
presentation)
let
noise = λ totalXY size.
let (x, y) = totalXY
in x' <- lap x 1.0;;
y' <- lap y 1.0;;
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Abs

Capture

Λ, x : τ ; Γ ` e : σ
Λ; Γ ` λ x : τ. e : τ → σ

x : τ ∈ Γ capturable τ
Γ; Λ ` capture x : τ

App

Let

Λ; Γ ` e1 : σ → τ Λ; Γ ` e2 : σ
Λ; Γ ` e1 e2 : τ

Λ; Γ ` e : τ Λ, x : τ ; Γ ` e2 : σ
Λ; Γ ` let x = e in e2 : σ

Let-Tuple-Top

Λ, x1 : τ1 , . . . , xk : τk ; Γ ` t0 : σ
Λ; Γ ` t : (τ1 , . . . , τk )
Λ; Γ ` let (x1 , . . . , xk ) = t in t0 : σ

Cond

Λ; Γ ` e : bool Λ; Γ ` ei : τ
Λ; Γ ` if e then e1 else e2 end : τ
Just

Nothing

Λ; Γ ` e : τ
Λ; Γ ` Just e : Maybe τ

Λ; Γ ` Nothing : Maybe τ
Case

Λ, x : τ ; Γ ` e1 : σ Λ; Γ ` e2 : σ Λ; Γ ` e : Maybe τ
Λ; Γ ` case e Just(x) → e1 | Nothing → e2 : σ
Figure 5.4: Inner terms typing rules

size' <- lap size 1.0;;
return (x'/size', y'/size')
totalCoords = λ pts.
let ptxs = bmap (λ maybeXY ->
case maybeXY of
Just xy -> let (x, y) = xy in x
Nothing -> 0.0) pts
let ptys = bmap (λ maybeXY ->
case maybeXY of
Just xy -> let (x, y) = xy in y
Nothing -> 0.0) pts
in (bsum 1.0 ptxs, bsum 1.0 ptys)
sqdist = λ xy1 xy2.
let (x1, y1) = xy1
(x2, y2) = xy2
in (x1-x2)*(x1-x2) + (y1-y2)*(y1-y2)
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assign = λ c1 c2 c3 xy.
let d1 = sqdist c1 xy
d2 = sqdist c2 xy
d3 = sqdist c3 xy
in if d1 < d2 and d1 < d3 then 0
else if d2 < d1 and d2 < d3 then 1
else 2
countPoints = λ pts.
let temp =
bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> 1.0
Nothing -> 0.0) pts
in bsum 1.0 temp
step = λ c1 c2 c3 pts.
let (parts1, parts2, parts3) =
bpartition 3
(assign (capture c1) (capture c2) (capture c3))
pts
p1TotalXY = totalCoords parts1
p1Size
= countPoints parts1
p2TotalXY = totalCoords parts2
p2Size
= countPoints parts2
p3TotalXY = totalCoords parts3
p3Size
= countPoints parts3
in c1' <- noise p1TotalXY p1Size;;
c2' <- noise p2TotalXY p2Size;;
c3' <- noise p3TotalXY p3Size;;
return (c1', c2', c3')
in step c1 c2 c3
Given initial centroids c1 , c2 , c3 : (Double, Double), the partially applied function
step c1 c2 c3 is a query that Orchard accepts, and the hypothetical database is a bag
of 2D points in the unit square pts : {(Double, Double)}. The query would return
a nested tuple that encodes the updated coordinates of the 3 centroids.
Since the top-level query language forbids branching and recursion, there is a
distinct structure to all computations with the type {τ } →
σ that can be broken
into three different “zones”:
(1) Red zone computations run directly on raw data of a single user device.
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Here, the assign function is a red zone computation.
(2) Orange zone computations are performed on user data that has been aggregated but not yet noised—here, the lap calls that add Laplace noise within
the noise function are orange zone computations.
(3) Green zone computations involve only public and noised data—here, the
final divisions in noise are green zone computations.
We note that user data can only pass from red to orange zone by aggregation
through the bsum (bag sum) operator, and aggregated data can only pass from orange to green zone by adding noise to it through the lap noise mechanism. Moreover, red zone computation always operates on a single entry in a bag. The query
language prevents the analyst from “nesting” bag operations inside a bag operation. The analyst may capture released information, and use this information in
argument functions passed to bag operators. The query language does not prevent
the program from capturing aggregated but unreleased (orange zone) information.
Such programs may leak aggregated but still sensitive information to user devices,
and these programs are rejected during compilation. We will discuss how such
programs are detected during compilation in Section 5.4.
In a top-level query, this stratification allows us to dispatch computations in
different zones to the corresponding party. Red-zone code runs directly on user
devices; computations in the red zone only need the data of one user at a time,
so each user device can run red-zone computations without sending any sensitive data anywhere. Once users encrypt their red-zone outputs (which must be
vectors of numbers) and send the encrypted vectors to the aggregator, execution
passes from red to orange zone, and the aggregator sums up the encrypted vectors through CaT (Section 5.1). The committee elected by CaT then decrypts the
encrypted aggregated sum, and adds appropriate noise to each coordinate of the
summed vector. The noised and decrypted data finally passes from orange to green
zone, and green-zone code computes over released data “in the clear” on the aggregator’s machine.
The CaT primitive plays a crucial role in transitions from red to orange zone,
and orange to green zone. Let us assume the hypothetical input database of user
data has type {σ}. The compiler transforms a top-level query into a target language that contains the bmcs() operator. The bmcs() operator is an abstraction in
the target language that runs the CaT primitive. This operator takes the following
parameters:
(1) a piece of auxiliary data mstate : τ used in the map function,
(2) a closed inner term f : τ → σ → [Double] that is the map function (in red
zone), which operates over mstate and each user device’s raw data,
(3) a vector of constant values bounds : [Double] that are the clip bounds for each
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coordinate of the output vector from the map function,
(4) a piece of auxiliary data rstate : ρ used in the release function, and
(5) a closed term r : ρ → [Double] →
γ that is the release function (in orange
zone), which receives the aggregated vector, and adds noise to values derived
from the aggregated vector, and transforms it into an output value (in green
zone) in the type γ.
Orchard’s compiler transforms top-level queries into target code accepted by a
framework called SCALE-MAMBA [KU Leuven COSIC]. However, for cleaner
presentation, we assume that the target code is a calculus with the following grammar rules:
t := n | r | var t | t t | λvar t : τ. t | t op t
let var t = t in t | let (var t , . . . , var t ) = t in t |
lap(t, r) | x ← t;; t | return t |
bmcs(t, e, t, t, t)
The target language is similar to the top-level query language, but bag operations
are no longer allowed. Instead, bag operations are encoded by applications of bmcs
(). This target language is also an extension of STLC, and we can give a typing rule
for the bmcs() operator:
BMCS

Λ; Γ `top mst : τ
∅; ∅ ` f : τ → σ → [Double]
∅; ∅ `top bounds : [Double]
Λ; Γ `top rst : ρ
∅; ∅ `top r : ρ → [Double] →
γ
Λ; Γ `top bmcs(mst , f, bounds, rst , r) :

γ

Programs in this target language can be easily converted into SCALE-MAMBA
programs.
Since the CaT primitive is expensive to invoke, the compiler must also take care
to reduce the total number of bmcs() calls in the compiled code. In the following
sections, we first discuss a procedure that compiles all bag operations into bmcs(),
and then discuss an optimization that reduces number of calls to bmcs().
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5.4

Compilation

We first unfold the two complex bag operations bfilter and bpartition into combinations of bmap (bag map) operations. A bag filter is a bag map that maps bag
entries into optional entries based on the boolean predicate, while a bag partition
that splits a bag into k parts is a tuple of k bag filters that only keeps bag entries
with matching partition indices.
Transforming a top-level query into target code requires a representation of the
relationships between bag variables, and their aggregated outputs, so that we can
construct appropriate “map” and “release” argument functions for bmcs(). We will
uncover this relationship by first normalizing the top-level query.
The goal of normalization is to flatten the query body, so that the relationship
between bag variables is easy to analyze. The flattened query body is a list of let
and monad bindings such that the terms on the right-hand side of these bindings
do not contain any nested bindings. This restricted form is called the “administrative normal form” for lambda calculus [Flanagan et al., 1993]. In this work, we
normalize the query body so that the flattened body is not only in administrative
normal form, but that all let-bindings only involve primitive bag operations on the
right-hand side—programmer defined terms will be inlined.

5.4.1

Normalization

We first alpha-rename all variables to be globally unique across the entire top-level
query, we will also assume a supply of globally fresh variable names. Next, we
inline all let-bound terms except for let-bound aggregated results from bag sums.
Inner terms bound at the top-level3 are also inlined. Let-bound aggregated sums
syntactically describe the relationship between a bag variable and the variable that
holds its aggregated sum, and we want to preserve this information in the syntax.
We consider the effect of inlining on the k-means step function as an example. Since the step function repeats the same computation for each partition, we
highlight the effects of normalization for one of the partitions. The inlined code for
k-means is shown in Figure 5.5.
We notice in the definition of p1TotalXY, p1Size and c1', there are nested let
bindings, and nested monad binds. We use the following rewrite rules to flatten
them. We also eliminate trivial monad binds of the form x ← return t; ; m, and turn
these into let bindings. Since we ensured variable names are globally unique in a
previous step, we do not accidentally capture variables when we lift let bindings
3

Inner terms defined in a let vare = e in t.
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let
step = λ c1 c2 c3 pts.
let
(parts1, parts2, parts3) = (bmap ... pts, ..., ...)
...
p1TotalXY = let ptxs = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> let (x, y) = xy in x
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
ptys = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> let (x, y) = xy in y
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
in (bsum 1.0 ptxs, bsum 1.0 ptys)
p1Size = let temp = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> 1.0
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
in bsum 1.0 temp
...
in c1' <- (let (x, y) = p1TotalXY
in x' <- lap x 1.0;;
y' <- lap y 1.0;;
size' <- lap size 1.0;;
return (x'/size', y'/size'))
...
in step c1 c2 c3
Figure 5.5: Inlined k-means
and monad bindings out.
rewrite let x = (let y = ty in tx ) in t ⇒
let y = ty in let x = tx in t
rewrite x ← (let y = t in k) ⇒
let y = t in x ← k
rewrite x ← (y ← m; ; k) ⇒
y ← m; ; x ← k
rewrite x ← return t; ; m ⇒
let x = t in m
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let
step = λ c1 c2 c3 pts.
let
(parts1, parts2, parts3) =
(bmap ... pts, bmap ... pts, bmap ... pts)
ptxs = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> let (x, y) = xy in x
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
ptys = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> let (x, y) = xy in y
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
p1TotalXY = (bsum 1.0 ptxs, bsum 1.0 ptys)
temp = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> 1.0
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
p1Size = bsum 1.0 temp
(x, y) = p1TotalXY
...
in x' <- lap x 1.0;;
y' <- lap y 1.0;;
size' <- lap p1Size 1.0;;
let c1' = (x'/size', y'/size') in
...
in step c1 c2 c3
Figure 5.6: Flattened step function
Applying these rewrite rules flattens nested let and monad bindings. For the step
example, the flattened code is shown in Figure 5.6. Note that the variables x and y
really just bind to bsum 1.0 ptxs and bsum 1.0 ptys once we eliminate the intermediate tuples. We would like to make that relationship explicit as well. So, we use
the following rewrite rules to unpack let bindings to tuples.
rewrite let x = (t1 , . . . , tk ) in t ⇒
let (x1 , . . . , xk ) = (t1 , . . . , tk ) in t[(x1 , . . . , xk )/x]
x1 , . . . , xk are globally fresh variables
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rewrite let (x1 , . . . , xk ) = (t1 , . . . , tk ) in t ⇒
let x1 = t1 in . . . let xk = tk in t
rewrite let (x1 , . . . , xk ) = (y1 , . . . , yk ) in t ⇒
t[y1 , . . . , yk /x1 , . . . , xk ]
xi and yi are all variables
The third rewrite rule eliminates extra variables introduced by the first two rules.
We also allow that rule to rewrite trivial single variable let bindings, such as let
x = y in t, into t[y/x]. After unpacking let-bound tuples, the transformed step
function is shown in Figure 5.7.
Finally, some terms may use outputs of the bsum operator directly in arithmetic
expressions or as arguments to the Laplace mechanism. We want to lift these bag
sums out, and give them fresh variable names. We achieve this with the following rewrite rules. These bag sums do not occur in the k-means example, but may
appear in general.
rewrite (bsum e x) op t ⇒
let y = bsum e x in y op t
rewrite t op (bsum e x) ⇒
let y = bsum e x in t op y
rewrite lap(bsum e x, r) ⇒
let y = bsum e x in lap(y, r)
The normalization step repeats in rounds until no more progress can be made.
Each round first performs all possible inlining, followed by repeated rewriting using all rules introduced above. We remark that this normalization process must
eventually terminate.
First, we consider the repeated rewriting within a single round. The first set of
rewrite rules flatten nested bindings, the second set of rewrite rules remove variables bound to tuple introduction forms, and the third set of rewrite rules lift out
bag sums. Note that the first set of rewrite rules do not create more tuple introduction forms, and that the second set of rules do not create more nested bindings. The
second set of rules may create more tuple introduction forms due to the substitution [(x1 , . . . , xk )/x]. However, since tuple terms have finite syntax tree depth, the
rewrite rules must eventually exhaust all possible tuple terms in the source code.
So, rewriting in a single round eventually terminates. The third set of rules may
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let
step = λ c1 c2 c3 pts.
let
part1 = bmap ... pts
...
ptxs = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> let (x, y) = xy in x
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
...
p1TotalX = bsum 1.0 ptxs
p1TotalY = bsum 1.0 ptys
temp = bmap (λ maybeXY.
case maybeXY
Just xy -> 1.0
Nothing -> 0.0) part1
p1Size = bsum 1.0 temp
...
in x' <- lap p1TotalX 1.0;;
y' <- lap p1TotalY 1.0;;
size' <- lap p1Size 1.0;;
-- these will get inlined away in the next round
let c1x = x'/size'
c1y = y'/size'
in
...
in step c1 c2 c3
Figure 5.7: Unpacking let-bound tuples in step
create nested bindings by lifting out bag sums from the Laplace mechanism applications, but since there are only finitely many bag operators in the input code,
eventually no more bag sums can be lifted out, and all nested bindings will get
flattened by the first set of rules.
Are there only finitely many rounds? This is indeed the case because eventually, all let-bound variables are either bag variables, or the result of an aggregated
sum from bag sum. At that point, no more inlining is possible. Since our rewriting
and inlining steps do not ever create more applications of bag operators, we must
eventually run out of inlining opportunities. So, the normalization step eventually
terminates.
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5.4.2

Tree of Bags

After normalizing the top-level query, all right-hand-side terms in a let binding
must be a bag operation, since the normalization step inlines programmer-defined
abstractions and let-bound tuples. This means all let bindings are now in the form
of let x = f y, where x and y are variables for bags or aggregated sum, and f is
either bag map or bag sum. We can use a graph to represent these binding relationships. In such a graph, node y points to node x with an edge annotated by f , if x is
bound to f y.
We use the normalized query as the basis for code generation. The normalized
let bindings give us a graph whose nodes are in-scope bag variables. In this graph,
an edge that points from y to x is annotated with the bag operation that computes
x from y. This graph allows us to build map functions, clip ranges, and release
functions for bmcs(). Note that there can be at most a single directed path between
any two connected nodes in this graph, and all let-bound variables must originate
from the hypothetical input database. This suggests the graph is really a directed
tree, with the hypothetical input database variable at the root. So, we call this graph
a tree of bags. We call nodes that represent aggregated sums (results of bag sums)
exit nodes of this tree. We write exits(g) for the set of exit nodes in the tree. We can
immediately tell whether a node is an exit node by checking if the variable at that
node has type Double.
The release functions for bmcs() are built from applications of the Laplace mechanism in the normalized query. In particular, the center argument to the Laplace
mechanism is a term that describes how to combine encrypted aggregated sums
into the to-be-noised value. This step must be performed by the committee (Section 5.1), and is encoded in the release function argument passed to bmcs().
The map functions and release functions derived from a normalized query may
capture in-scope variables. We use a separate closure conversion pass to extract the
captured closure, and convert the map and release functions to closed terms. The
query language type system forces inner terms (thus map functions) to capture
only values with capturable datatypes. These values can be directly serialized
and sent to user devices. The release functions do not exist yet in the typechecking
phase, and may capture values of a non-capturable datatype. We use the type
system again in the code generation step to reject release functions that capture
free variables with non-capturable types.
A high-level diagram of the steps involved in code generation is:
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We write Γ; g ` t : τ I p to mean under typing context Γ and tree of bags g, the
normalized term t with type τ generates code p. Note that we no longer track a
typing context Λ for inner term variables. This is because inner term variables can
only be introduced in two locations: (1) at the top-level, and (2) inside argument
functions to bag map, filter, and partition. A well-typed inner term can only have
free inner term variables from (1), but those variables are inlined during the normalization step. This implies remaining inner terms (argument functions to bag
operations) do not have any free inner term variables, though they may have free
top-level variables due to capture. When we need to typecheck an inner term in
the code generation step, we always start with an empty typing context ∅ for Λ.
Since the normalized top-level query is a mixture of flattened let bindings, and
monad bindings, where the bound terms are Laplace mechanisms and arithmetic
terms over variables, our code generation inference rules only consider these syntactic forms. We write g, x : τ →f y : σ to mean extending the graph g with nodes x
and y (of types τ and σ respectively), and an edge from x to y annotated by f . We
give a subset of the inference rules terms that are not the Laplace mechanism. We
separately give inference rules for the Laplace mechanism in Section 5.4.3.
L ET-BM AP

x:τ ∈Γ x∈
/g

x : {τ } ∈ Γ ∅; Γ ` f : τ → σ
Γ, y : {σ}; g, x : {τ } →bmap f y : {σ} ` t : ρ I p

Γ; g ` x : τ I x

Γ; g ` let y = bmap f x in t : ρ I p

VAR

L ET-BS UM

x : {Double} ∈ Γ r ∈ R
Γ, y : Double; g, x : {Double} →bsum r y : Double ` t : ρ I p
Γ; g ` let y = bsum r x in t : ρ I p
B IND

Γ; g ` m :
τ Ip
Γ, x : τ ; g ` k :
σIq
Γ; g ` x ← m; ; k :

R ETURN

Γ; g ` t : τ I p

σ I x ← p; ; q

Γ; g ` return t :

τ I return p

B INOP

Γ; g ` t1 : Double I p1
Γ; g ` t2 : Double I p2
Γ; g ` t1 op t2 : Double I p1 op p2
The VAR rule participates in sub-derivations for code generation of arithmetic ex123

pressions. The code generated here is executed directly on the aggregator, so they
must only manipulate released data. We know exactly which set of variables are
not released yet—those in the tree of bags g. So, VAR forbids direct access to any
variable x ∈ g.
The rules L ET-BM AP and L ET-BS UM extend g with an edge annotated with the
bag operation from the corresponding binding, and recursively generate code for
the rest of the program.
B IND, R ETURN and B INOP recursively generate code for the sub-terms, and
assemble the generated code back together using the original structure.
Code generation rule for the Laplace mechanism is notably missing. Such a rule
is in charge of producing the map function, clip ranges, and the release function,
and emitting the corresponding bmcs() call. This rule is presented separately due
to its complexity in the following subsection.
As an example, Figure 5.8 gives a subset of the tree of bags built from the normalized step function on the first partition. The abbreviated functions in edge annotations are the following4 :
f = λ pt.
if assign (capture c1) (capture c2) (capture c3) pt == 0
then Just pt else Nothing
gx = λ xy.
case xy of Just xy' -> let (x, y) = xy' in x | Nothing -> 0.0
gy = λ xy.
case xy of Just xy' -> let (x, y) = xy' in y | Nothing -> 0.0
h = λ xy.
case xy of Just xy' -> 1.0 | Nothing -> 0.0

Figure 5.8: k-means tree of bags
The assign function in f would have been inlined completely, but we keep its name here for
clean presentation.
4
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5.4.3

Code Generation

The tree g guides us to compute any in-scope aggregated sum starting from the
original hypothetical input database. For any variable x that we would like to compute, we walk the path p from the root of the tree to x, while maintaining an intermediate map function f , and a clip range c. We initialize f to id—the identity
function, and leave c uninitialized.
Along the path p from root to x, when we encounter an edge annotated by
bmap g, we update the map function f to g ◦ f —a new function that first applies f ,
followed by g. When we encounter an edge annotated by bsum c0 , we set c to the
constant c0 .
For any exit node x that holds an aggregated sum, once we have traversed the
path from root to x, we know exactly the map function f and the clip range for
computing x. These will become arguments to the emitted bmcs() code. We use a
function extract(g, x) = (f, c) to perform the extraction of the map function f , and
the clip range c for an exit node x in from the tree g.
We may need to use multiple aggregated sums in a single bmcs() run. Suppose
the set of exit node variables are x1 , . . . , xn , and extract(g, xi ) = (fi , ci ), we must
fuse each fi into a single map function, and each clip range ci into a single vector
of clip ranges. Fusing the clip ranges is simple—fix an order on x1 , . . . , xn , and
arrange each ci into a vector [c1 , . . . , cn ]. To fuse the map functions, first recall that
each fi is a function with type τ → Double—a computation that takes a bag entry
from the hypothetical input database to a single numeric value. We want to use the
collection {fi } to produce a vector of numeric values. The fusion follows the same
strategy we used for fusing clip ranges—arrange the outputs from each fi into a
vector:
f = λ row . [f1 row , . . . , fn row ]
We write extractvec (g, xs) = (f, c) for the function that extracts the individual map
functions and clip ranges for each xi ∈ xs, and fuses them into f and c.
How do we find out which exit nodes need to be computed, and when do we
need to emit bmcs()? This information can be extracted from the Laplace mechanisms in the normalized query. Among the set of free variables used in the center argument to a Laplace mechanism, some may be exit nodes from the tree of bags. So,
the release function must arrange a computation that gives the value of the center
argument using aggregated results. For a center argument t to the Laplace mechanism, and a tree of bags g, the set of required exit nodes are xs = fvs(t) ∩ exits(g).
Fix the same order that we use for fusing map functions on xs, and label the variables in that set as x1 , . . . , xn . We can build a release function r for the term t by
substituting the exit node variables with terms that select the corresponding ag125

gregated sum:
r = λ vec. lapcmt (t[x1 / (prj1 vec) , . . . , xn / (prjn vec)], w)
Here, each prji is a function with type [Double] → Double, and each projection
function selects the ith coordinate from the input vector. These sums are used to
compute the value of t. The committee then adds Laplace noise to the decrypted
value of t. We write lapcmt for the Laplace mechanism executed by the committee
to disambiguate from a Laplace mechanism that runs directly on the aggregator.
Note that this release function may contain additional free variables. Since these
free variables are not in g, they only bind to public (and unencrypted) data. We will
discuss how to extract these free variables into a separate closure environment in
Section 5.4.4.
Now that we know how to build each of the arguments of bmcs() when we
encounter a Laplace mechanism, a simple strategy for code generation is to just
emit one bmcs() call for each use of Laplace mechanism.
However, invoking bmcs() is only necessary when we need to aggregate and
noise data from the hypothetical input database. If the analyst decides to add more
noise to an already released value, invoking bmcs() is wasteful. A better strategy is
to only emit bmcs() for Laplace mechanisms that noise private data.
The map and release functions built from the procedure described above may
be open terms. For now, we assume a function cconvert(f ) = (f 0 , tup) performs
closure conversion on f , producing a closed term f 0 , and a tuple tup formed from
the free variables in f . In particular, we assume the closure converted function f 0
has the form:
λ cls v. let (x1 , . . . , xn ) = cls in f v
The function f 0 just unpacks a supplied closure argument, and brings the free variables x1 , . . . , xn in-scope for f .
However, two types of closures would violate the assumptions of the runtime
environment (Section 5.1). First, closures that involve non-capturable datatypes
cannot be serialized and sent to user devices. Additionally, closures that involve
any variable in the tree of bags g may send encrypted (and unusable) data to user
devices. The first type can be ruled out using type information from Γ. The second
type is more subtle—if a closure uses, for example, an un-noised aggregated sum in
a bag map operation, then at runtime, this aggregated sum has not been decrypted
yet, and it is impossible to use this encrypted sum in the map function that runs
on a user device. We rule out this second type of closures by checking that the free
variables in the intermediate map functions do not overlap with the tree of bags.
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We now give our code generation inference rules for the Laplace mechanism.
L APLACE -U SE E XITS

xs , fvs(t) ∩ exits(g) 6= ∅ ∅; Γ `top t :
Double
extractvec (g, xs) = (f, c) fvs(f ) ∩ dom(g) = ∅
r , λ vec. lapcmt (t[x1 / (prj1 vec) , . . . , xn / (prjn vec)], w)
x ∈ fvs(f ) ∪ fvs(r) ⇒ x : τ ∈ Γ ∧ capturable τ
cconvert(f ) = (f 0 , tupf ) cconvert(r) = (r0 , tupr )
Γ; g ` lap(t, w) :

Double I bmcs(tupf , f 0 , c, tupr , r0 )

L APLACE -N O E XITS

fvs(t) ∩ exits(g) = ∅
Γ; g ` lap(t, r) :

∅; Γ `top t :

Double

Double I lap(t, r)

L APLACE -U SE E XITS applies to a Laplace mechanism whose center argument contains exit nodes as free variables. The premises in this rule construct the map function, the clip ranges, and the release function using the steps sketched out above,
and apply the closure conversion pass cconvert() to the map and release functions.
We will discuss the details of cconvert() in the next section.
L AP -N O E XITS applies to a Laplace mechanism whose center argument does
not contain any exit nodes. This means such a Laplace mechanism only adds more
noise to already released data, and there is no need to use bmcs(). So, the generated
code is a Laplace mechanism that runs directly on the aggregator.
Although both rules apply to the same syntactic form lap(t, r), there is no ambiguity on which rule the compiler selects during code generation. The set of free
variables of the center argument, and the set of exit nodes in the tree of bags are all
known, and the compiler just computes the intersection of these two sets to decide
which rule applies.

5.4.4

Closure Conversion

As mentioned in the previous section, the intermediate map and release functions
we build may capture variables, while the bmcs() operator requires both map and
release functions to be closed terms. We can resolve this issue by performing standard closure conversion on the map and release functions.
Map functions are constructed by function composition on inner terms. After
normalization (Section 5.4.1), the only free variables in map functions are from ηt ,
and these captured variables are annotated explicitly with the syntax capture x,
and restricted to capturable types by the type system.
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Release functions are built from top-level terms (described by grammar rule t in
Figure 5.1), and they do not explicitly annotate captured variables. Nevertheless,
we can find these captured variables easily by computing the set of free variables
for a release function rt .
The cconvert() closure conversion procedure receives a term f with type σ →
ρ, and produces two terms. The first term is the closure converted function f 0 :
(τ1 , . . . , τn ) → σ → ρ, and the second term is a tuple of the extracted free variables
(x1 , . . . , xn ) : (τ1 , . . . , τn ). The closure converted function f 0 receives the closure
environment as an argument, unpacks the closure argument, and binds the free
variables x1 , . . . , xn from f with each corresponding projection from the closure
argument:
λ cls v. let (x1 , . . . , xn ) = cls in f v
If a function supplied to cconvert() is closed, then the extracted tuple is the unit
value, and the extracted function still receives this unit value as a trivial closure
argument, but does not let bind variables before running f .
Combining all of the code generation steps, and running these steps over the
normalized k-means example yields the following code:
x'

<- bmcs((c1, c2, c3), gxf, [1.0],
λ tup vec. (λ x. lapcmt (x,
y'
<- bmcs((c1, c2, c3), gyf, [1.0],
λ tup vec. (λ x. lapcmt (x,
size' <- bmcs((c1, c2, c3), hf, [1.0],
λ tup vec. (λ x. lapcmt (x,
...
return ((x'/size', y'/size'), ..., ...)

(),
1.0)) vec[0]);;
(),
1.0)) vec[0]);;
(),
1.0)) vec[0]);;

The functions gxf, gyf, and hf are defined by these equations:
gxf = λ tup row.
let (c1,
in (gx ◦
gyf = λ tup row.
let (c1,
in (gy ◦
hf = λ tup row.
let (c1,
in (h ◦

c2, c3) = tup
f ◦ id) row
c2, c3) = tup
f ◦ id) row
c2, c3) = tup
f ◦ id) v
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5.5

Optimization

The compilation passes described so far produce a correct sequence of bmcs() commands. However, these passes introduce, in the worst case, one bmcs() command
per Laplace mechanism used in the top-level query. This is inefficient due to repeated broadcasting to large number of user devices. We must leverage the fact
that bmcs() can aggregate entire vectors, and perform additional fusion to reduce
the number of calls to bmcs().
We implement this optimization with additional rewrites to the normalized
top-level query produced from Section 5.4.2, before we perform code generation.
In the example of k-means, the three calls to the Laplace mechanism for computing
each centroid do not depend on each other, so we should be able to use a single
bmcs() to release all three noised values. We expose this fusion opportunity by first
rewriting these independent calls to the Laplace mechanism using the following
rewrite rules:
rewrite x ← lap(tx , r1 ); ; y ← lap(ty , r2 ); ; k ⇒
(x, y) ← par2 (lap(tx , r1 ), lap(ty , r2 )); ; k
x∈
/ fv(ty )
rewrite x ← lap(t, r); ; (x1 , . . . , xk ) ← park (m1 , . . . , mk ); ; p ⇒
(x, x1 , . . . , xk ) ← park+1 (lap(t, r), m1 , . . . , mk ); ; p
x∈
/ fv(m1 ), . . . , fv(mk )
A park term groups k independent Laplace mechanisms together, so that the
code generation step recognizes fusion opportunities just from looking at the syntax of the intermediate code. Because we have introduced a new syntactic form
to normalized top-level queries, we need to add an inference rule to the compilation pass in Section 5.4.3 to handle this case. Intuitively, to generate bmcs() for
independent Laplace mechanisms under a park combinator, we should first recursively generate map functions, clip ranges, and release functions for each enclosed
Laplace mechanism, and then fuse them together through vector concatenation.
The closure tuples are also fused together.
The inference rule is shown in Figure 5.9. The premises of this rule use the
vector concatenation operation, written x++y.
The fused map function unpacks a large tuple of closures for each constituent
map function, and concatenates the output vectors from each map function. Each
slicei is a function that selects the correct slice from the concatenated vector for
each release function, and the fused release function applies the ith constituent
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Par

Γ; g ` mi :
Double I bmcs(tupfi , fi , ci , tupri , ri )
tupf , (tupf1 , . . . , tupfn )
tupr , (tupr1 , . . . , tuprn )
f , λ cls row. let (cls1 , . . . , clsn ) = cls in (f1 cls1 row)++ . . . ++(fn clsn row)
c , c1 ++ . . . ++cn
r , λ cls vec. let (cls1 , . . . , clsn ) = cls in
x1 ← r1 cls1 (slice1 vec); ; . . . ; ;
xn ← rn clsn (slicen vec); ;
return (x1 , . . . , xn )
Γ; g ` parn (m1 , . . . , mn ) : (Double, . . . , Double) I bmcs(tupf , f, c, tupr , r)
Figure 5.9: Code Generation for Fused Laplace Mechanism

release function to the ith slice of the fused aggregated vector, and arranges the
outputs in a tuple. Because the clip range vector size is a compile-time constant,
the ith slice operation can be defined as selecting the coordinates in the range of
P
[sizei−1 , sizei ) for the concatenated vector, with size0 , 0, and sizei , i |ci |.
The fused clip range vector is a concatenation of the smaller clip range vectors.
In the PAR inference rule, we assume that each mi within the parn combinator
recursively generates a bmcs() call. However, there may be an mi among m1 , . . . , mn
that does use any exit node. In this case, the L APLACE -N O E XITS rule applies for
such an mi , and the associated generated code is not bmcs().
In this case, this mi can be safely lifted out from the parn term, and placed in
front of the now smaller parn−1 term. This is because, for any j > i, mj does not
depend on the noised data from mi by the constraint on the par rewrite rule. For
any j < i, mj also cannot possibly depend on the noised data from mi because the
variable that binds to the output of mi is not in scope when mj is defined. So, when
we generate code using PAR, we will lift out these Laplace mechanisms that do not
lead to bmcs() code. The inference rule omits this detail for simplicity.
In the example for k-means, by applying this fusion optimization before we
generate code, we can group all 9 Laplace mechanism calls5 under the a single
par9 operator, reducing the total number of bmcs() calls from 9 down to 1 in the
final generated code.
This concludes all compilation passes for Orchard.
5

There are 3 Laplace mechanism calls for each partition, and there are 3 partitions in total.
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5.6

Evaluation

To evaluate how many queries the Orchard compiler supports, we surveyed the
differential privacy literature to find queries that are plausible candidates for this
highly distributed setting. We collected as many different kinds of queries as we
could find, and only excluded queries that are substantially similar to the ones
we already have. We also excluded queries where we cannot imagine the data is
distributed across lots of individual devices.
We collected 17 queries in total, and 14 can be expressed in the top-level query
language. All 14 can be successfully compiled into sequences of bmcs() instructions. The three unfit queries are PATE [Papernot et al., 2017], IDC [Gupta et al.,
2012], and DStress [Papadimitriou et al., 2017]. These queries are not a good fit for
Orchard. DStress operates on graphs, while we assume a set of per-user records.
IDC is a template algorithm with an oracle function U , and good choices of U require functions beyond bag operations. PATE requires training private (un-noised)
teacher models using data collected from user devices, and then releasing noised
labels on an unlabeled public dataset. The computation for releasing noised labels
must happen on the committee, since the aggregator cannot be trusted to use the
privately trained models. However, this is too much computation to be realistically
carried out through MPC.
We ran the generated code for each of the 14 queries and the high-level query on
small test data using a few dozen simulated “user devices”. We manually validated
that both computations produce similar outputs.

5.7

Limitations

Simplistic Optimization Orchard’s compiler uses a simplistic approach for reducing the number of bmcs() calls. Although we found this approach sufficient in
our evaluation of the 14 queries, in general, a programmer could construct queries
where independent Laplace mechanisms are separated by let bindings, and obscure fusion opportunities.
A better optimization strategy fully exploits the stratified structure of Orchard
queries. Concretely, we can extend the tree of bags with nodes that represent applications of Laplace mechanisms. This extension turns the tree into a directed acyclic
graph (DAG). We can perform a modified breadth first search on this DAG to collect entire layers of independent applications of Laplace mechanisms. Each layer
can be computed using a single bmcs() call. Since one per independent layer is the
minimum number of bmcs() calls required, the generated code is optimal in terms
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of bmcs() invocations. The implementation of this optimization strategy is part of
the future work for the Orchard compiler.
Limited Expressiveness The query language is quite restricted—programs do
not branch nor loop. Supporting these constructs calls for a path-sensitive analysis in the code generation step, and additional analysis to rule out code that may
branch or loop on encrypted data. It is not immediately clear if Orchard’s current
approach for code generation can be adapted to support these language features.
Iteration for a constant number of times is already supported by unrolling.
Lack of Compiler Correctness Orchard’s high-level query language can be
given a straightforward operational semantics by adapting the operational semantics of STLC. We may wish to know that, for any simply typed Orchard query t
and an input x, if t x eventually reduces to a distribution µ and t compiles to t0 ,
then the compiled code t0 x eventually reduces to the same distribution. The main
challenge here is giving an operational semantics to the lower-level code involving
bmcs(). In Section 5.4.3, we take care to reject closures with un-capturable values
and encrypted aggregated sums. In principle, such programs can reduce under
the higher-level STLC-like operational semantics, but they do not reduce under
the runtime assumptions of bmcs().
The Fuzz type system can rule out some un-executable programs because those
programs violate privacy. However, differential privacy type systems are known to
be incomplete. Restricting queries to a particular differential privacy type system
may rule out useful programs that can run on Orchard. It is preferable to consider more generally the question that, if the input query is not rejected by the
Orchard compiler, does the compiler always generate correct code? The complications around encryption and closures imply that the operational semantics for bmcs
() must distinguish capturable and un-capturable values, and must distinguish
encrypted and clear data. Giving such an operational semantics and developing a
general compiler correctness theorem for Orchard may lead to a type system that
is relatively complete with respect to the assumptions of bmcs(), and such a type
system may generalize Orchard beyond the scope of differentially private analytics.
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Chapter 6
Implementing Embedded Languages
6.1

EDSL

In previous chapters, we discussed typechecking, testing, and compiling three
domain-specific languages. These DSLs are based on the imperative while language P W HILE, and the probabilistic lambda calculus Pλ. To evaluate our ideas
from previous chapters, we must implement each of the three object languages and
the associated type system, testing framework, and compiler. Implementing a standalone programming language is a large engineering task that involves building a
parser for the language syntax, an interpreter for evaluation, and additional program analysis software such as the sensitivity type system, the symbolic execution
engine, and the Orchard compiler described in this dissertation. While the implementation effort in the last category is necessary, we should aim to be as efficient
as possible on the other components of a language implementation. Additionally,
the object languages of DPCheck and Orchard share a common core calculus—the
Simply Typed Lambda Calculus (STLC). We should aim to share implementations
efforts on this core between these two object languages.
Driven by this goal, we implement the object languages as domain-specific languages embedded in Haskell (EDSL). Our Haskell implementation is called DPHS
(Differential Privacy in Haskell). Our implementation allows programmers to code
directly in the host language Haskell through a “shallow” embedding API. This
API exposes functions for building object language terms, and provides a typebased mechanism for automatically converting Haskell terms to and from an introspectable “deep” representation. Furthermore, the abstract syntax tree of DPHS
terms are extensible datatypes. Extensible datatypes allow us to attach different
primitive operations and base datatypes to DPCheck and Orchard, while sharing
the same core calculus representation for both object languages.
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Reusing Haskell’s syntax removes the need of implementing parsers. Haskell’s
rich standard library also saves us the effort of developing a library around basic
data structures such as functional lists and tuples in the object languages. We index
DPHS terms with Haskell types, and rely on Haskell’s typechecker to ensure the
embedded code does not contain trivial type errors.
DPHS’s design combines two orthogonal language representation techniques
in Haskell. We build the connections between deep and shallow representations
through the techniques of Svenningsson and Axelsson [2015]. The data structures
that represent DPHS terms are modularly constructed using the tools developed
by Swierstra [2008] and Bahr and Hvitved [2011].
In this chapter, we introduce these implementation techniques, and show how
to combine them to create a compositional EDSL that has both a shallow and a
deep embedding.

6.2

Deep and Shallow Embedding

Svenningsson and Axelsson [2015] invented a technique for reifying Haskell programs into abstract syntax tree values, and reflecting those AST values back into
Haskell programs. The technique is versatile enough to reify and reflect higherorder functions, and effectful code. The reification and reflection mechanisms allow us to code in a DSL through Haskell’s syntax, and to analyze the resulting
code by inspecting the reified data structure. Furthermore, Svenningsson and Axelsson [2015]’s technique applies to type-indexed terms, which allows us to borrow
Haskell’s type system for simple typechecking on DSL programs. Here, we review
Svenningsson and Axelsson [2015]’s main ideas to demystify the reification and
reflection mechanism.
The following data structure represents lambda calculus terms with higherorder abstract syntax [Pfenning and Elliott, 1988] through Haskell’s GADTs feature [Vytiniotis et al., 2006]:
data Expr :: * -> * where
Val :: a -> Expr a
Abs :: (Expr a -> Expr b) -> Expr (a -> b)
App :: Expr (a -> b) -> Expr a -> Expr b
We wish to write Haskell functions with type Expr a → Expr b for representing
functions in the object language. We also want a mechanism for turning that function into a value with type Expr (a → b) automatically. Of course, given f :: Expr
a → Expr b, we can just apply the constructor Abs, since Abs f has the desired
134

type. However, things quickly become more complicated with multi-argument and
higher-order functions:
f :: Expr a -> Expr b -> Expr c
Abs (Abs . f) :: Expr (a -> b -> c)
g :: (Expr a -> Expr b) -> Expr c
Abs (g . App) :: Expr ((a -> b) -> c)
There is an underlying pattern to how the constructors Abs and App are applied in
these conversions. In fact, this pattern is fully type-directed. We can use a Haskell
typeclass called Syntactic to encode this pattern.
class Syntactic (a :: *) where
type DeepRepr a :: *
toDeepRepr
:: a -> Expr (DeepRepr a)
fromDeepRepr :: Expr (DeepRepr a) -> a
Each type a that satisfies the Syntactic constraint has an associated type DeepRepr
a that is the index on the reified AST type Expr. Here, a type a satisfies the constraint Syntactic a if we can both reify values of type a into an AST value with
type Expr (DeepRepr a), and can reflect Expr (DeepRepr a) back into values in
the type a.
A trivial instance of Syntactic can be established on the Expr type itself, since
both reification and reflection are just identity functions:
instance Syntactic (Expr a) where
type DeepRepr (Expr a) = a
toDeepRepr :: Expr a -> Expr a
toDeepRepr = id
fromDeepRepr :: Expr a -> Expr a
fromDeepRepr = id
We also want to reify and reflect Haskell functions in the type Expr a → Expr b so
that we can use toDeepRepr to automatically construct an object-level function from
a Haskell function. In fact, we can slightly generalize the type to any Haskell function with type a → b where the type variables a and b both satisfy Syntactic. This
generalization allows a and b to be instantiated with function types too, covering
all higher-order functions and multi-argument functions with one instance.
instance (Syntactic a, Syntactic b) => Syntactic (a -> b) where
type DeepRepr (a -> b) = DeepRepr a -> DeepRepr b
toDeepRepr :: (a -> b) -> Expr (DeepRepr a -> DeepRepr b)
toDeepRepr f = Abs (toDeepRepr . f . fromDeepRepr)
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fromDeepRepr :: Expr (DeepRepr a -> DeepRepr b) -> (a -> b)
fromDeepRepr f = fromDeepRepr . App f . toDeepRepr
The implementations of toDeepRepr and fromDeepRepr converts terms to and from
the object-level.
toDeepRepr

a→b

Expr (DeepRepr a → DeepRepr b)
fromDeepRepr

The reification process of function values first reflects the argument from deep
representation to shallow representation, then applies the function f, and finally
reifies the result from shallow representation to deep representation. The reflection
process of function values is a similar process in the reverse direction: we construct
a function that first reifies the function argument, then a term that applies a deep
representation of the function f to the reified argument, and finally we reflect the
entire term back to a shallow representation.
We can simulate the instance resolution process and apply equational reasoning to informally see how Syntactic reifies the examples f :: Expr a → Expr b →
Expr c and g :: (Expr a → Expr b)→ Expr c. We use the notation toDeepRepr @a
and fromDeepRepr @a to explicitly refer to the reification and reflection functions
at the type a.
toDeepRepr @(Expr a -> Expr b -> Expr c) f
= Abs ((toDeepRepr @(Expr b -> Expr c)) .
f . (fromDeepRepr @(Expr a)))
= Abs ((toDeepRepr @(Expr b -> Expr c)) . f . id)
= Abs ((toDeepRepr @(Expr b -> Expr c)) . f)
-- eta-expand toDeepRepr @(Expr b -> Expr c)
= Abs ((\x -> toDeepRepr @(Expr b -> Expr c) x) . f)
= Abs ((\x -> Abs ((toDeepRepr @(Expr c)) . x .
(fromDeepRepr @(Expr b)))) . f)
= Abs ((\x -> Abs (id . x . id)) . f)
= Abs ((\x -> Abs x) . f)
= Abs (Abs . f)
toDeepRepr @((Expr a -> Expr b) -> Expr c) g
= Abs ((toDeepRepr @(Expr c)) .
g . (fromDeepRepr @(Expr a -> Expr b)))
-- eta-expand fromDeepRepr @(Expr a -> Expr b)
= Abs (id . g . (\x -> fromDeepRepr @(Expr a -> Expr b) x))
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= Abs (g . (\x -> (fromDeepRepr (@Expr b)) .
App x . (toDeepRepr @(Expr a))))
= Abs (g . (\x -> id . App x . id))
= Abs (g . (\x -> App x))
= Abs (g . App)
Both of these results match our expectation.
We promised reification and reflection for effectful code. To represent effectful code in our Expr terms, we need to first add two more constructors Bind and
Return:
data Expr :: * -> * where
...
Bind :: Monad m => Expr (m a) -> Expr (a -> m b) -> Expr (m b)
Return :: Monad m => Expr a -> Expr (m a)
These two constructors can be used to construct terms indexed by any monad type
m. For example, assuming the IO function getLine :: IO String from the Haskell
standard library, we can first inject this value into Expr through the Val constructor.
The term Val getLine has type Expr (IO String)1 . For this example, we also inject the string concatenation function (++) :: String → String → String into Expr
through Val and name it concat:
concat :: Expr (String -> String -> String)
concat = Val (++)
Then, the following Expr term represents a program that reads two lines through
IO, and returns the concatenation of these two lines.
Bind (Val getLine)
(Abs (\(s :: Expr String) ->
Bind (Val getLine)
(Abs (\(t :: Expr String) ->
Return (App (App concat s) t)))))
However, manually writing down the Bind and Return constructors is tedious and
distracting. Haskell has the do notation feature that streamlines monadic code. A
program equivalent to the one above, but in do notation is much more concice:
do s <- getLine
t <- getLine
return (s ++ t)
1

We use the Val constructor for primitives, whose values are passed in directly from the host-level.
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We will now extend our Syntactic instances, so that we can express effectful
object-level code in do notation.
In Haskell, do notation terms are desugared into terms that explicitly apply the
>>= (pronounced “bind”) and return operators from the Monad typeclass:
class Monad m where
(>>=) :: m a -> (a -> m b) -> m b
return :: a -> m a
In order to express embedded effectful code in do notation, the shallow representation of effectful Expr terms must be an instance of Monad. What would such a representation look like? Svenningsson and Axelsson [2015] give a solution whose roots
can be traced back to [Filinski, 1994] and [Hinze, 2012]. Filinski [1994] and Hinze
[2012] demonstrate how to reify and reflect a monad value to and from a continuation with a universal answer type. This method can be distilled into Haskell using
the following definitions:
newtype K m a = K { runK :: forall r. (a -> m r) -> m r }
embed :: Monad m => m a -> K m a
embed a = K (\cont -> a >>= cont)
project :: Monad m => K m a -> m a
project (K m) = m return
The pair embed and project demonstrates an isomorphism between any monad
value in the type m a and a different representation in the type K m a. The type
constructor K m itself forms a limited version of the continuation monad:
instance Monad (K m) where
return a = K (\cont -> cont a)
(K a) >>= f = K (\cont -> a (\v -> runK (f v) cont))
Most critically, we notice that the definitions of >>= and return for K m do not require m to be an instance of Monad—only the embed and project pair requires the
Monad instance of m.
This suggests that we can use a type similar to K m for shallow representations
of effectful object-level terms. And as long as we have structures that represent the
>>= and return operations, we can extract the underlying represented term.
Our extended Expr term indeed provides these structures—they are the Bind
and Return constructors. So, we use a modified version of K, called Mon2 , as the
shallow representation of effectful terms in the Expr language:
2

This is the same name used by Svenningsson and Axelsson [2015].
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newtype Mon m a =
{ runMon :: forall r. (a -> Expr (m r)) -> Expr (m r) }
embed :: (Syntactic a, Monad m) => Expr (m (DeepRepr a)) -> Mon m a
embed a = Mon (\cont -> Bind a (toDeepRepr cont))
project :: (Syntactic a, Monad m) => Mon m a -> Expr (m (DeepRepr a))
project (Mon a) = a (fromDeepRepr Return)
instance Monad (Mon m) where
return a = Mon (\cont -> cont a)
(Mon k) >>= f = Mon (\cont -> k (\v -> runMon (f v) cont))
With the new embed and project pair, we can declare an instance of Syntactic for
terms in the type Mon m a for any monad m and any Syntactic type a:
instance (Syntactic a, Monad m) => Syntactic (Mon m a) where
type DeepRepr (Mon m a) = m (DeepRepr a)
toDeepRepr :: Mon m a -> Expr (m (DeepRepr a))
toDeepRepr = project
fromDeepRepr :: Expr (m (DeepRepr a)) -> Mon m a
fromDeepRepr = embed
With this monad representation mechanism, we can now write effectful Expr terms
in do notation—since our shallow representation of Expr (m a) is a value of with
a monad type Mon m a. Going back to the example of getLine, we can now write
such a program:
prog :: Mon IO (Expr String)
prog = do
s <- getLine'
t <- getLine'
return (s .++ t)
where
getLine' :: Mon IO (Expr String)
getLine' = fromDeepRepr (Val getLine)
(.++) :: Expr String -> Expr String -> Expr String
(.++) = fromDeepRepr concat
Furthermore, we can easily convert prog into a deep representation—the term
toDeepRepr prog has type Expr (IO String), so toDeepRepr prog is a value in
our abstract syntax type that uses Bind and Return constructors to sequence to-
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gether effectful code.
toDeepRepr

Mon m a

Expr (m (DeepRepr a))
fromDeepRepr

The object languages in this dissertation rely on the probability distribution monad.
The reflection and reification support from the Syntactic typeclass for function
and monad values play a critical role for converting programmer-defined EDSL
terms in the shallow representation to a deep representation suitable for analysis.
Remark on Exotic Terms This embedded representation admits a set of exotic
terms that could not be represented using a standalone surface language. For example, a function represented in higher-order abstract syntax may pattern match
on the syntactic structure of the argument term, and produce different bodies on
different argument terms. In this work, we do not statically rule out these exotic
terms. We assume the programmer is only interested in using the embedded representation for producing code that she can just as well write in a standalone language. Washburn and Weirich [2003] discuss one technique based on parametric
polymorphism to statically exclude exotic terms from HOAS encoding.

6.3

Compositional Datatypes

Swierstra [2008] popularized the technique of representing recursive data structures as fixpoints of functors. This technique factors out recursion from datatypes,
and uses a separate fixpoint type constructor to recover recursion. This separation of recursion and datatype composition allows us to compose a datatype by
“summing up” a collection of possible constructions, and also gives us a clean
framework for writing composable recursive operations over values in the compositional datatype.
As an example, consider the following recursive data structure for representing
arithmetic terms:
data Arith where
Lit :: Double -> Arith
Add :: Arith -> Arith ->
Sub :: Arith -> Arith ->
Mult :: Arith -> Arith ->
Div :: Arith -> Arith ->

Arith
Arith
Arith
Arith
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An equivalent representation of Arith that factors out the recursion uses the following two types:
newtype Term f = MkTerm { unTerm :: f (Term f) }
data ArithF :: * -> * where
LitF :: Double -> ArithF
AddF :: r -> r -> ArithF
SubF :: r -> r -> ArithF
MultF :: r -> r -> ArithF
DivF :: r -> r -> ArithF

r
r
r
r
r

The datatype ArithF is similar to the recursive version of Arith, but every recursive occurrence of Arith in its definition is replaced by a type variable r in ArithF.
Finally, the recursive version of Arith is recovered by applying the type constructor Term to ArithF.
Here, Term is the fixpoint type constructor that “ties the knot” around ArithF.
Since Term only has one constructor, the type Term ArithF is isomorphic to ArithF
(Term ArithF). This implies Term ArithF and the original recursive Arith have
the same structure. A value of type Term ArithF, at the outermost layer, is built
from constructors of ArithF. At each position where the type variable r occurs in
the definition of ArithF, a nested value of type Term ArithF may occur. This is the
same recursive structure that the original Arith datatype allows.
The benefit of factoring out recursion in the style of ArithF is that we can extend our language by defining additional data structures instead of modifying the
original Arith datatype. Suppose now we want to add trigonometry operators to
our language, we can achieve this by defining the additional datatype TrigF:
data TrigF :: * -> * where
SinF :: r -> TrigF r
CosF :: r -> TrigF r
And, we use the sum functor :+: to compose ArithF and TrigF:
data (:+:) :: (* -> *) -> (* -> *) -> * where
Inl :: f r -> (f :+: g) r
Inr :: g r -> (f :+: g) r
type ArithTrig = Term (ArithF :+: TrigF)
The resulting composition ArithTrig is a type that admits terms with both arithmetic operations and trigonometry operations. For example, the term 1 + sin 2
can be represented by the term:
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MkTerm (Inl (AddF (MkTerm (Inl (LitF 1)))
(MkTerm (Inr (SinF (MkTerm (Inl (LitF 2))))))))
To perform a structurally recursive operation over terms with type Term (ArithF
:+: TrigF), we can directly write a recursive function that pattern matches on
each constructor:
eval :: Term (ArithF :+: TrigF) ->
eval (Term arith) = go arith
where go (Inl (LitF v)) = v
go (Inl (AddF lhs rhs)) =
go (Inl (SubF lhs rhs)) =
go (Inl (MultF lhs rhs)) =
go (Inl (DivF lhs rhs)) =
go (Inr (SinF inner))
=
go (Inr (CosF inner))
=

Double
eval lhs + eval rhs
eval lhs - eval rhs
eval lhs * eval rhs
eval lhs / eval rhs
sin (eval inner)
cos (eval inner)

However, as the number of components (such as ArithF and TrigF) grow in the
sum composition, the pattern match code contains heavier boilerplate as we need
to directly pattern match on the many layers of sum functor constructors Inl and
Inr.
Instead, we can take advantage of the structure of the Term type constructor,
and use a general recursion combinator to encode the recursive computation over
terms. To specify a structurally recursive operation, we need to specify two ingredients: (1) a single-step of the structural recursion, and (2) how to recursively apply
this single-step operation over a term.
To specify the first ingredient, we notice that in the definition of eval above,
each branch of go evaluates the constructor by combining the recursively computed results from the constructor’s arguments. Given these recursively computed
values from the arguments, a single step of eval just performs the corresponding
numeric operation. In fact, we can use ArithF and TrigF to store the inputs to this
single step of eval. Such a function has the following type:
type Step = ArithF Double -> Double
Now, the second ingredient is a combinator recur that recursively applies values of
type Step over values in Term ArithF. The function recur must have the following
type:
recur :: Step -> Term ArithF -> Double
The function recur should recursively compute the Double result at each occurrence of Term ArithF, and then compute the final output Double with one top-level
application of the Step function.
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Here, we leverage the Haskell Functor abstraction to apply a function uniformly at all locations where a type variable occurs:
instance Functor ArithF where
fmap :: (a -> b) -> ArithF a -> ArithF b
fmap f (LitF v)
= LitF v
fmap f (AddF lhs rhs) = AddF (f lhs) (f rhs)
fmap f (SubF lhs rhs) = SubF (f lhs) (f rhs)
fmap f (MultF lhs rhs) = MultF (f lhs) (f rhs)
fmap f (DivF lhs rhs) = DivF (f lhs) (f rhs)
Now, the recur function can be defined as
recur :: Step -> Term ArithF -> Double
recur step (Term arith) = step (fmap (recur step) arith)
A function with the type Step belongs to a general family of functions that have
been extensively studied by Meijer et al. [1991]. For any functor f, a function with
the type Alg f a = f a → a is called an algebra, and the functor f itself is called the
carrier. The function recur is called a catamorphism that structurally folds an algebra
over a fixpoint of the carrier. To stay consistent with established literature, we will
use these established names to generalize and redefine the functions introduced
above as:
type Alg f a = f a -> a
evalArith
evalArith
evalArith
evalArith
evalArith
evalArith

:: Alg ArithF Double
(LitF v)
= v
(AddF lhs rhs) = lhs
(SubF lhs rhs) = lhs
(MultF lhs rhs) = lhs
(DivF lhs rhs) = lhs

+
*
/

rhs
rhs
rhs
rhs

cata :: Functor f => Alg f a -> Term f -> a
cata alg = alg . fmap (cata alg) . unTerm
eval :: Term ArithF -> Double
eval = cata evalArith
What about sums such as ArithF :+: TrigF? We can lift algebras for components
of a sum functor into an algebra over the sum functor itself:
data (:+:) f g r where
Inl :: f r -> (f :+: g) r
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Inr :: g r -> (f :+: g) r
sumAlg :: Alg f a -> Alg g a -> Alg (f :+: g) a
sumAlg alg1 alg2 (Inl left) = alg1 left
sumAlg alg1 alg2 (Inr right) = alg2 right
Now, if we define the function evalTrig:
evalTrig :: Alg TrigF Double
evalTrig (SinF v) = sin v
evalTrig (CosF v) = cos v
Then, the function cata (sumAlg evalArithF evalTrig) is a recursive evaluator
for terms with both arithmetic and trigonometry operations. Note that we do not
have to explicitly pattern match on the constructors of the sum functor.
The combinator sumAlg can be used to build a recursive computation for a term
with many distinct component carriers. If a term has the functor carrier F1 :+:
... :+: Fn, then we can modularly define a recursive operation by giving a corresponding algebra for each of Fi , and use sumAlg for composition.

6.4

Type-Indexed Compositional Datatypes

We discussed how to define extensible datatypes in Section 6.3. However, our discussion only covers datatypes that do not contain type indices. This is incompatible
with the usage of GADTs for connecting deep and shallow representations introduced in Section 6.2.
The reflection and reification processes critically depend on the type-index of
the GADT representation to select corresponding instances of Syntactic. To define
language representations that are both compositional, and support reflection and
reification, we must generalize and unify the two techniques from Section 6.2 and
Section 6.3.
A Haskell type inhabited by Haskell values has the kind *. In Section 6.3, we
gave a method for factoring out recursion for these datatypes, using the type constructor Term. This method splits the original type with kind * into a Functor of
kind * → *.
A general Haskell GADT indexed by a Haskell type has kind k → *, where the
variable k stands for the kind of the index type. In this work, we are interested
in GADTs whose type indices have kind *. So, we will specialize k into *. As an
example, consider the following GADT IArith :: * -> * (the prefix I stands for
“indexed”):
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data IArith :: * -> * where
ILit :: Double -> IArith
IAdd :: IArith Double ->
ISub :: IArith Double ->
IMult :: IArith Double ->
IDiv :: IArith Double ->

Double
IArith
IArith
IArith
IArith

Double
Double
Double
Double

->
->
->
->

IArith
IArith
IArith
IArith

Double
Double
Double
Double

We notice that IArith has exactly the same recursive structure as the un-indexed
version Arith. Perhaps we can factor out the recursive structure here as well?
The trick is to “lift” Functor, Alg, Term, and cata to their higher-kind counterparts: HFunctor (higher-kinded functor), HAlg (algebra for higher-kinded functor), HTerm (fixpoint for higher-kinded functor), and hcata (catamorphism over
fixpoints of higher-kinded functors). We give the definitions below.
class HFunctor (h :: (* -> *) -> * -> *) where
hfmap :: (forall i. f i -> g i) -> (forall i. h f i -> h g i)
type HAlg (h :: (* -> *) -> * -> *)) (g :: * -> *) =
(forall i. h g i -> g i)
newtype HTerm (h :: (* -> *) -> * -> *) (i :: *) =
HTerm { unHTerm :: h (HTerm h) i }
hcata :: HTerm h i -> HAlg h g -> g i
hcata term alg = alg . hfmap (hcata alg) . unTerm
These definitions may appear cryptic, but we can give some intuition for their
application in this dissertation.
For us, GADTs serve two purposes: (1) to borrow Haskell’s typechecker for
typechecking, and (2) to guide typeclass instances for reflection and reification of
DPHS terms. Here, we focus on the first point. The type indices that we give to
GADT constructors are based on our design of the object language’s type system.
There is the “obvious” choice of using an ML-like type system, but we have the
freedom to choose anything else that may also serve as a reasonable type system.3
This suggests that the combinators we use to factor out recursion for GADTs
should be oblivious to our choice of type indices—these combinators operate over
the value-level structures, instead of the type-level indices. By keeping this idea in
mind, let us go through the type signatures for each of the four higher-kinded
entities again.
3

We even have the freedom to choose an unsound type system, but that makes the object language
less useful.
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First, the typeclass HFunctor gives us the combinator hfmap. Similar to how the
functor map fmap applies a function over all values of type a held in a functor
value of type T a. The combinator hfmap should map over all “values” of type r
held in a higher-order functor HT r, as long as the instance HFunctor HT holds.
However, HT r and r are not value-inhabiting types. They both have kind * ->
*. Both of these types expect a type index. So, for some index type i, the types HT
r i and r i hold values.
We argued informally that hfmap should be oblivious to the choice of these type
indices, since the type system design is up to the taste of the language designer. So,
the combinator hfmap should be able to map over terms with any type index i.
The type signature of hfmap reflects this property: (forall i. f i → g i)→ (
forall i. h f i → h g i). The combinator hfmap receives a function that works
with any type index i, and hfmap applies this function over the entire structure of
the value.
Next, let us unpack the definition of HAlg. Recall that an algebra Alg f a is a
function with type f a → a. The functor f :: * → * is the carrier, and the algebra
is performing a single step of a recursive computation with results in type a :: *.
The higher-kinded version HAlg h g also represents a single step of recursive
computation. To remain oblivious to the type index on these terms, the higherkinded algebra should also work regardless of what the index i is. So, a higherkinded algebra HAlg h g are functions that work with any type index i, and this is
reflected in the type signature forall i. h g i → g i for a higher-kinded algebra.
Readers may wonder what if the recursive computation wants to produce an
un-indexed value? For example, can we write a pretty printer that produces values
of type String using HAlg? There is a problem—the type String does not take any
index i at all.
From these existing types, it is true that a higher-kinded algebra cannot directly
produce a value of type String. However, we can achieve the same effect through
a useful type known as Const (pronounced “the constant functor”):
newtype Const a i = Const { unConst :: a }
Now, a pretty printer can be expressed as a higher-kinded algebra with type HAlg
h (Const String).
The higher-kinded fixpoint type constructor HTerm is a straightforward lifting
of Term, and allows the index type i to annotate terms built from fixpoints.
Finally, the function hcata folds a higher-kinded algebra over an HTerm value.
The definition of hcata is actually identical to that of cata. The only difference is
in the type, and hcata is universal in the index i.
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To wrap up the discussion on extensible GADTs, let us refactor IArith and
implement its interpreter through algebra and catamorphism.
First, the higher-kinded functor that factors out recursion for IArith.
data IArithF :: (* -> *) -> * -> * where
ILitF :: Double -> IArithF r Double
IAddF :: r Double -> r Double -> IArithF
ISubF :: r Double -> r Double -> IArithF
IMultF :: r Double -> r Double -> IArithF
IDivF :: r Double -> r Double -> IArithF

r
r
r
r

Double
Double
Double
Double

To implement the interpreter, we need another utility type I (pronounced “the
identity functor”).
newtype I i = I { unI :: i }
Finally, the higher-kinded algebra for evaluation and the resulting interpreter:
evalAlg
evalAlg
evalAlg
evalAlg
evalAlg
evalAlg

:: HAlg
(ILitF
(IAddF
(ISubF
(IMultF
(IDivF

IArithF I
v)
=
lhs rhs) =
lhs rhs) =
lhs rhs) =
lhs rhs) =

I
I
I
I
I

v
(unI
(unI
(unI
(unI

lhs
lhs
lhs
lhs

+
*
/

unI
unI
unI
unI

rhs)
rhs)
rhs)
rhs)

eval :: HTerm IArithF Double -> Double
eval = unI . hcata evalAlg

6.5

Combining Syntactic and Extensible GADTs

Section 6.2 and Section 6.4 have separately introduced a technique for connecting
deep and shallow representations of type-indexed terms, and a technique for representing type-indexed terms as fixpoints of higher-order functors. DPHS applies
both of these techniques for building modular type-indexed object-level terms that
have both deep and shallow representations.
For DPCheck and Orchard, DPHS starts with a core lambda calculus, which
provides abstractions and applications. Monad compositions are represented with
a datatype that provides the Bind and Return constructors. The Laplace mechanism is represented by a separate datatype specific to the distribution monad
a.
We add primitive datatypes and primitive operations with additional extensions
to the core lambda calculus.
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Although the techniques introduced in Section 6.2 and Section 6.4 are compatible with each other, we need to generalize the Syntactic typeclass with an extra
parameter to accommodate modular composition. The original Syntactic typeclass assumes that we are always reflecting and reifying Expr terms. But, with the
extensible encoding, the type of the terms are HTerm f, where f is a sum of higherorder functors that make up the language encoding. So, we modify the declaration
of Syntactic into:
class Syntactic (lang :: * -> *) a where
type DeepRepr a :: *
toDeepRepr
:: a -> lang (DeepRepr a)
fromDeepRepr :: lang (DeepRepr a) -> a
Here, the first type variable lang will be instantiated with HTerm f, where f selects
the desired features for an object language. The shallow representation of effectful
code Mon also needs to be generalized into:
newtype Mon lang m a =
Mon {runMon :: forall b. (a -> lang (m b)) -> lang (m b)}
We also introduce a type synonym EmMon to abbreviate the now quite verbose types
of shallowly embedded effectful code.
type EmMon f m a = Mon f m (f a)
The type constructors DPCheck and DPCheckM from Chapter 4 are defined as HTerm
DPCheckF and EmMon (HTerm DPCheckF), where DPCheckF is a sum of higher-order
functors that give the language features used in DPCheck.
For Fuzzi, commands are represented by the following data structure:
data ImpF :: (* -> *) -> * -> * where
Assign :: Variable a
--> r a
--> ImpF r (FuzziM ())
Branch :: r Bool
--> r (FuzziM ())
--> r (FuzziM ())
--> ImpF r (FuzziM ())
While :: r Bool ->
-r (FuzziM ()) ->
-ImpF r (FuzziM ())

^ the lhs variable
^ the rhs expression
^ branch condition
^ then branch
^ else branch
^ loop condition
^ loop body

In particular, we represent commands as effectful code in a monad that supports
both stateful updates and sampling from distributions. Such a monad is given by
monad transformers [Jones, 1995] in Haskell:
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newtype FuzziM a = FuzziM { runFuzziM :: StateT Mem

a }

The state monad transformer allows us to track the value of program variables,
while the distribution monad gives us sampling. Fuzzi commands are sequenced
together using monad Bind constructors.
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Chapter 7
A Related Differential Privacy Proof
Technique
Along with development on approximate couplings and apRHL, a parallel line of
work independently built mechanized proof systems for differential privacy using
a different abstraction for probabilistic relational reasoning. The LightDP [Zhang
and Kifer, 2017] and ShadowDP [Wang et al., 2020] type systems build proofs
based on an abstraction called randomness alignment.
Both approximate coupling and randomness alignment transform relations on
deterministic program states into relations on probability distributions, and both
kinds of abstraction relieve the prover from the error-prone task of direct reasoning over probabilistic program semantics. Hsu [2017], Zhang and Kifer [2017] and
Wang et al. [2020] demonstrate that both approximate coupling and randomness
alignment are effective abstractions that enable proofs of many sophisticated differentially private programs.
Two questions arise: (1) what is the difference between approximate coupling
and randomness alignment, and (2) how does this difference influence proofs of
differential privacy based on these two different techniques? We answer both questions in this chapter.
We reviewed probability distributions, approximate couplings, and apRHL in
Chapter 2. In this chapter, we fill in the technical backgrounds on randomness
alignment.
First, we define randomness alignment in Section 7.1. We discuss the technical
difference between the definitions of approximate coupling and randomness alignment in Section 7.2. Following an overview on the LightDP type system based on
randomness alignment in Section 7.3, we illustrate the resulting difference between
apRHL proofs and randomness alignment proofs by comparing the key derivation
steps. We observe that the key steps in randomness-alignment-based proofs appear
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easier to automate than the key steps found in apRHL proofs (Section 7.4).
LightDP cannot construct optimal proofs for report noisy max, and its successor ShadowDP uses a technique called shadow execution to enrich randomness
alignment proofs and address this issue. We summarize this extension to LightDP,
and explain how this extension improves randomness alignment proofs for report
noisy max near the end of Section 7.4.

7.1

Randomness Alignment

Wang et al. [2020], Zhang and Kifer [2017] define a randomness alignment as an
injective function from a vector of Laplace noise into another vector of Laplace
noise values of the same dimension. The alignment is chosen for proving that the
outputs of aligned runs of a program are identical, and the authors [Wang et al.,
2020, Zhang and Kifer, 2017] show such alignments imply differential privacy.
The Laplace distributions used in [Zhang and Kifer, 2017] and [Wang et al.,
2020] are all centered at 0. This restriction simplifies the presentation of randomness alignment, but does not sacrifice any expressiveness. Sampling from a Laplace
distribution lap(c, w) is equivalent to evaluating c + η, after sampling η from the
distribution lap(0, w).
Consider a pair of similar inputs x1 ∼ x2 and a program p, assume that the
(2)
(2)
internal noise values used by p are η1 , . . . , ηn ∈ R, and assume that the execution p(x1 ) with this vector of noise values results in the output ω. A randomness
alignment is a function f : Rn → Rn with two constraints on f : (1) f must be
injective, and (2) if the internal noise on the execution p(x2 ) are the noise values
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
η1 , . . . , ηn = f (η1 , . . . , ηn ), then the related run p(x2 ) also produces output ω.
Aligning noise under f induces a difference in probability that depends on how
far apart the related noise values are. The authors [Wang et al., 2020, Zhang and
Kifer, 2017] show that an upper bound on this difference over inputs to f is the
differential privacy cost .

7.2

Difference in Definition

Randomness alignments focus on (, 0)-differential privacy. For the following discussion, we limit the scope of approximate couplings to (, 0)-differential privacy
as well. The main difference between randomness alignment and approximate
coupling lies in how much flexibility is allowed for relating noise between two
executions.
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Shift couplings (Lemma 11) are used frequently in approximate-coupling-based
proofs. The statement of Lemma 11 requires the shift distance s to be a constant
value, and this means s must be independent of other quantities. In particular, the
shift distance s cannot depend on the related pair of noise values. In other words,
the value of s must be the same for all related samples (x1 , x2 )—we cannot relate
the sample values (1.4, 3.4) with an s = 2, while relating (1.5, 4.5) with an s = 3 in
the same shift coupling.
Randomness alignment is more flexible, since the alignment f is a function
from noise values to noise values. Specifically, this allows f to choose different
aligned noise values by branching on boolean predicates on the input noise values.
This technique is applied in all non-trivial alignment-based proofs of differential
privacy by Wang et al. [2019], Zhang and Kifer [2017]. Furthermore, these boolean
predicates are often derived from branch conditions in the program syntax, which
implies f can depend on values from program states.
The difference between approximate coupling and randomness alignment is
more evident when we place these abstractions into corresponding proof systems
for differential privacy. These proof systems are all designed for the object language P W HILE, which we introduced along with apRHL in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we present an overview of the type systems from [Zhang and Kifer, 2017] and
[Wang et al., 2020], and discuss how the technical difference between approximate
coupling and randomness alignment impacts differential proofs.

7.3

Randomness Alignment Type System

Type Definition LightDP’s type system tracks the datatype and exact distance
between related values using a lightweight relational dependent type system. In
particular, types are formed with 2 pieces of information: (1) the datatype of a value
τ , and (2) the distance annotation d of a value.
Datatypes in LightDP include booleans, integers, real numbers, and nestable
lists at these datatypes. The distance annotation d is a term with the following
inductive construction:
1. a constant value r,
2. a program variable x,
3. an arithmetic term: d1 op d2 , where op is one of +, −, ×, /, or
4. a conditional term d1 cmp d2 ? d3 : d4 , where cmp is one of =, ≥, >, ≤, <.
In the simplest form, an example type such as real2 represents that the typed term
evaluates to values that are exactly distance 2 apart in related executions.
Distance annotation may appear inside the list type to precisely track the exact
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distance between values of two related lists. For example, the type [real2 ] is a list
of real numbers that are all exactly 2 apart in related program states. A distance
annotation is only meaningful for numeric datatypes, so the authors ([Zhang and
Kifer, 2017]) omit them for the boolean and list type. In fact, LightDP requires
related boolean values to be identical, and requires related list values to have the
same length.
A typing context Γ is an association from program variables to types. Given
x : τd ∈ Γ, we follow the author’s convention and write Γ(x) for its distance annotation, when the exact datatype τ is clear from context.
The typing context may also map a variable to a datatype with a special “star”
distance annotation. For example, x : τ∗ is a valid association from variable x to
datatype τ with distance annotation ∗. Star distance annotations mark variables
whose exact distance is not statically known. Zhang and Kifer [2017] model the star
distance annotation with an existentially quantified variable ∃ x̂ such that xh1i +
x̂ = xh2i—the existentially quantified x̂ tracks the exact distance between related
values of x.
In general, mixing dependent types and mutable states of imperative programs
leads to subtle questions about type soundness [Xi, 2000]. In LightDP, Zhang and
Kifer [2017] place a restriction on variables that appear in types to address these
issues. First, program variables are split into a set of deterministic variables Vars,
and a set of probabilistic variables H. The two sets are disjoint. For a deterministic
variable x ∈ Vars, if Γ(x) = d, then the free variables in d must never be modified.
For a probabilistic variable y ∈ H, LightDP assumes that y is used at most once
after y has been defined, and that if Γ(y) = d, the free variables in d must not
be modified between the command that defines y, and the command that uses
y. In other words, the free variables that appear in the distance annotation for a
probabilistic variable must be immutable between the definition and the use site
of that probabilistic variable.
To give a concrete example on this restriction, consider the following P W HILE
program:
j = i;
y = lap (j , 1.0) ;
if y > 0 then j = 1 else j = -1 end

Here, we assume the value of i is an input to the program, and that i is never modified. The variable j is a deterministic variable, and the variable y is a probabilistic
variable.
In this example, the distance annotation for j can involve the variable i, but not
the modified variables y or j. The distance annotation for y can involve the variable
j because j is unmodified between definition of y and use of y.
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Note that the separation of deterministic and probabilistic variables is purely
syntactic. Deterministic variables are only modified by regular assignment commands, and probabilistic variables are only modified by noise commands. Values of deterministic variables may be influenced indirectly by probabilistic values
through branching, as seen in this example.
Expression Typing Judgments LightDP’s expression typing judgments have
the form Γ ` e : τd . Expression judgments lift the distance annotations on program
variables to expressions. We can interpret Γ ` e : τd as “under program states
related by Γ, the expression e evaluates to values with exact distance equal to the
value of d”.
Remark The definition of relating two program states m1 and m2 by a typing
context Γ involves a subtle detail. If Γ(x) = d, since d itself can involve variables,
we must evaluate the term d to know the exact distance between the related values
m1 (x) and m2 (x). But which program state, m1 or m2 , should we evaluate d under?
Zhang and Kifer [2017] and Wang et al. [2019] assume that the distance annotation
is always evaluated under the left projection given a pair of program states. This
means, two program states m1 and m2 are related by Γ if, for each variable x such
that Γ(x) = d, the related values m1 (x) and m2 (x) are at distance [[d]](m1 ) apart.
Figure 7.1 shows the expression typing rules. T-N UM and T-B OOLEAN assign
the standard types for constants. T-VAR looks up the type for a variable with a
distance annotation from the typing context.
T-VAR S TAR looks up the type for a variable x with a star distance annotation,
which means the exact distance between related values of x is not statically known.
This typing rule unpacks the existentially quantified variable that tracks the distance of x, giving it a name x̂, and makes this variable available for derivations that
uses T-VAR S TAR internally. Note that the assumption about evaluating distance
terms applies here—the distance is tracked by the value of x̂ in the left projection
for a pair of related program states.
In an addition or subtraction expression, T-L INEAR O P combines the distance
annotations using the same arithmetic operation. This typing rule captures the effect of addition and subtraction on distance between related values, using the following standard arithmetic properties:
1. If e1 h1i + d1 = e1 h2i and e2 h1i + d2 = e2 h2i, then (e1 + e2 )h1i + (d1 + d2 ) =
(e1 + e2 )h2i.
2. If e1 h1i + d1 = e1 h2i and e2 h1i + d2 = e2 h2i, then (e1 − e2 )h1i + (d1 − d2 ) =
(e1 − e2 )h2i.
For a multiplication or division expression, T-N ON L INEAR O P requires that the
operand expressions must have distance annotation 0. This choice is different from
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T-Num

r∈R
Γ ` r : real0

T-Boolean

T-Var

T-VarStar

Γ ` b : bool

Γ, x : τd ` x : τd

Γ, x : τ∗ ` x : τx̂

T-LinearOp

T-NonLinearOp

Γ ` e1 : reald1 Γ ` e2 : reald2
op = + or −
Γ ` e1 op e2 : reald1 op d2

Γ ` e1 : real0 Γ ` e2 : real0
op = × or /
Γ ` e1 op e2 : real0

T-CompareOp

Γ ` e1 : reald1 Γ ` e2 : reald2
op = ≥ or > or ≤ or < or =
Ψ → (e1 op e2 ↔ (e1 + d1 op e2 + d2 ))
Γ ` e1 op e2 : bool
T-Index

Γ ` e1 : [τ ] Γ ` e2 : int0
Γ ` e1 [e2 ] : τ

T-Neg

Γ ` e : bool
Γ ` ¬e : bool

T-Cons

Γ ` e1 : τ Γ ` e2 : [τ ]
Γ ` e1 :: e2 : [τ ]

T-Select

Γ ` e1 : bool Γ ` e2 : τ Γ ` e3 : τ
Γ ` e1 ?e2 : e3 : τ

Figure 7.1: LightDP Expression Typing Rules
related work on sensitivity type systems [Near et al., 2019, Reed and Pierce, 2010a,
Winograd-Cort et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2019], which admit terms with unbounded
distance apart. However, LightDP’s evaluation demonstrates that the restriction
from T-N ON L INEAR O P does not preclude typechecking the main benchmark algorithms.
T-C OMPARE O P typechecks comparison expressions between numeric terms.
This typing rule refers to a relational predicate Ψ, which is the precondition of the
typechecked program. This precondition usually encodes the similarity relation for
inputs to the program. Zhang and Kifer [2017] assume that inputs are not modified,
and this assumption preserves the global precondition throughout the program, so
the type system can implicitly refer to this global precondition.
The typing rule for comparison expression requires that, under the global precondition Ψ, the typechecker must demonstrate Ψ implies the comparison expression always evaluate to the same boolean value in related runs. Since the comparison boolean results are used to steer control flow in command execution, this typing rule effectively requires all control flows in related execution to take the same
path. This requirement implies that randomness alignment proofs of differential
privacy derived by LightDP only reason over synchronized control flow paths.
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T-Skip

Γ ` skip * skip
T-Seq

T-Assn

Γ ` e : τ Γ ` x : σd τ = σd
Γ`x=e*x=e

Γ ` c1 * c01 Γ ` c2 * c02
Γ ` c1 ; c2 * c01 ; c02

T-AssnStar

Γ ` x : τx̂ Γ ` e : τd
Γ ` x = e * x = e; x̂ = d

T-If

Γ ` e : bool Γ ` ci * c0i
Γ ` if e then c1 else c2 end * if e then c01 else c02 end

T-While

Γ ` e : bool Γ ` c * c0
Γ ` while e do c end * while e do c end

T-Laplace

Γ(x) = reald
Γ ` x = lap(0, r) * havoc x; v = v + |d|/r
Figure 7.2: LightDP Command Typing Rules
T-N EG, T-C ONS, T-I NDEX, and T-S ELECT are standard and are used for checking the datatype of operations on list and boolean types.
Command Typing Judgments A LightDP command typing judgment has
the form Γ ` c * c0 . These judgments describe a distance-directed program transformation phase, taking the original program c to a transformed program c0 . The
transformed program explicitly aggregates the incurred privacy cost of each randomness alignment choice. In particular, the transformed program contains a distinguished variable vε for tracking the aggregated privacy cost. An assertion is
added to c0 at the end, to bound vε by the expected privacy cost of the original program. Theorem 2 from [Zhang and Kifer, 2017] states that if a value  bounds the
value of vε under all similar inputs, then the original program is -differentially private. To automate this step, Zhang and Kifer [2017] use an SMT solver to statically
discharge the proof obligation of bounding vε ≤  under the global precondition
Ψ.
Figure 7.2 lists the command typing rules. T-S KIP, T-A SSN, T-S EQ, T-I F and
T-W HILE are standard rules that assemble recursively transformed program fragments.
T-A SSN S TAR updates the existentially quantified distance annotation x̂ for a
variable, by inserting an assignment command to x̂, and setting x̂ to the derived
distance annotation of the right-hand-side expression in the original program. Such
variables are made explicit in the transformed program, and may appear in privacy
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Algorithm 3 Sparse Vector (apRHL)
1: procedure sv(T, N, q)
2:
i = 0; out = [];
3:
t = lap(T, 2/);
4:
while i < len(q) ∧ len(out) < N do do
5:
ans = (−1, 0); go = true;
6:
while i < len(q) ∧ go do
7:
a = lap(q[i], 8N/);
8:
if a > t then
9:
noisy = lap(q[i], 4N/);
10:
ans = (i, noisy);
11:
out = ans :: out;
12:
go = false;
13:
end if
14:
i=i+1
15:
end while
16:
end while
17: end procedure
cost terms added to vε .
T-L APLACE processes the Laplace mechanism command. The noise command
replaces the sampling instruction x = lap(0, r) with a non-deterministic instruction havoc x in the transformed code. The command havoc x may set x to any value
in the support of the Laplace distribution non-deterministically. Since the induced
randomness alignment cost is now explicitly tracked by a variable vε , the exact
probabilistic semantics of the Laplace mechanism is no longer important, and for
this reason, the Laplace mechanisms are replaced by havoc commands.

7.4

Different Proof Approaches

We study the proofs and typing derivations on two benchmark algorithms, sparse
vector and report noisy max, from [Hsu, 2017] and [Wang et al., 2019, Zhang and
Kifer, 2017] in this section, and compare the crucial steps between both approaches.
The LightDP type system by itself cannot typecheck report noisy max under the
optimal privacy cost. ShadowDP extends LightDP to handle non-synchronized
control flow, and this extension allows ShadowDP to typecheck report noisy max
with the optimal privacy cost. Since LightDP and ShadowDP are designed for
(, 0)-differential privacy, we omit the δ privacy parameter in apRHL judgments
in this section, and assume δ is always 0.
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Algorithm 3 lists an implementation of sparse vector that has a privacy proof
in apRHL by Hsu [2017], and Algorithm 4 lists the code for the sparse vector algorithm that has a typing derivation presented by Zhang and Kifer [2017]. Both
versions of sparse vector takes 3 inputs: T —a threshold value, q—a list of numeric
values, and N —an upper bound on the number of “above threshold” answers that
sparse vector is allowed to produce.
The precondition for both versions of sparse vector is that T and N are public
parameters—their values are identical for related executions, and each value in the
input list must be no more than 1 apart in related executions.
Operationally, sparse vector releases the identity of “above threshold” numeric
values from the list. First, both implementations add noise to the threshold value.
Then, Algorithm 3 adds noise to each numeric value, and releases the index of each
noisy value above the noisy threshold value, together with a freshly noised copy of
the selected numeric value. Algorithm 4 compares each noisy value against the
noisy threshold, and appends the true boolean value to the output list for each
above threshold value, or the false boolean value to the output list for each below
threshold value. In both implementations, the parameter N bounds the number
of above threshold answers in the final output—once there are N above threshold
answers in the output, both implementations immediately abort the rest of the
computation.
First, we consider the proof by Hsu [2017] for sparse vector in apRHL. Let Adj
encode the precondition for sparse vector. We want to build a derivation for the
following apRHL judgment:
` sv ∼ sv : Adj ⇒ outh1i = outh2i
The key insight for this proof [Dwork and Roth, 2014] is that we only need to “pay
privacy cost” for the above-threshold numbers, while the below-threshold values
can be processed without paying any privacy cost.
The first step is to apply the E QUIV rule, and transform Algorithm 3 into the
following program (with main difference highlighted):
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

i = 0; out = [];
t = lap(T, 2/);
while i < len(q) ∧ len(out) < N do do
ans = (−1, 0); go = true;
while i < len(q) do
a = lap(q[i], 8N/);
if a > t ∧ go then
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8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

noisy = lap(q[i], 4N/);
ans = (i, noisy);
go = false;
end if
i=i+1
end while
if fst(ans) 6= −1 then

out = ans :: out; i = fst(ans) + 1
16:
end if
17: end while
15:

This transformed sparse vector computes the same outputs as Algorithm 3 does.
The main difference is that, in the transformed code, the inner loop passes over all
numbers in the tail of the list q (starting from index i at each iteration in the outer
loop). As soon as the inner loop encounters the first above-threshold number, the
inner loop body stores the associated index and a freshly noised copy of the above
threshold entry in the variable ans. The inner loop also sets go to false once an
above threshold entry is found, causing the rest of the inner loop to pass over the
remaining tail of q without doing anything.
Once the inner loop finishes, lines 14 through 16 append the above-threshold
entry to the output list, and reset the iteration variable i to the index immediately
following the above threshold entry.
The main purpose of this program transformation step is to separate the output
list from the code that finds a single above threshold entry, so that we can derive
an apRHL judgment for the subroutine that finds a single above threshold entry,
and use the resulting judgment as part of the derivation for the whole program.
Let us refer to lines 5 through 13 as aboveT, and derive the following judgment
for an arbitrary pair of (j, v):
` aboveT ∼/2N aboveT : th1i + 1 = th2i ⇒ ansh1i = (j, v) → ansh2i = (j, v)
The precondition is that the noised threshold value is 1 apart in two related runs—
th1i + 1 = th2i.
To construct a derivation for this judgment, we need to apply E QUIV again to
rewrite aboveT into the following program that splits the loop into three parts: (1)
iterations before the jth value, (2) iteration at the jth value, and (3) iterations after
the jth value:
while i < len(q) ∧ i < j do
2:
a = lap(q[i], 8N/)
1:
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3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:

if a > t ∧ go then
noisy = lap(q[i], 4N/);
ans = (i, noisy);
go = false;
end if
i=i+1
end while
while i < len(q) ∧ i = j do
a = lap(q[i], 8N/)
if a > t ∧ go then
noisy = lap(q[i], 4N/);
ans = (i, noisy);
go = false;
end if
i=i+1
end while
while i < len(q) ∧ i > j do
a = lap(q[i], 8N/)
if a > t ∧ go then
noisy = lap(q[i], 4N/);
ans = (i, noisy);
go = false;
end if
i=i+1
end while

We may attempt to transform aboveT by replacing the jth iteration with just its
body, instead of using a while loop. However, such a transformation is incorrect—
we want to derive the judgment ` aboveT ∼/2N aboveT : th1i + 1 = th2i ⇒
ansh1i = (j, v) → ansh2i = (j, v) for all pairs of (j, v). In particular, if j is out-ofbounds with respect to len(q), then the transformation that uses just the loop body
would run an extra iteration, and would be incorrect.
Hsu [2017] refers to this transformed program as aboveT’, and the three loops
as w< , w= and w> . We use the same names here. We reason about each loop synchronously with the following invariants by applying W HILE:
Inv < , th1i + 1 = th2i
∧ goh1i → goh2i
∧ (¬ (ih1i < len(q) ∧ ih1i < j) → ih1i = j)
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Inv = , th1i + 1 = th2i
∧ goh1i → goh2i
∧ ansh1i = (j, v) → ansh2i = (j, v)
∧ (¬ (ih1i < len(q) ∧ ih1i = j) → ih1i = j + 1)
Inv > , th1i + 1 = th2i
∧ ih1i > j
∧ ansh1i = (j, v) → ansh2i = (j, v)
The most interesting case happens in the analysis for w= . Here, we apply L AP -G EN
to couple the noised values a (on line 11) such that ah1i + 1 = ah2i, using parameters s = 1 and k = 2 for L AP -G EN. The induced privacy cost for this application of
L AP -G EN is 2/8N = /4N . This coupling allows us to show that the branch condition on line 12 is true for both related runs, and conclude the jth noised value is
above threshold for both runs. Within this branch, we establish another approximate coupling with L AP so that noisyh1i = noisyh2i for the noise command on line
13, and this induces another privacy cost of /4N . So, with total privacy cost /2N
for the jth iteration, we can conclude
` w= ∼/2N w= : Inv = ⇒ Inv = ∧ ¬ (ih1i < len(q) ∧ ih1i = j) .
The other two while loops use L AP -N ULL in their internal derivations, and
induce no privacy cost. Combining all of these sub-derivations gives us the judgment:
` aboveT0 ∼/2N aboveT0 : th1i + 1 = th2i ⇒ ansh1i = (j, v) → ansh2i = (j, v).
With an application of PW-E Q and F RAME (to preserve the assertion th1i + 1 =
th2i), we have a suitable judgment for aboveT:
` aboveT ∼/2N aboveT : th1i + 1 = th2i ⇒ ansh1i = ansh2i ∧ th1i + 1 = th2i.
We now analyze the outer loop by applying W HILE with the loop iteration
counter expression i ≥ len(q) ? 0 : N − len(out). This matches our intuition that
the inner loop runs at most N times, resulting in aggregated privacy cost of /2N ×
N = /2 for the outer loop. We apply L AP -G EN for establishing the condition
th1i + 1 = th2i before the main loop, by selecting the parameters s = 1, and k = 1.
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This induces a privacy cost of /2. Assembling these derivations, we can conclude
` sv ∼ sv : Adj ⇒ outh1i = outh2i.
Remark The key steps in this proof are: (1) the initial program transformation of
sparse vector into an easier-to-analyze form, (2) the second program transformation that splits the inner loop into w< , w= and w> , (3) choosing the loop invariants
for w< , w= , and w> , and (4) choosing the parameters to applications of L AP -G EN.
Steps 3 and 4 can be adapted from existing paper proofs of privacy for sparse
vector. Steps 1 and 2 are unique for apRHL, and designing the suitable transformed
programs for subsequent derivation steps requires deep familiarity with apRHL
proof rules. Automating these transformation steps appears difficult.
In particular, the second transformation is critical for proving aboveT only incurs a privacy cost of /2N . Had we not dissected the while loop into w< , w= and
w> , and instead had we directly applied W HILE to aboveT, the aggregated privacy
cost for aboveT would be a term that linearly scales with len(q). This would prevent us from creating a proof with the optimal privacy cost.
The LightDP derivation Algorithm 4 shows a version of sparse vector accepted by the LightDP type system. There are two points of difference between
this implementation and the sparse vector implementation in Algorithm 3: (1) Algorithm 4 encodes the identity of above threshold noisy values using boolean values, instead of returning the indices directly, and that (2) Algorithm 4 does not
release another freshly noised copy of the above threshold noisy values. The first
difference does not impact the privacy cost, but the second difference does. Intuitively, since we are releasing less information when running Algorithm 4, we
should use less privacy cost per above threshold entry if the same amount of noise
is applied. Algorithm 4 uses less noise compared to Algorithm 3 for each above
threshold result—line 7 in Algorithm 3 uses twice the amount of noise compared
to line 8 in Algorithm 4. The overall effect is that Algorithm 4 omits the additional
information while keeping total privacy cost the same at .
In order to typecheck Algorithm 4 in LightDP, we must first give distance annotations for each variable. The input parameters are already annotated. For the other
variables, we choose the constant 1 for T 0 and n1 , and the term q[i] + n2 ≥ T 0 ? 2 : 0
for n2 . The annotation for all other variables are the constant 0.
The distance annotation on T 0 and n1 is a constant, and is similar to the shift
coupling parameter that we choose in the proof for Algorithm 3—the distance between noised thresholds is fixed at 1.
The distance annotation for n2 leverages dependency in LightDP—it is a term
q[i] + n2 ≥ T 0 ? 2 : 0. Readers may find it surprising that the distance annotation
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Algorithm 4 Sparse Vector (LightDP)
1: procedure sv(T : real0 , N : int0 , q : [real∗ ])
2: returns (out : [bool])
3: precondition ∀i. |q[i]h1i − q[i]h2i| ≤ 1
4:
n1 = lap(0, 2/);
5:
T 0 = T + n1 ;
6:
cabove = 0; cbelow = 0; i = 0;
7:
while cabove < N ∧ i < len(q) do
8:
n2 = lap(0, 4N/);
9:
if q[i] + n2 ≥ T 0 then
10:
out = true :: out;
11:
cabove = cabove + 1;
12:
else
13:
out = false :: out;
14:
cbelow = cbelow + 1;
15:
end if
16:
i=i+1
17:
end while
18: end procedure
of n2 is defined in terms of n2 itself. Per our remark earlier in Section 7.3, we only
interpret the distance term in the left projection for a pair of related program states,
and this resolves the seemingly circular definition.
The distance annotation on n2 requires that, for each above threshold noisy
value, use a randomness alignment of 2 on the noise, and use a randomness alignment of 0 on the noise for below threshold noisy values.
At the core, these distance annotations follow the same high-level strategy of
the apRHL proof (adapted from [Dwork and Roth, 2014]). We set up the noisy
threshold values so that they are one apart, and set up the noisy numeric entries
so that each above threshold entry synchronizes with an above threshold entry in
the related execution. The typing derivation in LightDP is simpler than the proof
derivation. With the distance annotation discussed earlier, the type system performs the program transformation Γ ` sv * sv0 using a fully syntax-directed
procedure. The transformed program sv’ is the following code:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

procedure SV ’(T : real0 , N : int0 , q : [real∗ ])
returns (out : [bool])
precondition ∀i. |q[i]h1i − q[i]h2i| ≤ 1
vε = 0;
havoc n1 ; vε = vε + /2;
T 0 = T + n1 ; cabove = 0; cbelow = 0; i = 0;
163

7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

while cabove < N ∧ i < len(q) do
havoc n2 ; vε = vε + (q[i] + n2 ≥ T 0 ? 2 : 0) × /4N ;
if q[i] + n2 ≥ T 0 then
out = true :: out;
cabove = cabove + 1;
else
out = false :: out;
cbelow = cbelow + 1;
end if
end while
end procedure

LightDP’s type soundness property states that if the postcondition vε ≤  can be
proven for the transformed program, then SV is -differentially private. Proving
this postcondition in the transformed program can be carried out using standard
Hoare Logic1 with manually annotated loop invariants. For the while loop between
line 7 and 16, we provide the loop invariant Inv :
Inv , vε = /2 + cabove × /2N
∧ (¬(cabove < N ) → cabove = N )
After the while loop, we can derive v = /2+/2 = , concluding the entire privacy
proof.
Remark The key steps involved in the LightDP typing derivation are (1) providing the initial distance annotations, (2) transforming the source code by following
the typing rules for explicit privacy cost aggregation, (3) providing the loop invariant for the transformed program, and (4) deriving a classic Hoare Logic judgment
that bounds the total privacy cost in the postcondition for the transformed program. Zhang and Kifer [2017] automate step 2 and 4 in their implementation of
LightDP, and only steps 1 and 3 require manual input.
Comparing the LightDP typing derivation with the apRHL proof derivation,
we observe that the typing derivation in LightDP involves fewer “creative” steps
than the apRHL proof derivation does. In particular, the apRHL proof uses two
non-trivial program transformations in intermediate steps. LightDP uses a single automated program transformation. However, LightDP requires related control flow paths to be synchronized. This constraint simplifies the distance-directed
program transformation process, but sacrifices some expressiveness. By requiring
1

Extended with a rule for the non-deterministic havoc command.
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Algorithm 5 Report Noisy Max
1: procedure rnm(qs : [real∗ ])
2: returns(maxi : int)
3: precondition(∀ i. |qs[i]h1i − qs[i]h2i| ≤ 1)
4:
maxA = 0;
5:
maxi = (−1);
6:
i = 0;
7:
while i < len(qs) do
8:
noise = lap(0, /2);
9:
if maxi < 0 ∨ qs[i] + noise ≥ maxA then
10:
maxA = qs[i] + noise; maxi = i;
11:
end if
12:
i = i + 1;
13:
end while
14: end procedure
fewer manual steps, LightDP supplies more automation for proving differential
privacy on sparse vector than apRHL.
Report Noisy Max Although synchronizing control flow paths simplifies the
type system for LightDP, this assumption also prevents LightDP from constructing
optimal differential privacy proofs for some algorithms. Report noisy max is such
an algorithm, shown in Algorithm 5.
In order to prove this algorithm is -differentially private for the output max i
in apRHL, we use the PW-E Q rule, and apply a similar program transformation
step to rewrite the while loop into 3 separate loops for each possible output value
j. The three separate loops are: (1) iterations before j, (2) the jth iteration, and (3)
iterations after j.
For the jth iteration, we use the L AP -G EN proof rule with parameter s = 1 and
k = 2, and we use L AP -N ULL for the other two loops. This allows us to establish a
relation noiseh1i + 1 = noiseh2i with cost . Using the precondition of report noisy
max, we can ensure the noisy max value also occurs at index j, forcing the related
execution to produce the same value for max i . The derivation is very similar to
that of aboveT. The total privacy cost is  for the apRHL proof.
For LightDP, the restriction on synchronized control flows immediately poses
a problem if we wish to prove the algorithm with an  privacy cost. Writing qs0
for the implicit list of noisy values in an execution, this execution observes some
ordering of the values in qs0 as reflected by the sequence of branch condition values
on line 9. For example, if the list has length 4, and the sequence of branch condition
values observed on line 9 is true, false, false, true, then we know max i = 3.
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There are other sequences of branch condition values that lead to the output
max i = 3. The first branch value will always be true because max i is initialized to
a negative value, but the two intermediate branch conditions could be anything.
Each different sequence of branch condition values that ends in true represents
a different control flow path that leads to the same output, so a alignment-based
privacy proof that achieves  privacy cost must use an alignment that can establish
equality on max i even if the intermediate paths are different. Forcing these intermediate branch conditions to be identical leads to a privacy proof with a larger
privacy cost. In LightDP, we can only prove report noisy max is (len(q) × )differentially private.
Randomness Alignment with Non-Synchronized Control Flow LightDP
distance annotations can establish constraints between a Laplace noise at the annotation site and noise values sampled prior to this noise value. However, for report
noisy max, forcing an aligned noisy element to be the largest requires establishing
a global constraint that involves all sampled noise values in the entire execution,
including those noisy values not yet seen by the analysis. To address this problem,
Wang et al. [2019] propose an extension to the LightDP type system, called ShadowDP that can change the alignment of noise sampled in the past.
In ShadowDP, the type system maintains two copies of distance annotations for
each program variable, represented by the notation x : τhd◦ ,d† i . The annotation d◦ is
called the aligned distance, and d† is called the shadow distance. The execution related by this dual-annotation type system is correspondingly split into two kinds:
aligned execution, and shadow execution. An aligned execution is the same kind of
related execution modeled by LightDP’s type system, where all control flow paths
are synchronized, and all noise samples are exactly at the distance annotation d◦
apart. In a shadow execution, the distance between the 0-centered Laplace noise
values is always 0, and incurs 0 privacy cost (similar to how L AP N ULL relates
Laplace samples in apRHL). Furthermore, control flow paths need not be synchronized in a shadow execution.
The programmer provides an annotation called a selector for each Laplace noise
command. A selector S is a term with the following inductive construction:
1. the constant ◦,
2. the constant †, or
3. a conditional term Ω ? S1 : S2 .
The selector is used to switch all past distance annotations between shadow and
aligned distance. The constant ◦ unconditionally selects aligned distance for all
past Laplace noise, the constant † unconditionally selects shadow distance, and
the conditional term Ω ? S1 : S2 makes a choice by branching on the condition Ω.
In ShadowDP, a distance annotation is provided at each Laplace command. So,
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the syntax of an annotated Laplace command in ShadowDP is
x = lap(0, r), S, d
For example, the annotated report noisy max algorithm for ShadowDP is the
following:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

procedure RNM(q : [numh∗,∗i ]) returns(maxi : inth0,∗i )
precondition(∀ i. |qs[i]h1i − qs[i]h2i| ≤ 1)
maxA = 0;
maxi = (−1);
i = 0;
while i < len(qs) do
noise = lap(0, /2), Ω ? † : ◦ , Ω ? 2 : 0 ;
if maxi < 0 ∨ qs[i] + noise ≥ maxA then
maxA = qs[i] + noise; maxi = i;
end if
i = i + 1;
end while
end procedure

The condition Ω in the annotation corresponds to the branch condition on line 8.
The Laplace noise command is annotated with both a selector Ω ? † : ◦, and an
aligned distance Ω ? 2 : 0. The shadow distance is implicitly set to the constant 0.
This selector switches all past alignments to 0 (the shadow distance) whenever
a new noisy value is larger than the noisy max seen so far. The distance annotation
sets the aligned distance to 2 when the new noisy value is the largest, otherwise
the distance annotation chooses 0.
Let us consider an example pair of input lists [1, 2, 2, 1] and [2, 3, 1, 2] to gain
some intuition on how the selector operates. Assume that the Laplace noise values
we observe in the first run are 1, 0, −1, and 3. So, we have the following list of noisy
values in the first execution [2, 2, 1, 4], and we return the index 3 of the largest noisy
value 4.
The annotated selector selects the shadow execution (for past noise samples),
and the aligned distance 2, whenever the noisy value is largest in the first run. We
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visualize the decisions made by the selector with the following diagram:
qh1i

1

2

2

1

noiseh1i

1

0

−1

3

qh2i

2

3

1

2

shadow

1

0

−1

3

aligned

3

2

−1

5

We list the two input lists as qh1i and qh2i, and the observed noise on qh1i as
noiseh1i. The shadow execution noise is identical to noiseh1i, and listed under
shadow. The aligned execution noise is listed under aligned.
In the related execution on qh2i, we go through 4 iterations:
1. The branch condition Ω evaluates to true in the left projection program state,
and the selector picks † for all previous samples. However, there are no previous samples yet in the related execution, so there is no effect on the aligned
noise values. The aligned distance for this initial noise is 2, so the aligned
noise is 1 + 2 = 3.
2. The branch condition Ω evaluates to true again in the first execution, and the
selector picks † for all previous samples. This switches the previous alignments on noise values to the shadow distance. So, the noise that was aligned
to 3 in the first iteration, has now been switched to 1. We choose the aligned
distance 2 for this second Laplace noise value, and the aligned noise is 0+2 =
2.
3. The branch condition Ω evaluates to false in the first execution, and the selector picks ◦ for all previous samples. This means we continue with previously established alignments for all previous samples.
4. The branch condition Ω evaluates to true in the first execution, and the selector requires a switch to shadow annotations for all previous samples again.
We align this last noise value to 5, while switching to the shadow noise values
for all previous sampled noises.
At the end of the loop, the randomness alignment shifts each noise by 0, 0, 0 and
2. This alignment has a privacy cost of 2/2 ×  = , and also ensures the maximum noisy value occurs at the last position on the second input [2, 3, 1, 2]. The
concrete arrows trace the final randomness alignment selected by ShadowDP, and
the dashed arrows trace abandoned alignment candidates.
With this extension, the ShadowDP type system successfully constructs a ran168

domness alignment that proves -differential privacy for report noisy max. ShadowDP’s type system maintains two copies of randomness alignment. One of the
two copies always establishes a 0-privacy cost alignment similar to the null coupling (Lemma 10) of apRHL, and the other alignment can “abandon” previously
established alignment by switching the established alignment to the 0-cost shadow
alignment.
ShadowDP’s type system strictly extends LightDP’s distance types, to create
randomness alignments that can prove differential privacy for algorithms whose
related runs may follow different internal paths. Due to the shared foundation between the two systems, we do not go into details about each of ShadowDP’s typing
rule, and instead provide a summary that highlights the key difference between
ShadowDP and LightDP in this section.
A typing context Γ in ShadowDP maps a program variable to its datatype annotated with two distance annotations—an aligned distance, and a shadow distance. Note that although the shadow distance for Laplace noise is always 0, the
shadow distance for variables and terms that depend on Laplace noise may be
non-0. Given, x : τhd◦ ,d† i ∈ Γ, we write Γ(x) for the pair of distance annotations
hd◦ , d† i when the datatype τ is clear from context.
Expression typing judgments in ShadowDP have the form Γ ` e : τhd◦ ,d† i . The
typing rules for expression judgments are almost identical to the expression typing
rules from LightDP, except now each typing rule gives two distance types for each
expression.
The program transformation phase is broken into two stages for cleaner presentation. The first stage uses command typing judgments that make the existentially
quantified distance variables explicit in the transformed code. Command typing
judgments in ShadowDP have the form ` Γ {c * c0 } Γ0 .2 The second stage uses
judgments of the form c0 ⇒ c00 , and introduces the distinguished variable v for
tracking privacy cost.
One notable difference is that ShadowDP’s judgments are flow-sensitive—each
judgment performs program transformation from c to c0 under an input typing
context Γ, and produces an output typing context Γ0 .
This extension to flow-sensitive typing is crucial for expressing the “switching”
behavior of selectors. Now that a Laplace noise command can potentially change
the distance annotations for all existing variables in Γ in a derivation, to propagate the new distance annotations to subsequent analysis, the switched distance
annotations must be passed on, and flow-sensitive typing is a natural choice.
2

We are omitting a program counter component for ShadowDP command typing judgments here
because this component does not directly relate to the current discussion. Full details can be found
in ShadowDP authors’ publication [Wang et al., 2019].
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The T-L APLACE typing rule for noise commands captures the essence of the
shadow execution construction.
T-L APLACE

Γ0 = λ x. hS(hd◦ , d† i)i where Γ ` x : τhd◦ ,d† i
Ψ → (x + d)[d 7→ v1 ] = (x + d)[d 7→ v2 ] → v1 = v2

` Γ {x = lap(0, r), S, d * x = lap(0, r), S, d} Γ0 [x 7→ realhd,0i ]
T-L APLACE has two premises. The first one constructs an output typing context using the annotated selector S. In the output typing context, each program variable’s
distance annotation can be potentially altered by evaluating S on the pair of distance annotations. The rules are defined by the following equations. In particular,
the † selector replaces the aligned distance with the shadow distance.
◦(hd◦ , d† i) = hd◦ , d† i
†(hd◦ , d† i) = hd† , d† i
(e ? S1 : S2 )(hd◦ , d† i) = e ? S1 (hd◦ , d† i) : S2 (hd◦ , d† i)
The second premise checks the injectivity property for the distance annotation d—
randomness alignment must be an injective function, and injectivity is checked
pointwise for each variable in ShadowDP.
The second program transformation stage only has one non-trivial rule for
Laplace noise commands. All other rules just structurally transform their subcommands, and assemble the results back together.
x = lap(0, r), S, d ⇒ havoc x; vε = S(hvε , 0i) + |d|/r
With these modifications to the type system, ShadowDP extends the construction
process of randomness alignment from LightDP by simultaneously maintaining
two distance annotations, and allowing the typechecking process to switch previously established alignments to a “default” choice that incurs 0-privacy cost. This
extension proves useful in Wang et al. [2019]’s evaluation of ShadowDP. While
LightDP can only establish a N -privacy proof for report noisy max (N being the
size of the input list), ShadowDP successfully constructs an -privacy proof.
Remark Although approximate coupling is an advanced concept in probability theory, the program logic apRHL is a clean framework for differential privacy
proofs. The distinction between logic-level terms and program terms in apRHL
cleanly separates runtime values and proof objects. This conceptual clarity makes
apRHL a suitable target for mechanized formalization. Barthe et al. [2013] present
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such a formalization for a subset of apRHL proof rules in Coq [Coq Development Team, 2018]. However, the separation also comes with a cost—we have to
perform syntactic transformations to make the program syntax more amenable to
apRHL derivation rules. Designing these syntactic transformations is non-trivial,
and requires expert knowledge of apRHL.
LightDP and ShadowDP are designed with automation as a high-priority goal,
and the authors [Wang et al., 2019, Zhang and Kifer, 2017] demonstrate that the
manual effort for using these type systems is small. This is achieved by introducing dependent distance types. Mixing dependent types and mutation is complicated, the authors carefully introduce syntactic restrictions to prevent mutations
that would raise soundness questions, and this intuitively resolves the problem of
mixing dependency and mutation. Nevertheless, such a type system over an imperative language remains an interesting subject of study. One potential route to
fully justify the soundness of the type system, is to translate the static and dynamic
semantics of P W HILE with distance types into a target lambda calculus equipped
with Dijkstra Monad [Swamy et al., 2013]. Such a presentation may reveal opportunities for weakening the syntactic restrictions, and further enriching randomnessalignment-based type systems.
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Chapter 8
Related Work
Languages for Differential Privacy McSherry introduced Privacy Integrated
Queries as an embedded query language extension for C# [McSherry, 2009]. PINQ
pioneered language-level support for differential privacy by analyzing function
sensitivities for SQL-like queries, and by releasing noised results for these queries
using the Laplace mechanism. Both Fuzzi and the Orchard query language take
inspiration from PINQ’s collection of privacy primitives.
DJoin [Narayan and Haeberlen, 2012] runs queries over datasets distributed
across many machines. The authors point out that the distributed nature of data
is not just a question of size, but for the reason that different databases are owned
by different organizations that do not wish to share them. Fuzzi and DPCheck
are designed to check and test centralized computations, and do not consider the
distributed setting. The Orchard compiler specifically focuses on compiling a centralized query to run on top of distributed data, using a secure execution model
that protects intermediate un-noised results. DJoin specifically focuses on answering distributed join queries, which are queries that constructs and filters tuples of
records from multiple (potentially different) distributed datasets. Orchard aims
to answer general differentially private queries on a homogeneous distributed
dataset. Both DJoin and Orchard rely on MPC for noising and decryption.
Fuzz [Reed and Pierce, 2010a], DFuzz [Gaboardi et al., 2013a], AdaptiveFuzz
[Winograd-Cort et al., 2017], and Duet [Near et al., 2019] are higher-order functional programming languages with a sensitivity-tracking type system and differentially private primitives. Fuzzi’s sensitivity type system is inspired by Fuzz, but
differs in that Fuzzi separately tracks the sensitivity of each value in the program
state, which may change as the program assigns to variables, while Fuzz tracks
function sensitivity. Fuzz is also restricted to (, 0)-differential privacy, while Fuzzi
supports (, δ)-differential privacy.
DFuzz extends Fuzz with linear indexed types and dependent types, allow172

ing programmers to abstract types over sensitivity annotations. DFuzz’s type system is more expressive than the type systems considered in this work. This additional level of expressiveness admits programs whose sensitivities and privacy
costs scale with input sensitivities. Although we do not consider indexed types in
this work, the extension mechanism of Fuzzi does allow language designers to add
typing rules quantified over constants (such as the loop count in A DV-C OMP); this
provides a lightweight alternative for programmers to write code whose privacy
costs scale with program constants.
AdaptiveFuzz extends Fuzz by using staged computation and stream semantics to implement a powerful composition mechanism ([Rogers et al., 2016]) called
Privacy Filters. Privacy Filters give programmers the freedom to choose future
computations based on results released from earlier differentially private computations. For example, a program may stop a private gradient descent loop as soon
as accuracy reaches a desired threshold, thus saving some privacy budget by stopping early, rather than fixing the number of iterations ahead of time. Our work
does not provide much support for sophisticated compositions of privacy costs,
other than the A DV-C OMP extension found in Fuzzi, but support for composition
mechanisms can be added in principle using a formalized version of the composition mechanism in apRHL.
LightDP [Zhang and Kifer, 2017] is an imperative language that uses dependent
types to prove differential privacy. LightDP’s type system tracks exact symbolic
distance between related values, while Fuzzi’s type system tracks statically known
constant upper bounds on distance between related values. As we discussed in
Chapter 7, the differential privacy proof technique—randomness alignment—of
LightDP is closely related to approximate couplings, which form the foundation
for the Fuzzi type system and DPCheck’s testing framework.
Machine-Assisted Verification and Testing of Differential Privacy ShadowDP [Wang et al., 2019] is an improvement of LightDP that uses a technique
called “shadow execution” to semi-automatically prove differential privacy. The
program logic apRHL has been formalized in Coq through the EasyCrypt [EasyCrypt Development Team, 2018] verification framework for probabilistic computations. Albarghouthi and Hsu [2017] demonstrate a proof synthesis tool that uses
an extension of approximate couplings called “variable approximate couplings” to
automatically synthesize differential privacy proofs. Barthe et al. [2019a] present a
system that automatically proves or disproves differential privacy for a restricted
variant of P W HILE.
These systems are designed to mechanically verify privacy of small programs
with complex proofs. LightDP, ShadowDP, and the proof synthesis framework of
Albarghouthi and Hsu [2017] all rely on an SMT solver, and these developments
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take care to only emit queries restricted to decidable theories. Furthermore, these
systems often carry the burden of proving termination of the program under analysis. Probabilistically terminating programs (such as PrivTree) pose challenge to
these systems. DPCheck avoids having to prove termination by considering the
privacy properties of concrete runs of a program. The concretely sampled values
reduce complexity in the SMT models built by DPCheck.
Barthe et al. [2019a]’s work is unique in that the authors explicitly identify a
fragment of programs where the problem of verifying differential privacy is decidable. The authors give a novel operational semantics to P W HILE based on markov
chains, and prove that state transition probabilities under this operational semantics are in a decidable theory. This decidability allow the authors to build an automated tool that prove, or refute differential privacy. In their object language, noised
samples cannot appear directly in outputs, and can only influence output values by
appearing in branch conditions. This restriction allows the authors to create a complete decision procedure that proves or disproves differential privacy. DPCheck
does not place restrictions on where sampled values may appear, and the testing
strategy is not complete.
Since DPCheck does not prove differential privacy, our testing result by itself
may not be sufficient for critical applications. When absolute guarantee of differential privacy is required, a manual verification is still necessary.
StatDP [Ding et al., 2018a] is a framework for statistical testing of differential privacy. DP-Finder [Bichsel et al., 2018] is a framework that detects violations
of differential privacy through code transformation and a special sampling technique, and objective optimization.
DPCheck has very similar goals compared to StatDP and DP-Finder, but they
are different in their approaches towards this goal. StatDP repeatedly runs the program under test, constructs two histograms that approximate the output distributions on similar inputs, and compares these histograms using statistical tests to
detect violations of differential privacy. DP-Finder applies a special sampling technique to construct a formula that approximates the privacy loss random variable,
and infers a lower bound of  through objective optimization on this approximation formula.
DPCheck also repeatedly runs a program under test, using a profiling interpreter that collects execution traces. Both StatDP and DP-Finder place restrictions
on the shape of outputs from programs under test because both frameworks apply
heuristics to detect output events that likely indicate violations of differential privacy. DPCheck adapts the pointwise proof technique for testing, so that we only
need equality tests on program outputs.
Distributed Differential Privacy Queries Google’s RAPPOR [Erlingsson
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et al., 2014a] uses local differential privacy to aggregate data from browsers running on user machines. Similar systems have been deployed by Apple [Apple,
2017] and Microsoft [Ding et al., 2017]. Using local differential privacy does not
require users to trust the data aggregator, but severely reduces the signal-to-noise
ratio in aggregated data.
Shi et al. [2011] also apply a distributed key generation scheme to remove necessity of trust. However, this scheme does not work well when participants of the
protocol frequently drop in and out. Some systems have scaled MPC to larger sizes
than seen in Orchard—Sepia [Burkhart et al., 2010] handles hundreds of users, and
Reyzin et al. perform secure aggregation for thousands of users, by using homomorphic threshold encryption. But supporting MPC at the scale of all users as considered in Orchard’s setting seems unrealistic. Orchard circumvents the bottleneck
of scaling MPC by only delegating small computations to the small MPC committee.
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Chapter 9
Future Work
We first discuss a few concrete next steps for extending the work presented in this
dissertation. We then discuss the broader directions for applying this work, and
theoretical advancements that may follow from or generalize the results of this
dissertation.

9.1

Concrete Steps

Fuzzi (1) We can enrich the set of extensions to further increase Fuzzi’s utility.
For example, extending the sensitivity type system and adding report noisy max
and sparse vector to Fuzzi would allow programmers to perform more interesting
analysis on numeric vectors while paying a small privacy cost. (2) We can formalize
more sophisticated composition mechanisms, such as Privacy Filters, to improve
privacy cost aggregations in Fuzzi. (3) We can formalize Fuzzi’s type system in
Coq [Coq Development Team, 2018]. (4) We can also implement DPCheck-style
testing for Fuzzi programs, so that language designers can use testing to detect
bugs in new extension typing rules before proofs are attempted.
DPCheck (1) The testing framework does not scale well to large inputs because the testing step builds an SMT model whose size often scales with the size
of test inputs. In practice, this prevents us from using DPCheck on large inputs
that real-world systems process. To remove this scaling bottleneck, we can develop domain-specific solver heuristics for the kinds of models DPCheck generates. (2) We can develop specification based-testing for differential privacy, using
programmer annotations to select shift values instead of asking Z3 to find solutions. (3) DPCheck relies on manually written input generators for testing. We can
investigate how to automatically derive such input generators. Furthermore, we
can design additional analysis over the program under test, so that the automat176

ically derived generators produce inputs that expose potential privacy violations
quickly.
Orchard (1) The current query language for Orchard is fairly restricted. The
inner terms that run on user-devices can be enriched with more primitive types
and language features to make writing Orchard programs easier. (2) The aggressive
inlining that the Orchard compiler performs leads to code bloat in the output. The
code size can be improved by implementing hash-consing during compilation to
recover some sharing. (3) The improved optimization strategy we discussed in
Section 5.7 can be implemented to ensure the generated code only use as many
bmcs() invocations as necessary.

9.2

Broader Directions

Probabilistic Separation Logic for Aliasing While Fuzzi is an imperative language with arrays, it lacks some fundamental features for efficiently working with
arrays. Critically, Fuzzi does not allow aliasing. An assignment command makes
a copy of the assigning value, and associates the assigned variable with that copy.
This copying semantics leads to inefficiency when the program manipulates large
array values. Most realistic imperative languages allow pointers into arrays, and
allows multiple pointers to alias the same underlying array. A standard formal reasoning tool that can account for pointers is the separation logic [Reynolds, 2002].
Extending apRHL into a separation logic that can reason about pointers and aliasing will pave the theoretical foundation for relational reasoning about probabilistic
imperative programs with pointers.
Testing Other Variants of Differential Privacy This dissertation has focused
on developing tools towards -DP and (, δ)-DP. Among both theorists and practitioners, variants of differential privacy such as zero-concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) [Bun and Steinke, 2016, Dwork and Rothblum, 2016], and Renyidifferential privacy (Renyi-DP) [Mironov, 2017] are gaining momentum, because
the composition theorems under these variants lead to asymptotically improved
privacy parameters compared to pure and approximate differential privacy. These
advanced variants of differential privacy have similar building blocks such as sensitivity (under a different metric), and fundamental noise mechanism (through a
different probability distribution). The Duet functional programming language by
Near et al. [2019] has a type system that tracks zCDP and Renyi-DP. A Fuzzi-style
type system for tracking zCDP and Renyi-DP can be developed, by substituting
the sensitivity analysis and noise mechanism in Fuzzi with those for zCDP and
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Renyi-DP.
Naturally, we may ask if we can test these variants of differential privacy by
generalizing DPCheck? Generalizing DPCheck for these variants requires two theoretical advancements: (1) couplings on the fundamental noise mechanisms used
by zCDP and Renyi-DP, and (2) a “pointwise equality”-like proof technique for
zCDP and Renyi-DP. The first requirement has a solution presented by Sato et al.
[2019]. Sato et al. develop a program logic similar to apRHL, but designed for
proving zCDP and Renyi-DP. This program logic uses an abstraction called “approximate span-liftings” for relating fundamental noise distributions in zCDP and
Renyi-DP. We can potentially substitute approximate couplings with span liftings
for testing.
However, the second requirement does not have a clear answer yet. A possible
direction is to take the “approximate span-lifting” construction from Sato et al., and
build an analogous pointwise proof theorem based on approximate span-liftings.
Continuous Distributions The pointwise proof technique only applies to discrete distributions—distributions whose support is a countable set. In general, differential privacy (and variants of DP) involve continuous distributions, whose supports are not countable. It is unclear whether we can justify DPCheck’s testing
strategy on continuous distributions. Developing a sound testing strategy of differential privacy in the continuous case may lead to generalization of the pointwise
proof technique.
Improving Sampling Methods DPCheck samples concrete execution traces,
and build SMT models based on these traces in the hope that we can quickly discover ill-behaved traces, and thus detect violations of differential privacy. In the
current work, DPCheck naively samples from the distributions that arise from the
operational semantics of the object language. Some ill-behaved traces may rarely
occur, and DPCheck has to wait for many samples before an ill-behaved trace appears. We can improve the sampling method by using code coverage information
as runtime feedback to the profiling interpreter, and ask the interpreter to use samples that steers evaluation towards unexplored paths.
Abstraction for Testing DPCheck is most effective when deployed on implementations of small but intricate algorithms. On larger programs, the scaling bottleneck significantly slows down testing. Past research [Calcagno et al., 2011] on
automated program analysis suggests that the key to automated analysis at scale
is abstraction. In the case of DPCheck, abstraction calls for sealed evidence of the
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differential privacy property for subroutines. The extension typing rules we developed for Fuzzi are a kind of abstraction that hides the details of an apRHL proof
from the rest of Fuzzi’s type system. To scale testing, we need similar kinds of abstractions. Most importantly, such sealed evidence must clearly communicate the
differential privacy property for a subroutine to the rest of the program, and must
be compatible with the SMT models we build for approximate couplings. Developing representations and theory around such kinds of abstractions may help scale
DPCheck’s testing strategy to much larger programs.
Pedagogical Tools While researchers may find differential privacy a straightforward tool for privacy-preserving data analysis, students may find differential
privacy difficult to understand at first exposure. Expertise of differential privacy
can be developed by experimenting with implementations of differentially private
algorithms, and attempting differential privacy proofs for these algorithms. For
this pedagogical purpose, software that provides fully automated differential privacy testing would be a great machine assistant to the student. We believe the core
ideas of DPCheck can be used to build such a pedagogical tool. Additionally, an automatic apRHL proof checker bundled with proof automation in the style of Fuzzi
can help the student practice developing non-trivial differential privacy proofs.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 54
Proof. We first highlight a useful inequality used throughout this proof: for any r ∈
[0, 1], and any n ≥ 1
(1 − r)n ≤ e−rn
We want to analyze and bound the probability of the testing process failing to
reject f . More concretely, we want to establish an upper bound on the probability of
f being accepted by the testing process for its claim of (, 0)-DP over d independently
drawn inputs under I.
This proof first gives an upper bound on the probability of accepting f on any
input drawn from I, and then gives an upper bound on the probability of accepting
f over d independently drawn inputs from I using the upper bound from the first
part.
Under the input distribution I, we sometimes draw “good” inputs on which f
exhibits privacy loss bounded by  with high probability. Since we are interested in
an upper bound on the probability of acceptance, we can bound the probability of
acceptance on good inputs with just probability 1. Note that, by definition of illbehaved, good inputs are drawn with probability 1 − α under I.
When we draw a pair of (, δ)-bad input (x1 , x2 ) from I, by definition of illbehaved, a sampled execution has a less than 1 − δ chance of having a dual execution
with privacy loss less than . So, the probability that all m sampled execution traces
having dual executions that exhibit privacy loss bounded by  is at most (1 − δ)m ≤
e−δm .
We can consider the number of valid solutions for the symbolic models built by
DPCheck (Equation (4.7)) as a random variable X that depends on the m sampled
traces. Markov’s inequality applies for this random variable X.
P(X ≥ a) ≤
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E(X)
a

The program f is accepted if there is at least 1 valid solution. So, we want to give
an upper bound on the probability of P(X ≥ 1). Taking a = 1, we know P(X ≥
1) ≤ E(X) from Markov’s inequality. The right hand side of this inequality is the
expected number of valid solutions given the m sampled traces, and we can give an
upper bound on this expectation.
First, we bound the total number of different configurations for shift values. Recall
that we assume all numeric values belong to a discretized subset of the real numbers
with constant gap ω. By assumption, we know each shift value is in the range of
[C1 , C2 ]. We use this range and the gap ω to count the total number of shift sequences.
1
So, there are C2 −C
different values for each shifti in each output bucket. There
ω
are at most k shift values for each output bucket, and there are at most n output
buckets, so, the total number of different configurations to symbolic shift values are


C2 − C1
ω

nk

Because the probability that m sampled traces all have valid dual executions is
at most e−δm , and each of these different configurations encodes one potentially valid
dual executions for the sampled traces, each different configuration has probability
at most e−δm for being valid. So, the upperbound on the expectation is
e

−δm



C2 − C1
ω

nk

If we want this term to be at most e−θ for some θ, then we can establish a lower
bound on m:

nk
C2 − C1
−δm
e
≤ e−θ
ω
C2 − C1
≤ −θ
(−δm) + nk ln
ω 

1
C2 − C1
θ + nk ln
≤m
δ
ω
Now, we combine the analysis for both the good inputs and bad inputs. For any pair
of inputs (regardless of whether the pair is good or bad) drawn from I, the probability
of accepting f when f runs on this pair of similar inputs is then bounded by:
(1 − α) · 1 + αe−θ = 1 − α(1 − e−θ )
The probability of drawing d independent pairs of inputs from I and accepting f
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on all of them is then bounded by:
d
−θ
1 − α(1 − e−θ ) ≤ e−α(1−e )d
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Appendix B
All Fuzzi expression typing rules
W EAKEN

` e :s 0 Γ ⇒ τ

S TRENGTHEN

` e :s Γ0 ⇒ τ

s0 ≤ s

` e :s Γ ⇒ τ

Γ ≤ Γ0

` e :s Γ ⇒ τ

VAR

x :s τ ∈ Γ
` x :s Γ ⇒ τ

P LUS

k literal

τ = int ∨ τ = real
` e 1 :s 1 Γ ⇒ τ ` e 2 :s 2 Γ ⇒ τ
s = s1 +s s2

` k :k Γ ⇒ real

` e1 + e2 :s ⇒ τ

C ONSTANT

M ULT

D IV

τ = int ∨ τ = real
` e1 :s1 Γ ⇒ τ ` e2 :s2 Γ ⇒ τ
s = s1 ∗ s s2

τ = int ∨ τ = real
` e1 :s1 Γ ⇒ τ ` e2 :s2 Γ ⇒ τ
s = s1 /s s2

` e1 ∗ e2 :s ⇒ τ

` e1 /e2 :s Γ ⇒ τ

V ECTOR -I NDEX

V ECTOR -U PDATE

` e :s Γ ⇒ [τ ] ` i :0 Γ ⇒ int
s<∞

` t :s1 Γ ⇒ [τ ] ` i :0 Γ ⇒ int ` e :s2 Γ ⇒ τ
s1 < ∞ s = s1 + s2

` e[i] :s Γ ⇒ τ

` update(t, i, e) :s Γ ⇒ [τ ]
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C OND -E XPR -0

` cond :0 Γ ⇒ bool
` e 1 :s 1 Γ ⇒ τ
` e 2 :s 2 Γ ⇒ τ
s = max(s1 , s2 )

V ECTOR -R ESIZE

` t :s Γ ⇒ [τ ]

` size :0 Γ ⇒ int

` resize(t, size) :s Γ ⇒ [τ ]

` cond ? e1 :e2 :s Γ ⇒ τ

C OND -E XPR -∞

` cond :∞ Γ ⇒ bool
` e 1 :s 1 Γ ⇒ τ
` e 2 :s 2 Γ ⇒ τ
` cond ? e1 :e2 :∞ Γ ⇒ τ
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Appendix C
Fuzzi Extension Typing Rule Proofs
Bag-Map is sound
Proof. First, we apply apRHL Equiv rule to rewrite the two loops into loop; skip ∼
skip; loop.
Note that by the restriction on types formed with bags, we know the type σ of
expression e must be compositions of only vectors and scalar types. Most critically,
this means if dσ (v1 , v2 ) = 0, then v1 = v2 .
First, we note that the modified variables (i, out, and tin ) in the loop are not in
Γ. So, if (m1 , m2 ) ∈ [[Γ]] are related program states before running the bag map loop,
then both m1 and m2 remain constant during the loop.
Let us write f (m, v) for [[e]]ρ (m ∪ tin 7→ v) (interpreting e over m extended with
an association between tin and v). By the property of distance on values with type σ,
soundness of expression typing rules and the dependency analysis typing judgment,
we know for any v, the equation f (m1 , v) = f (m2 , v) holds. So, extensionally, f (m1 , ·)
and f (m2 , ·) are the same function—let us just represent both equivalent functions
with a single function g.
Next, we apply While-L together with the one-sided loop invariant
outh1i[0..ih1i] = map g inh1i[0..h1i]
We can conclude that outh1i = map g inh1i—the output list of values computed by
the bag map loop just can be modeled by mapping a deterministic function g over
the input list of values.
We use While-R to similarly conclude that outh2i = map g inh2i. In both cases,
the losslessness requirement is fulfilled by the fact that e is a terminating expression,
and the index i is always within bounds.
Now, we prove the following property on map and bags.
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Lemma 55. Let b1 , b2 be two lists that are interpreted as bags. For any function g,
the bag distance between map g b1 and map g b2 is at most the bag distance between b1
and b2 .
Let d be the bag distance between b1 and b2 . Proceed by induction on d. In the
base case where d = 0, we can immediately conclude because the output bag distances
are also 0.
Now, assume b1 and b2 have bag distance d + 1. Without loss of generality, assume
b2 contains an extra element v that is missing from b1 (in the multiset sense). Then,
it must be the case that g applied to this element is also missing from map g b1 .
From induction hypothesis, we know that map g (b2 \v) and map g b1 have bag distance
bounded by d, adding g v back to the map output on b2 can increase the distance by
at most 1. This concludes the proof of this property.
Using Lemma 55 in an implication step with apRHL Conseq rule allows us to
conclude that the type information is correct.
Vector-Map is sound
Proof. Because the two vectors have the same length, we can directly apply apRHL
While rule with a relational invariant (the function g is constructed with the same
analysis as seen for Bag-Map):
outh1i[0..ih1i] = map g inh1i[0..ih1i]
∧ outh2i[0..ih2i] = map g inh2i[0..ih2i]
∧ ih1i = ih2i
∧ (¬(ih1i < length(inh1i)) → ih1i = length(in)h1i)
So, at the end, we know outh1i = map g inh1i, outh2i = map g inh2i, and the two
output lists that represent vectors have identical length.
By Lemma 44 and assumption of this typing rule, we know if dτ (v1 , v2 ) ≤ s, then
dσ (g(v1 ), g(v2 )) ≤ ks. The vector distance between the output lists are
dσ (g(inh1i[0]), g(inh2i[0])) + · · · + dσ (g(inh1i[n − 1]), g(inh2i[n − 1]))
≤ kdτ (inh1i[0], inh2i[0]) + · · · + kdτ (inh1i[n − 1], inh2i[n − 1])
= kd[τ ] (inh1i, inh2i)
This concludes our sensitivity argument for Vector-Map.
Partition is sound
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Proof. This proof follows the same steps as seen in the proof for Bag-Map. We first
rewrite the related programs so that each one-sided loop relates to a skip command.
Let gidx (v) be the function that computes the index of each bag value, similar to the
function g in Bag-Map. Let f (v) = (gidx (v), v). Then, we can model the outputs
of Partition using a function filter which excludes bag entries whose computed
index is out of range, and a function group(nparts , xs) which places value v of each
(i, v) from xs into the ith output list, with nparts output lists in total. Let g(i, v) =
0 ≤ i ∧ i < nparts .
We can use one-sided while rules to show
outh1i = group(nparts , filter g (map f inh1i))
and
outh2i = group(nparts , filter g (map f inh2i)).
Similar to Lemma 55, we can show that outputs of filter g has bag distance
bounded by the input bag distance.
Next, we prove the following fact about group: given two lists of index-and-value
tuples b1 , b2 with bag distance d, the outputs lists from group(k, b1 ) and group(k, b2 )
as vectors of bags have distance bounded by d.
By induction on d. If d = 0, then b1 , b2 contain the same set of elements (in
potentially different order), but the vector of bags produced from both groups will
also contain the same set of elements in each sub-bag. Since bag distance does not
care about ordering, we can conclude the two vectors of bags have distance 0 as well.
Now, assume b1 and b2 have distance d + 1. Without loss of generality, assume
b2 contains a pair (i, v) that is not in b1 . Now, consider the values group(k, b1 ) and
group(k, (b2 \(i, v)). By induction hypothesis, the vector-of-bag distance between them
is bounded by d. Now, placing v into the ith sub-bag in the output vector for b2 \(i, v)
can increase the vector-of-bag distance by at most 1.
Now, because filter g (map f inh1i) and filter g (map f inh2i) have bag distance
bounded by that between inh1i and inh2i, using the property of group above in an
implication step with apRHL Conseq concludes the proof for Partition.
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Appendix D
Fuzzi Implementation of Differentially
Private Gradient Descent
We show the full implementation of differentially private gradient descent for logistic regression from Zhang et al. [2019]. This code shown here is largely comprised of three parts: 1. a bmap application that preprocesses the input data, 2. a
second bmap application that computes the private gradients, 3. and a final step
that releases noised gradients and updates model parameter. The code also uses a
special extension called repeat. This extension takes a loop index variable, a constant literal integer and a Fuzzi command as parameters, and expands to a while
loop that executes the command for the specified number of times. The typing rule
for this extension simply unrolls the loop for the specified number of times, but
perform no special deduction on the sensitivities and privacy cost for the entire
loop. We had elided this extension from the main body of the paper because it
only provides a better programming experience (one could simply copy the loop
body for the specified number of times to reach same result), but does not provide
additional insight to Fuzzi’s design.
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lamb = 0.1;
rate = 0.1;
epoch = 0;
size $ = lap (10.0 , fc ( length ( db ) ) ) ;
/* used advanced composition for 100 total passes */
ac ( epoch , 100 , 1.0 e -6 ,
/* extend each row to account for bias */
bmap ( db , db1 , trow , i , trow1 ,
trow1 = zero_786 ;
trow1 [0] = 1.0;
repeat (j , 785 , trow1 [ j +1] = trow [ j ];) ;
j = 0;
);
/* compute the gradient for each row */
i = 0;
trow1 = zero_786 ;
bmap ( db1 , dws , trow1 , i , twout ,
twout = zero_785 ;
repeat (j , 785 , twout [ j ] = trow1 [ j ];) ;
j = 0;
dt = clip ( dot ( twout , w ) , 100.0) ;
temp = exp ( -1.0 * trow1 [785] * dt ) ;
prob = 1.0 / (1.0 + temp ) ;
sc = (1.0 - prob ) * trow1 [785];
twout = scale ( sc , twout ) ;
dt = 0.0;
temp = 0.0;
prob = 0.0;
sc = 0.0;
);
/* compute noised gradient and update model parameter */
repeat (j , 785 ,
i = 0; twout = zero_785 ; tf_out = 0.0;
bmap ( dws , dws_j , twout , i , tf_out , tf_out = twout [ j ];) ;
i = 0; tf_out = 0.0;
bsum ( dws_j , j_sum , i , tf_out , 1.0) ;
j_sum $ = lap (5000.0 , j_sum ) ;
w [ j ] = w [ j ] + ( j_sum / size - 2.0 * lamb * w [ j ]) * rate ;
);
/* clear aux variables */
db1 = {}; dt = 0.0;
dws = {}; dws_j = {};
i = 0; j = 0;
prob = 0.0; sc = 0.0; temp = 0.0; tf_out = 0.0;
trow = zero_785 ; trow1 = zero_786 ; twout = zero_785 ;
);
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